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world	 around	us,	 temporarily	 escaping	our	 real	 lives	by	diving	 into	 a	 fictional	world.	 The	
stories	we	read	can	provide	us	with	quite	different	reading	experiences.	There	are	stories	
which	 make	 us	 think,	 there	 are	 stories	 which	 make	 us	 experience	 strong	 emotions	 and	
there	 are	 other	 stories	which	 create	 colourful	 pictures	 in	 our	minds	 and	 take	 us	 on	wild	









with	 neuroimaging	 and	 self-report	measures	 of	 subjective	 experience.	 A	 special	 focus	 is	
perspective	taking	 in	simulation.	My	goal	was	to	qualify	 the	role	of	perspective	 in	mental	




The	remainder	of	this	 introduction	 is	dedicated	to	critically	 introducing	the	concept	of	
simulation	and	its	role	in	cognition.	In	addition,	I	will	discuss	new	directions	for	simulation	
in	situated	and	contextual	 language	use,	argue	that	simulation	plays	a	more	 fundamental	




behaviour	 or	 characteristics	 of	 one	 system	 through	 the	 use	 of	 another	 system	 (from	
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/simulation).	 In	 psychology,	 the	 term	 is	 used	 to	 describe	 a	
theory	which	 assumes	 that	 the	 human	mind	 imitates	 behaviour	 of	 others	without	 overt	
execution	of	that	behaviour	for	the	purpose	of	understanding	and	predicting	the	world,	and	
in	order	to	facilitate	appropriate	output	(Binder	&	Desai,	2011;	Goldman,	2006;	Moulton	&	
Kosslyn,	 2009).	 This	 means	 that	 our	 brain	 functions	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 proxy	 by	 simulating	
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situations	 and	 events	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 and	 represent	 meaning	 through	 creating	
internal	 models	 of	 the	 world.	 The	 most	 basic	 assumption	 of	 simulation	 is	 that	 mental	
models	 involve	 re-enacting	 brain	 states	 which	 were	 involved	 in	 its	 encoding,	 and	 are	
therefore	 based	 on	 prior	 subjective	 experience	with	 the	world	 (e.g.	 Barsalou,	 2015).	 For	
example,	when	observing	someone	performing	an	action,	we	create	a	mental	model	of	the	
event	by	partially	 re-enacting	brain	 states	 from	the	moment	of	 learning	or	executing	 this	
action.	 The	 term	 simulation	 theory	 is	 often	 used	 to	 contrast	 ‘theory-theory’.	 While	
simulation	 theory	 proposes	 that	 we	 understand	 others	 by	 unconsciously	 reconstructing	
how	 it	 would	 be	 to	 be	 the	 other	 person	 based	 on	 prior	 experience	 of	 being	 in	 similar	
situations	 ourselves,	 theory-theory	 proposes	 that	 we	 understand	 states	 of	 minds	 from	
others	by	statistical	inference	based	on	prior	experience	with	other	agents.		
It	has	been	suggested	that	the	dissociation	between	simulation	and	real	experience	 is	
along	 the	 lines	 of	 bottom	 up	 and	 top	 down	 processing:	 in	 contrast	 to	 real	 experiences,	
simulations	do	not	have	bottom	up	 input	 from	sensory	channels	 (Barsalou,	2015).	 In	 line	
with	 this,	 simulation	 is	 often	 understood	 as	 a	 subconscious	 or	 reduced	 form	 of	 mental	
imagery,	 which	 differs	 from	 the	 latter	 in	 terms	 of	 detail,	 specificity,	 consciousness,	
automaticity,	 and	 long	 term	 memory	 involvement	 (Barsalou,	 2008;	 Hétu	 et	 al.,	 2013;	
Iachini,	 2011).	 Indeed,	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 brain	 activations	 in	 regions	 involved	 in	




binds	 information	 from	 different	 levels	 of	 cognition	 like	 perception,	 imagery	 and	 social	
cognition	 based	 on	 (partial)	 re-activations	 of	 perceptual,	 motor	 and	 introspective	 states	
(Barsalou,	 2008,	 2009,	 Jeannerod,	 2001,	 2006).	 As	 such,	 simulation	 is	 framed	 as	 a	much	
more	 basic	 computational	mechanism	which	 unifies	 information	 across	 various	 forms	 of	
cognition.	 In	 this	 sense,	 simulation	 functions	 as	 a	 form	 of	 working	 memory	 mechanism	
which	 integrates	 information	 from	 different	 modalities	 and	 levels	 of	 cognition	 into	 a	
coherent	model	of	the	current	situation.	For	instance,	when	a	person	is	throwing	a	ball	to	
someone	 else,	 simulation	 helps	 unify	 input	 from	 perception	 with	 predictions	 about	 the	
current	 situation	 in	 order	 to	 generate	 an	 integrated	 representation	 of	 the	 event	 and	





function	 of	 simulation	 has	 further	 been	 linked	 to	 episodic	 memory	 (e.	 g.	 Rosenbaum,	
McKinnon,	Levine,	&	Moscovitch,	2004;	for	review	see	Wagner,	Shannon,	Kahn,	&	Buckner,	
2005),	 and	 situation	 models	 (Zwaan	 &	 Taylor,	 2006;	 Zwaan	 &	 van	 Oostendorp,	 1993).	
Because	 simulation	 shares	 network	 and	 functional	 properties	 with	 experiencing,	 some	








object	 (e.g.	 scissors)	 it	 is	 thought	 that	 visual	 cortices	 represent	 its	 shape	 and	 colour,	
whereas	 motor	 and	 premotor	 cortices	 represent	 actions	 associated	 with	 that	 object	
(affordances,	 e.g.	 grasping,	 cutting).	 Sensorimotor	 or	 action	 simulation	 is	 the	 most	
investigated	 form	 of	 simulation	 during	 language	 comprehension	 (Aziz-Zadeh,	 Wilson,	
Rizzolatti,	&	Iacoboni,	2006;	Hauk	et	al.,	2004;	see	Kiefer	&	Pulvermüller,	2012	for	a	review;	
Tettamanti	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Willems,	 Toni,	 Hagoort,	 &	 Casasanto,	 2010b)	 and	 has	 inspired	
theories	 of	 embodiment	 in	 language	 (Glenberg	 &	 Gallese,	 2012).	 Similar	 evidence	 for	
different	kinds	of	simulation	has	been	found,	for	instance	for	emotion	words	(Etkin,	Egner,	
&	Kalisch,	2011;	Olson,	Plotzker,	&	Ezzyat,	2007;	Ross	&	Olson,	2010;	Zahn	et	al.,	2007),	and	
colour	words	 (Simmons	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 Another	 type	 of	 simulation	 is	mentalizing,	which	 is	
understood	 as	 the	 social	 cognition	 equivalent	 of	 sensorimotor	 simulation.	 Mentalizing	
refers	to	the	understanding,	representing,	and	processing	of	mental	states	of	other	agents	
by	 using	 one’s	 own	 mind	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 simulating	 the	 states	 of	 mind	 of	 other	 agents	
(Decety	 &	 Chaminade,	 2003;	 Frith	 &	 Frith,	 2006).	 Indeed,	 at	 a	 conceptual	 level,	
sensorimotor	 simulation	 and	 mentalizing	 can	 be	 considered	 two	 aspects	 of	 mental	






activations	 are	 not	 always	 present	 (Bedny,	 Caramazza,	Grossman,	 Pascual-Leone,	&	 Saxe,	
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2008;	 de	 Zubicaray,	 Postle,	 McMahon,	 Meredith,	 &	 Ashton,	 2010;	 Postle,	 McMahon,	
Ashton,	Meredith,	 &	 de	 Zubicaray,	 2008;	 Raposo,	Moss,	 Stamatakis,	 &	 Tyler,	 2009;	Marc	
Sato,	Mengarelli,	Riggio,	Gallese,	&	Buccino,	2008),	and	there	is	only	limited	evidence	for	a	
strong	 causal	 contribution	 of	 simulation	 in	 language	 processing	 (Binder	 &	 Desai,	 2011;	
Willems	&	Casasanto,	2011).	Typically,	 it	 is	 found	 that	comprehension	 is	possible	without	
simulation	 (Bak,	 O’Donovan,	 Xuereb,	 Boniface,	 &	 Hodges,	 2001),	 but	 processing	 times	
might	 be	 increased	 (Papeo,	 Corradi-dellʼacqua,	 &	 Rumiati,	 2011).	 This	 has	 sparked	 some	
controversy	regarding	the	functional	role	of	simulation	in	language	(Caramazza,	Anzellotti,	
Strnad,	&	Lingnau,	2014;	Mahon	&	Caramazza,	2008).	However,	the	controversy	about	the	
role	 of	 simulation	 is	 entirely	 based	 on	 findings	 from	 studies	 investigating	 processing	 of	
single	words	(action	verbs)	or	decontextualized	sentences	(e.	g.	Maieron,	Marin,	Fabbro,	&	
Skrap,	 2013).	 While	 simulation	 seems	 not	 essential	 for	 comprehension	 of	 words	 or	
sentences	 as	 argued	by	many	accounts	based	on	non-contextual	 language	 (Caramazza	et	
al.,	 2014;	 Mahon,	 2014),	 we	 cannot	 exclude	 that	 the	 possibility	 that	 simulation	 plays	 a	
fundamental	 role	 in	 language	 comprehension	 beyond	 the	 level	 of	 single,	 isolated	 units.	
Moreover,	 some	accounts	 (Taylor	&	Zwaan,	2009)	argue	that	despite	not	being	necessary	
for	 successful	 comprehension,	 simulation	 is	 a	 helpful	 supplementary	 mechanism	
supporting	 comprehension	 and	 construction	 of	 mental	 models	 with	 a	 high	 degree	 of	
specificity	 (see	 also	 Barsalou,	 in	 press,	 Barsalou	 2015).	 Recently	 research	 has	 shifted	 to	
investigating	more	 systematically	 how	and	when	 simulation	 takes	 place	 and	 to	 define	 its	
function	 for	 cognition	 (Chatterjee,	 2011;	 Willems	 &	 Francken,	 2012).	 Some	 theoretical	
approaches	 tried	 to	 implement	 a	 more	 integrated	 view	 of	 simulation	 as	 a	 multimodal,	
flexible,	 and	 context	 dependent	 process	 (Barsalou,	 in	 press;	 2016).	 Yet,	 the	 function	 of	




situated,	 more	 natural	 language	 use	 by	 facilitating	 the	 construction	 of	 situation	 models	
(Bower	 &	 Morrow	 1990;	 Jacobs	 2015;	 Schrott	 &	 Jacobs	 2011;	 Zwaan	 2004;	 Zwaan	 &	
Radvansky	 1998;	 see	 Zwaan	 2014	 for	 a	 review).	 Experimental	 evidence	 shows	 that	









et	 al.,	 2011).	 This	 shows	 that	 simulations	 are	 tailored	 to	 situations	 and	 current	 task	
requirements,	 and	 the	 resulting	 mental	 models	 are	 constructed	 dynamically	 as	 needed	
(Barsalou,	2015).		
Situation	 models	 are	 globally	 coherent	 representations	 of	 specific	 situations,	 which	
integrate	simulations	from	multiple	modalities.	According	to	Zwaan	et	al.	(1995)	the	events	
in	 a	 situation	 model	 are	 connected	 along	 five	 dimensions:	 space,	 time,	 agent	 identity,	
causality,	 and	 intentionality	 	 (Johnson-Laird,	 1983;	 Zwaan	 &	 Radvansky,	 1998).	 These	
models	 have	 a	 robust	memory	 representation	 compared	 to	 the	 language	 input	 in	which	
they	were	encoded,	 suggesting	 that	 they	 function	as	a	memory	mechanism	 for	encoding	
information	 as	 coherent	 representations	 (Johnson-Laird,	 1983;	 Kintsch,	 2005;	 Kintsch	 &	
Dijk,	1978).	Zwaan	(2008)	argues	that	situation	models	receive	information	from	modality	
specific	 simulations	 in	 order	 to	 represent	 information	 about	 events	 and	 situations,	 and	
facilitate	 integration	 of	 knowledge	 into	 a	 coherent,	 existing	 framework.	 According	 to	
Zwaan’s	view	(Zwaan,	2008),	simulation	only	takes	place	in	modality	specific	cortical	areas	
for	concept	retrieval,	whereas	 it	 is	only	 indirectly	 involved	 in	the	event	representation	on	
the	level	of	the	situation	model.	Other	accounts	(e.	g.	Barsalou,	2015;	Casasanto	&	Lupyan,	
2015)	 argue	 that	 simulation	 is	 a	multimodal,	 context	 dependent,	 ad	 hoc	 construction	 of	
representation,	 therefore	 a	 unified	 representation	 with	 information	 from	 multiple	
modalities.		
Simulation	 on	 the	 level	 of	 situation	 models	 can	 only	 be	 investigated	 in	 context.	 For	
language	 research,	 narratives	 provide	 a	 great	 opportunity	 to	 investigate	 simulation	 in	
situation	models	while	being	confined	enough	to	maintain	experimental	control,	which	 is	
difficult	in	many	natural	contexts.	Similarly	to	situation	models,	information	in	narratives	is	
organized	 coherently	 along	 the	 5	 dimension	 of	 space,	 time,	 agent	 identity	 (here:	
protagonist),	causality,	and	intentionality.	(Fiction)	stories	especially	are	highly	appropriate	
to	test	simulation	in	language	comprehension	(Willems	&	Jacobs,	2016),	because	becoming	
immersed	 in	 a	 story	 is	 thought	 to	 facilitate	mental	 simulation	 (Jacobs,	 2015a;	 Schrott	 &	
Jacobs,	 2011;	 Sestir	 &	 Green,	 2010;	 Zwaan,	 2004).	 Indeed,	 Kurby	 and	 Zacks	 (2013)	
demonstrated	in	two	studies	that	modality	specific	sensorimotor	simulation	is	more	robust	
in	 connected	 discourse	 as	 compared	 to	 single	 sentences	 (see	 also	 Madden-Lombardi,	
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Jouen,	 Dominey,	 &	 Ventre-Dominey,	 2015).	 There	 is	 a	 growing	 body	 of	 research	 on	
sensorimotor	 simulation	 and	 mentalizing	 on	 the	 level	 of	 narrative	 comprehension	 (e.g.	
Nijhof	&	Willems	2015;	Wallentin	et	al.	2011;	Speer	et	al.	2009;	Kurby	and	Zacks,	2013).		
In	 addition	 to	 facilitating	 simulation,	 stories	 could	 have	 a	 substantial	 advantage	 for	
experimental	 research	 by	 reducing	 inter-individual	 variability	 in	 semantics.	 For	 example,	
when	looking	into	action	semantics,	a	verb	like	throwing	without	context	can	activate	very	
different	 action	 representations,	while	 throwing	a	 dart	or	 throwing	a	 tennis	 ball	 reduces	
the	probability	that	subjects	activate	different	types	of	events.	The	contextual	embedding	
in	a	narrative	helps	 to	 further	 reduce	ambiguity	by	keeping	 the	 time,	agent	and	causality	
components	 of	 the	 event	 constant	 for	 different	 events	 in	 a	 design.	 Besides,	 using	more	
natural	 and	 meaningful	 stimulus	 materials	 increases	 motivation	 and	 relevance	 for	
participants	 in	 experiments.	 Especially	 in	 neuroimaging	 research,	 continuous	 stimulus	




g.	 Hasson,	 Nir,	 Levy,	 Fuhrmann,	 &	Malach,	 2004;	 Kauttonen,	 Hlushchuk,	 &	 Tikka,	 2015),	
theatre	 plays	 (e.	 g.	 Metz-Lutz,	 2010),	 and	 dance	 performances	 (e.	 g.	 Bachrach,	 Jola,	 &	
Pallier,	2016).		
Narratives	open	an	exciting	new	perspective	 to	 investigating	 language	comprehension	
in	 more	 natural	 contexts.	 Humans	 spend	 a	 substantial	 part	 of	 their	 awake	 time	 being	
engaged	with	stories.	Whether	we	read	the	newspaper,	watch	TV,	listen	to	others,	or	read	a	
book,	 much	 of	 our	 information	 input	 has	 the	 form	 of	 a	 narrative.	 A	 very	 interesting	
question	 for	 research	 on	 language	 comprehension	 is	 why	 humans	 engage	 in	 stories	 for	
entertainment.	 Following	 simulation	 theory,	 engaging	with	 stories	 helps	 us	 simulate	 real	
world	 encounters,	 and	 therefore	 experience	 situations	 'vicariously'	 (Zwaan,	 2004).	 This	
offers	an	explanation	for	human	engagement	with	stories	and	why	we	have	developed	such	










in	 semantic	 processing	 has	 led	 to	 an	 understanding	 of	 simulation	which	 is	 reduced	 to	 a	
mental	 1st	 person	 imitation	 of	 action,	 perception,	 or	 emotion.	 Given	 the	 limited	
understanding	 of	 the	 function	 of	 simulation,	 such	 a	 limitation	 obscures	 the	 potential	 of	
simulation	as	an	important	cognitive	mechanism	(Barsalou,	n.d.).	By	restricting	the	focus	to	




events	 or	 mental	 states	 can	 be	 from	 the	 1st	 or	 3rd	 person	 perspective	 (Vogeley	 &	 Fink,	
2003).	Neuroimaging	research	on	action	and	motor	imagery	shows	that	perspective	taking	
affects	 the	 involvement	 of	 different	 neural	 networks	 for	 1st	 and	 3rd	 person	 perspective,	
which	overlap	only	partially	(e.	g.	Ruby	&	Decety,	2001).	Similar	findings	have	been	shown	
for	 imagining	 the	mental	 states	 of	 self	 or	 others,	 showing	 that	mentalizing	 in	 1st	 person	
shares	resources	with	3rd	person,	but	the	networks	are	largely	independent	(Vogeley	et	al.,	
2001).	 However	 perspective	 is	 not	 only	 crucial	 for	 representing	 information	 in	 a	 mental	
model,	but	also	for	the	format	 in	which	it	 is	fed	 into	this	model.	Pointing	out	the	relation	
between	perceptual	input	and	its	mental	representation	seems	trivial	when	we	think	about	
action	 and	 perception,	 where	 perspective	 is	 a	 clear	 inherent	 feature.	 For	 language	 and	







Smith,	 you,	 he,	 the	 guy	 over	 there)	 result	 in	 different	 mental	 models?	 Unfortunately,	
perspective	 in	 language	 processing	 has	 not	 received	 much	 attention	 from	 embodied	
accounts	 of	 language.	 Instead,	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 commonly	 assumed	 that	 mental	









Hagoort,	 &	 Casasanto,	 2010;	 Willems,	 Toni,	 et	 al.,	 2010b).	 How	 this	 generalizes	 over	
contextually	embedded	language	is	unclear.		
Perspective	 taking	 is	 considered	 important	 in	 the	 construction	 and	 comprehension	of	
fiction	(e.g.	M.	Bal,	1997;	Genette,	1980;	Rimmon-Kennan,	2002;	Sanford	&	Emmott,	2012)	
as	well	 as	 in	 the	 generation	 of	 situation	models	 (Bower	&	Morrow,	 1990;	 Johnson-Laird,	
1983).	Readers	often	take	the	mental	perspective	of	the	protagonist	and	simulate	his	or	her	
mental	 states	 as	 the	 source	 of	 construal	 when	 constructing	 a	 situation	model	 (Albrecht,	
O’Brien,	Mason,	&	Myers,	1995;	Horton	&	Rapp,	2003).	Taking	the	viewpoint	of	a	character	
is	 linked	 to	 identification:	 it	 is	 believed	 that	 the	 reader	 is	 more	 engaged	 when	 taking	 a	
character’s	viewpoint	and	adopting	the	character’s	goals	and	intentions.	During	the	course	
of	 the	 story	 this	 results	 in	 experiencing	 emotions	 of	 empathy	 (Oatley,	 1999a).	 Indeed,	
adopting	a	protagonist’s	perspective	causes	changes	in	the	mental	and	emotional	states	of	
the	 reader	 (Gerrig,	 1993;	 Green	 &	 Brock,	 2000;	 Komeda,	 Tsunemi,	 Inohara,	 Kusumi,	 &	
Rapp,	2013)	which	also	has	been	linked	to	story	immersion	(Sestir	&	Green,	2010).		
Narrative	 perspective	 (Who	 is	 telling	 the	 story?)	 and	 narrative	 viewpoint	 (Whose	
viewpoint	 is	 the	narrative	 constructed	 from?)	 are	 typically	 aligned	with	 a	 character	 (or	 a	
narrator),	 whose	 mental	 or	 visual	 response	 to	 the	 events	 in	 the	 story	 is	 the	 source	 of	
construal	of	the	narrative	events	for	the	reader	(Dancygier,	2014).	 In	1st	person	narratives	
the	narrator	coincides	with	the	character	from	whose	viewpoint	the	ongoing	situations	are	
constructed.	 In	 contrast,	 3rd	 person	 narratives	 present	 the	 story	 from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 a	





Kennan,	 2002).	 The	 effectiveness	 of	 the	modulation	of	 'mental	 viewpoint'	 by	 focalization	








An	 established	 way	 to	 guide	 cognitive	 perspective	 taking	 is	 the	 choice	 of	 personal	
pronouns,	which	refer	to	protagonists	(Bergen	&	Chang,	2005;	Brunyé	et	al.,	2009;	Brunyé,	
Ditman,	Mahoney,	 &	 Taylor,	 2011;	 Ditman,	 Brunyé,	Mahoney,	 &	 Taylor,	 2010;	 Sanford	 &	
Emmott,	2012).	Experimental	research	with	single	sentences	shows	that	personal	pronouns	
in	 thematic	 agent's	 positions	 affect	 the	 spatial	 representation	 in	 the	 reader,	 e.g.	 people	
react	 faster	 to	 a	picture	 showing	a	 tomato	being	 sliced	 from	1st	 person	perspective	 after	
hearing	the	sentence	'I	am	slicing	a	tomato'	than	after	hearing	the	sentence	'he	is	slicing	a	
tomato'	and	vice	versa	(Brunyé	et	al.,	2009).	In	a	series	of	experiments,	it	has	been	shown	





Taken	 together,	perspective	 is	 a	 largely	overlooked	 feature	which	 is	 crucial	 for	mental	
models	 of	 events.	 The	 relation	 between	 how	 an	 event	 is	 communicated	 and	 its	 mental	
model	is	especially	unclear.	Whereas	some	language	accounts	propose	that	comprehension	





In	this	dissertation,	 I	will	 focus	on	simulation	during	narrative	comprehension	 in	more	
natural	 situations.	 I	 set	 out	 to	 further	 qualify	 the	 function	 of	 mental	 simulation	 by	
investigating	 perspective	 as	 a	 core	 feature	 of	 simulation	 in	 a	 systematic	 investigation	 of	
simulation	with	 literary	narratives.	The	novelty	of	 the	projects	 in	my	dissertation	 is	 that	 I	
used	a	combination	of	behavioural,	psychophysical,	and	neuroimaging	methods	to	test	the	
interaction	 of	 text	 and	 cognitive	 perspective.	 The	 goal	 was	 to	 scrutinize	 oversimplified	
assumptions	about	simulation	and	to	push	the	field	of	research	to	a	more	comprehensive	
model	of	what	simulation	is,	what	it	is	not,	and	to	reframe	its	functional	role	in	cognition.	





simulation	 during	 comprehension	 of	 narratives.	 In	 Chapter	 2,	 I	 present	 an	 experiment	 in	
which	I	tested	the	effects	of	1st	and	3rd	person	narration	on	experiential	aspects	of	fiction	
reading.	 Participants	 read	 short	 literary	 stories	 in	 1st	 and	 3rd	 person	 perspectives	while	 I	
measured	their	arousal	during	reading	with	electrodermal	activity	recordings	(see	Info	box	











































anatomy	and	 is	used	 routinely	 for	detection	of	diseases	or	abnormal	 conditions.	 The	MRI	







contrast	 by	 imaging	 the	 change	 in	 blood	 flow	 (hemodynamic	 response)	 related	 to	 energy	
(oxygen)	use	by	brain	 cells.	When	neurons	become	active,	 local	blood	 flow	 to	 some	brain	




is	more	magnetic	 than	oxygenated	hemoglobin,	which	 is	 virtually	 resistant	 to	magnetism.	
This	 difference	 in	 BOLD	 response	 can	 be	 tested	 statistically	 and	 the	 results	 of	 this	 show	
which	groups	of	neurons	are	active	at	a	time	as	colored	blobs	on	brain	maps.		
Due	to	the	relative	slowness	of	the	metabolic	blood	response	the	temporal	resolution	is	not	
as	 good	 as	 in	 other	 types	 of	 neuroimaging,	 like	 electroencephalography.	 We	 typically	










Chapter	 3	 presents	 a	 follow	 up	 neuroimaging	 study	 on	 the	 findings	 of	 Chapter	 2	 in	
which	 I	measured	 brain	 activity	 of	 participants	 while	 they	 listened	 to	 literary	 narratives.	
Participants	were	presented	with	2	stories,	one	in	1st	and	one	in	3rd	person	perspective,	and	
answered	questions	regarding	their	engagement	with	the	protagonist	after	each	story.	With	
functional	magnetic	 resonance	 imaging	 (fMRI,	 see	 Info	 box	 2),	 I	 tested	 for	 differences	 in	
brain	 activations	between	1st	 and	3rd	 person	 stories	 associated	with	 action	events	during	
comprehension.	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 study	 was	 to	 test	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 text	 perspective	






and	mental	 imagery.	 In	 this	experiment	 I	 tested	empirically	how	 (dis)similar	 simulation	 is	
from	 imagery	 by	 comparing	 brain	 activity	 during	 narrative	 comprehension	 of	 action	 and	
mentalizing	events	with	imagining	the	same	events	either	as	the	protagonist	(1st	person)	or	
an	 observer	 (3rd	 person).	 Participants	 listened	 to	 2	 literary	 narratives,	 first	 for	
comprehension,	 and	 then	 two	 times	 again	 while	 imagining	 being	 in	 the	 shoes	 of	 the	
protagonist	 or	 imaging	 the	 situations	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 an	 eyewitness,	 while	 I	
measured	brain	activity	with	fMRI	(see	Info	box	2).	I	looked	into	differences	and	overlap	of	
brain	 activity	when	 participants	 engaged	 in	 1st	 and	 3rd	 person	 imagery	 as	well	 as	 during	
normal	comprehension.	
In	Chapter	5,	 I	 tested	 if	perspective	plays	a	similar	 role	 in	 factual	and	 fictional	stories.	
Following	up	on	 the	 findings	of	Chapter	2,	 I	 tested	whether	 the	effects	of	perspective	on	
experiential	aspects	of	reading	like	immersion	and	appreciation	are	specific	to	fiction.	In	an	
online	 study,	 I	 had	 participants	 read	 texts	 in	 1st	 or	 3rd	 person	 perspective	 which	 were	
labelled	 as	 either	 based	 on	 true	 events	 or	 as	 entirely	 fictional.	 I	 measured	 reading	
immersion,	appreciation	of	the	stories,	and	memory	of	events	in	the	stories.		
Finally,	in	the	last	Chapter	of	this	thesis,	I	will	discuss	the	findings	of	the	4	experiments	

















































Reading	 is	 a	 complex	 human	 behaviour	 in	 which	 several	 cognitive	 processes	 are	
involved.	An	elementary	part	of	comprehension	is	building	a	mental	model	of	the	semantic	
contents	of	the	text	(Gernsbacher,	1997).	Stories,	as	compared	to	non-narrative	texts,	often	
cause	 the	 reader	 to	become	 immersed	 into	 the	 story	and	construct	multimodal	 situation	
models	 (Zwaan	&	 van	Oostendorp,	 1993).	 Immersion	 is	 similar	 to	 flow	 (Csikszentmihalyi,	
1990)	and	transportation	(Sestir	&	Green,	2010).	These	terms	describe	a	state	of	absorption	
marked	 by	 ‘deep	 concentration,	 losing	 awareness	 of	 one’s	 self,	 one’s	 surroundings	 and	
track	of	time’	(Csikszentmihalyi,	1990;	Kuijpers,	2014).	Being	immersed	in	a	story	is	 linked	
to	 mental	 simulation	 (Jacobs,	 2015a,	 2015c;	 Schrott	 &	 Jacobs,	 2011;	 Zwaan,	 2004),	 and	




Immersion	 is	 a	 multidimensional	 experience	 based	 on	 different	 factors,	 whose	
contribution	to	the	experience	of	being	immersed	varies	with	the	situation.	Factors	which	
often	 reoccur	 in	 notions	 of	 immersion	 in	 narratives	 include	 the	 experience	 of	 mental	
imagery,	emotional	engagement	with	protagonists,	transportation	into	the	story	world,	and	
attention	 during	 reading	 (Kuijpers,	 2014;	 Kuijpers,	 Hakemulder,	 Tan,	 &	 Doicaru,	 2014).	
Experiencing	 imagery	 during	 narrative	 engagement,	 such	 as	 mental	 visualizations	 of	
surroundings,	 characters,	 and	 situations,	 has	 been	 hypothesized	 to	 influence	 immersion	
(Green	&	Brock,	2000;	Kuijpers,	2014).	Emotional	engagement	with	fictional	characters	of	
stories	 such	as	 feelings	of	 sympathy,	 empathy,	 and	 identification	 can	 facilitate	 immersion	
(Kuijpers,	 2014).	 Another	 important	 factor	 for	 immersion	 is	 attention.	 A	 high	 level	 of	
attention	 towards	 the	 story	 is	 often	 marked	 by	 a	 subjective	 experience	 of	 losing	 self-
awareness,	 awareness	of	 the	 surroundings,	 and	 track	of	 time	 (Kuijpers,	2014).	 The	 factor	
transportation	 ‘signifies	 a	 feeling	 of	 entering	 a	 story	 world,	 without	 completely	 losing	
contact	with	 the	actual	world’,	 thus	 the	 feeling	of	actually	being	part	of	a	 fictional	world	
during	reading	(Kuijpers,	2014).	Transportation	into	a	fictional	world	is	 linked	to	increased	
affective	 responses	 and	 identification	with	 fictional	 characters	 (Sestir	 &	 Green,	 2010).	 In	






Readers	can	become	 immersed	 in	a	story	by	either	 taking	 the	role	of	an	observer	 (3rd	
person	 perspective)	 or	 by	 taking	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 one	 of	 the	 characters	 (1st	 person	
perspective)	(Boyd,	2005;	Oatley,	1999a;	Sanford	&	Emmott,	2012).	Readers	often	take	the	
perspective	of	the	protagonist	and	simulate	his	or	her	mental	states	as	their	point	of	view	
when	constructing	a	 situation	model	 (Albrecht	et	al.,	 1995;	Horton	&	Rapp,	2003).	 It	has	
further	 been	 shown	 that	 which	 character	 the	 reader’s	 viewpoint	 is	 aligned	 with	 affects	
whether	 readers	 take	 a	 1st	 person	 perspective	 (de	 Graaf,	 Hoeken,	 Sanders,	 &	 Beentjes,	
2011).	Perspective	taking	 is	considered	 important	 in	the	construction	and	comprehension	
of	 fiction	 (e.g.	M.	 Bal,	 1997;	 Genette,	 1980;	 Rimmon-Kennan,	 2002;	 Sanford	 &	 Emmott,	
2012),	 and	 the	 generation	 of	 situation	 models	 (Bower	 &	 Morrow,	 1990;	 Johnson-Laird,	
1983).	 But	 perspective	 taking	 is	 also	 an	 important	 topic	 of	 research	 in	 the	 cognitive	
sciences	in	general.	Typically,	perspective	taking	is	investigated	in	the	framework	of	spatial	
cognition	(Kessler	&	Thomson,	2010;	see	e.g.	Zacks	&	Michelon,	2005)	or	social	cognition	
(Frith	 &	 Frith,	 2007).	 We	 assume	 that	 narrative	 comprehension	 involves	 both	 types	 of	
perspective	taking,	because	stories	include	information	about	actions,	location	changes	and	
characters.	
Taking	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 a	 character	 is	 linked	 to	 identification:	 it	 is	 believed	 that	 the	
reader	is	more	engaged	when	taking	a	character’s	viewpoint	and	adopting	the	character’s	
goals	and	intentions.	During	the	course	of	the	story	this	results	in	experiencing	emotions	of	
empathy	 (Oatley,	 1999a).	 Adopting	 a	 protagonist’s	 perspective	 can	 cause	 changes	 in	 the	
mental	and	emotional	states	of	the	reader	(Gerrig,	1993;	Green	&	Brock,	2000;	Komeda	et	
al.,	 2013)	 and	 has	 been	 shown	 to	 be	 linked	 to	 story	 immersion	 (Sestir	 &	 Green,	 2010).	
Experimental	evidence	further	shows	that	changing	narrative	viewpoints	 leads	to	changes	
in	 mental	 viewpoints.	 For	 example,	 in	 a	 discourse	 comprehension	 study,	 Black	 and	
colleagues	 (Black,	 Turner,	 &	 Bower,	 1979)	 showed	 that	 participants	 are	 sensitive	 to	






are	 narrative	 perspective	 (Who	 is	 telling	 the	 story?)	 and	 narrative	 viewpoint	 (Whose	




is	 the	 source	of	 construal	 of	 the	narrative	events	 for	 the	 reader	 (Dancygier,	 2014).	Using	
narrative	perspective,	story	writers	can	make	readers	'see'	through	the	eyes	of	one	of	the	
characters	 or	 take	 a	 mere	 spectator's	 view.	 A	 well-established	 way	 to	 guide	 cognitive	
perspective	 taking	 in	 text	 is	 the	choice	of	personal	pronouns,	which	 refer	 to	protagonists	
(Bergen	&	Chang,	2005;	Brunyé	et	al.,	2009,	2011;	Ditman	et	al.,	2010;	Sanford	&	Emmott,	
2012).	 Experimental	 research	 with	 single	 sentences	 shows	 that	 personal	 pronouns	 in	
thematic	 agent	 positions	 affect	 the	 spatial	 representation	 in	 the	 reader	 (Brunyé	 et	 al.,	
2009).	In	a	series	of	experiments,	it	has	been	shown	that	3rd	person	pronouns	(he,	she,	 it)	
robustly	 promote	 a	 3rd	 person	 perspective	 mental	 representation,	 whereas	 1st	 person	
pronouns	 can	promote	 either	 1st	 person	or	 3rd	 person	mental	 perspective,	 depending	on	
the	contextual	embedding.	Prevalence	for	1st	person	perspective	taking	 is	strongest	when	
participants	 are	 addressed	 directly	 with	 2nd	 person	 pronouns	 (e.g.	 You	 are	 slicing	





Despite	 the	 substantial	 body	 of	 narrative	 theory	 research	 and	 experimental	 evidence	
from	psychological	 studies	with	personal	pronouns,	 it	 remains	unclear	how	 the	choice	of	
personal	 pronouns	 influences	 experiential	 aspects	 of	 literary	 reading,	 such	 as	 immersion	
and	appreciation	of	a	 story.	 In	 the	present	 study	we	 investigated	how	story	 immersion	 is	




narration	 is	 uncommon	 in	 literary	 fiction,	 and	 the	 type	 of	 fiction	 in	 which	 it	 finds	
application	 is	 very	 different	 from	 typical	 1st	 or	 3rd	 person	narration	 texts.	 This	would	 not	
only	 limit	our	choice	of	appropriate	stimulus	materials	substantially,	but	would	also	result	
in	asymmetry	regarding	the	amount	of	prior	exposure	our	sample	population	has	with	the	
types	 of	 texts.	 Moreover,	 it	 has	 been	 shown	 that	 2nd	 person	 pronouns	 tend	 to	 be	




In	 the	 experiment,	 we	 combined	 measuring	 Electrodermal	 Activity	 (EDA)	 with	
appreciation	 ratings	 and	 established	 questionnaires	 for	 narrative	 engagement,	 to	
investigate	 if	 and	 how	 arousal,	 immersion,	 and	 affective	 responses	 to	 reading	 fiction	 are	
affected	 by	 personal	 pronouns	 referring	 to	 protagonists.	 The	main	 reason	 to	 include	 the	
EDA	 measure	 was	 to	 have	 an	 objective	 and	 online	 measure	 of	 arousal	 during	 actual	






Following	 the	 assumption	 that	 1st	 person	 perspective	 facilitates	 a	 more	 immediate	
experience	and	therefore	identification	(Oatley,	1999a;	Papeo	et	al.,	2011),	we	expect	that	
readers	are	more	emotionally	affected	by	1st	person	perspective	narratives	and	experience	
higher	 levels	 of	 immersion.	 This	 should	 result	 in	 higher	 scores	 on	 the	 immersion	
questionnaires,	especially	on	the	subscales	for	emotional	engagement,	transportation,	and	
attention.	 Physical	 arousal	 could	 also	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 immediateness	 of	 1st	 person	
narration,	because	of	higher	 suspense	or	emotional	 responses	during	 reading.	Therefore,	
we	 expect	 that	 both	 immersion	 as	measured	 by	 questionnaire	 responses	 and	 arousal	 as	
measured	by	EDA	are	higher	when	participants	read	1st	person	perspective	narratives.	We	
further	expect	 that	higher	 immersion	 results	 in	higher	appreciation	 (Busselle	&	Bilandzic,	
2009;	Green,	2004),	but	without	clear	expectations	as	to	which	components	of	immersion	
might	 cause	 this	 effect.	 Moreover,	 we	 expect	 high	 individual	 variability	 regarding	
experiential	aspects	of	literary	reading	and	sensitivity	to	stylistic	features.	To	be	able	to	take	
this	 into	 account,	 we	 measured	 participants’	 self-reported	 reading	 behaviour,	 previous	
print	 exposure,	 and	 empathy.	 The	 latter	 is	 expected	 to	 correlate	 with	 immersion,	 print	














































 Table 1: Story Information 
 
Eight short stories from Dutch fiction, published between 1974 and 2010, were selected as 
stimulus material (mean number of words per story = 1043.25, s.d. = 723.05, min = 338, max = 
2090). The stories were all typical short stories with a single plot, a single setting and focused on 
a single incident covering only a short period of time. There was only a very brief introduction 
(if at all) and an abrupt and open ending. All stories were internally focalized by the main 
character and the narrative voice was identical with the narrative point of view. Besides the 
main character, the number of active characters was very limited. In the original version half of 
the stories used 1st person pronouns to refer to the main character and half 3rd person pronouns. 




















































The	 selected	 stories	 were	 all	 typical	 short	 stories	 with	 a	 single	 plot,	 a	 single	 setting,	
focused	on	a	single	incident,	and	covered	only	a	short	period	of	time.	Also,	there	was	-	if	at	
all	 -	only	a	brief	 introduction,	an	open	ending,	and	the	number	of	characters	 in	 the	story	
was	 limited.	 The	 stories	 were	 written	 in	 a	 laconic	 style	 avoiding	 direct	 statements	 of	
judgments	 and	 attitudes,	 e.g.	 the	 following	 excerpt	 from	 the	 ending	 of	Officina	 Asmara	










For	 all	 stories	 the	 narrative	 voice	 was	 identical	 with	 the	 narrative	 point	 of	 view.	 All	




in	 the	 original	 version.	 To	make	 exact	 comparisons	we	 created	 a	 second	 version	 of	 each	































































For each story a second version was created by replacing the personal pronouns referring to the 
main character and its related verb in each text with the personal pronoun in the corresponding 
condition. Example taken from De tekening by Thomas Rosenboom. No authorized translation is 
available; the current translation is for illustration purposes only. 
Questionnaires	for	measuring	individual	differences	
For	an	estimate	of	print	exposure	we	used	a	Dutch	version	of	the	Author	Recognition	
Test	 (ART,	 Acheson,	 Wellu,	 &	 MacDonald,	 2008)	 containing	 42	 names	 of	 which	 30	 are	
existing	 fiction	 authors	 and	 12	 are	made	up	 names	 (see	 supplementary	material).	 In	 the	
ART,	participants	 are	 instructed	 to	 read	a	 list	of	names	and	 indicate	which	of	 the	writers	
they	 know.	 The	 score	 of	 each	 participant	 is	 computed	 by	 subtracting	 the	 sum	 of	 all	




In	addition,	 a	general	 reading	habits	questionnaire	was	used	consisting	of	4	 items	 (2	
questions	addressing	amount	and	frequency	of	reading	for	pleasure,	and	2	questions	about	
genre	preferences).	The	 items	of	 the	reading	habit	questionnaire	consisted	of	 ‘How	often	
do	you	read	fiction?’	with	five	possible	answers	ranging	from	‘daily’	to	‘never’,	‘How	many	






(IRI,	Davis,	 1980,	 1983).	 IRI	 is	 a	 self-report	measure	of	 individual	 differences	 in	 empathy,	
consisting	 of	 4	 subscales.	 The	 Fantasy	 scale	 of	 the	 IRI	 tests	 individual	 readiness	 to	 get	
transported	 imaginatively	 into	 the	 feelings	 and	 actions	 of	 fictive	 characters	 in	 books,	
movies,	 and	 plays.	 For	 the	 6	 items	 from	 the	 IRI	 Fantasy	 scale	 we	 used	 a	 7-point	 scale	
ranging	from	‘I	totally	agree’	(7)	to	‘I	totally	disagree’	(1).		
As	recent	evidence	suggests	a	positive	relation	of	fiction	reading	with	social	factors	such	
as	 empathy,	 interpersonal	 relationships,	 and	 social	 competence	 (P.	 M.	 Bal	 &	 Veltkamp,	
2013;	Green,	 2004;	 Keen,	 2007;	 Kidd	&	Castano,	 2013;	 Koopman,	 2015;	 R.	 a.	Mar	 et	 al.,	
2006,	2009),	we	included	the	Empathy	Quotient	questionnaire	(EQ)	to	measure	individual	





engagement	questionnaire	 (NEQ)	developed	by	Buselle	and	Bilandzic	 (2009).We	used	 the	
attention,	 transportation,	 emotional	 engagement,	 and	mental	 imagery	 subscales	 from	
SWAS	 and	 in	 addition	 the	 narrative	 understanding	 subscale	 from	 NEQ,	 as	 this	 is	 not	
covered	by	SWAS.	Our	questionnaire	comprised	of	34	items	(see	supplementary	material).	




story	 on	 a	 10-point	 scale	 (1=bad,	 10=brilliant).	 For	 the	 second	 appreciation	 measure	
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(Ranking)	participants	were	provided	with	a	 list	of	 titles	of	 the	stories	and	were	asked	to	
rank	 them	 in	order	of	appreciation	with	 the	one	 they	 liked	 the	most	on	 top	and	 the	one	
they	like	the	least	at	the	bottom.	
To	 test	 whether	 participants	 paid	 attention	 to	 each	 story,	 we	 prepared	 1	 content	
question	 per	 story,	 which	 participants	 answered	 in	 a	 multiple	 choice	 task	 with	 3-4	
alternatives	of	which	only	one	was	correct.	Each	question	indicated	clearly	to	which	story	it	




lamp	 with	 two	 brightness	 levels,	 and	 a	 window	 with	 blinds.	 They	 were	 encouraged	 to	
adjust	 the	 light	 to	 personal	 preference	 and	make	 themselves	 as	 comfortable	 as	 possible	
sitting	 at	 a	 desk	with	 a	 stable	 chair.	 The	 aim	was	 to	 create	 a	 relaxed	 atmosphere	with	 a	




and	 finished	 reading	 a	 story.	A	practice	 trial	was	performed	with	one	 story	 to	 familiarize	
participants	with	the	setting	and	order	of	events	within	a	trial.	The	story	from	the	practice	







the	 main	 character.	 Both	 blocks	 took	 place	 consecutively	 with	 a	 10	 minute	 break	 in	
between.	Block	order	was	counterbalanced	across	participants.	Directly	after	reading	each	
story,	 participants	 rated	 the	 story	 for	 appreciation	 and	 completed	 the	 immersion	
questionnaire.	The	stories	were	presented	in	black	font	(Calibri,	14pt.)	on	white	paper	(A4,	





Once	 participants	 finished	 the	 experiment,	 they	 were	 asked	 what	 they	 thought	 the	
experiment	was	about	and	whether	 they	 recognized	anything	 specific	about	 the	 selected	
stories	 or	 a	 significant	 change	 between	 the	 two	 blocks.	 This	 was	 followed	 by	 a	 verbal	
debriefing,	 which	 informed	 them	 about	 the	 research	 question,	 the	 experiment,	 and	 our	
expectations.	The	entire	experiment	took	approximately	90	minutes.	
Data	acquisition	
We	 measured	 EDA	 with	 BrainAMP	 ExG	 MR,	 Acceleration	 Sensor	 (Brain	 Products,	
www.brainproducts.com),	 and	 Ag/AgCI	 sensor	 electrodes	 (Model	 F-EGSR,	 Grass	
Technologies).	 The	 signal	 was	 recorded	 with	 Brain	 Vision	 Recorder	 (Brain	 Products)	 at	 a	
sampling	rate	of	5000Hz	for	the	first	8	participants	and	1000Hz	for	all	others,	with	low	cut-
off	DC	and	high	cut-off	1000Hz.	The	reason	for	decreasing	the	sampling	rate	was	to	reduce	
unnecessary	memory	 requirements	 and	 processing	 time	 in	 the	 data	 analysis	 as	we	were	






EDA	 signal	 processing	was	 done	with	Matlab	 R2013a	 (MathWorks,	 Natick,	MA,	USA).	
The	data	were	segmented	into	individual	trials.	Each	trial	was	defined	from	the	onset	to	the	
offset	 of	 reading	 a	 story.	 Trials	 with	 recording	 errors	 (e.g.	 data	 not	 saved	 to	 disk)	 were	
replaced	with	NaNs	 (out	of	416	 trials	 13	were	missing,	meaning	3.1%	of	missing	 values).	
Linear	 trend	was	 removed	 from	time	courses	 (‘de-trending’)	and	data	were	 resampled	 to	
100Hz.	 To	 correct	 for	 the	 time	 at	 the	 beginning	 or	 end	 of	 each	 trial	 when	 participant’s	
movement	 tended	 to	create	artefacts	 in	 the	EDA	signal,	we	 removed	 three	seconds	 from	
the	beginning	and	end	of	each	trial.	
The	 number	 of	 spontaneous	 fluctuations	 were	 computed	 using	 a	 peak	 detection	
algorithm	 in	which	peaks	are	defined	as	 local	maxima	 surrounded	by	 valleys	 (Eli	 Billauer,	
3.4.05,	see	http://www.billauer.co.il/peakdet.html;	d=0.15).	This	algorithm	picks	out	peaks	
very	 well	 across	 a	 range	 of	 settings.	 We	 used	 the	 number	 of	 peaks	 for	 statistical	
comparisons,	 because	 they	 reflect	 spontaneous	 fluctuations,	 due	 to	 increased	 arousal	
(Figner	&	Murphy,	 2011).	We	 ignored	 valleys	 in	 the	 analysis	 because	 only	 little	 is	 known	
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about	 local	 minima	 in	 arousal.	Analysing	 the	 number	 of	 peaks	 in	 EDA	 is	 not	 a	 standard	
measure	such	as	area	under	the	curve	or	absolute	amplitude	changes	relative	to	a	baseline.	
Because	 of	 our	 experimental	 design,	 which	 focused	 on	 the	 naturalness	 of	 the	 reading	
situation,	the	trials	are	relatively	long	and	differ	substantially	in	length.	This	means	that	we	








The	 content	 questions	 were	 checked	 for	 correctness.	 Two	 items	 were	 answered	
incorrectly	 by	 more	 than	 25%	 of	 participants	 indicating	 unexpected	 difficulty	 and	 were	
therefore	 not	 included	 in	 the	 evaluation.	 For	 the	 remaining	 6	 questions	we	 defined	 that	
more	than	1	incorrect	answer	(=33.33%	or	more)	led	to	exclusion	of	the	participant.	




Team,	 2009),	 using	 the	 nlme	 library	 for	 testing	 linear	 mixed	 models	 (Pinheiro,	 Bates,	
DebRoy,	 Sarkar,	 &	 (R	 CoreTeam),	 2014).	 The	 use	 of	 a	 linear	mixed	model	 allows	 for	 the	
inclusion	 of	 both	 participants	 and	 stories	 as	 random	 effects	 (Baayen,	 Davidson,	&	 Bates,	
2008).	Each	of	 the	main	measures	 (Immersion,	Rating,	Ranking,	Peaks)	was	analysed	 in	a	
separate	model.	 First,	 a	 simple	model	was	 constructed	 to	predict	 each	main	measure,	 in	
which	the	dependent	variable	was	on	the	intercept,	and	order	of	conditions,	pronoun	type,	
and	 whether	 the	 stories	 were	 the	 original	 or	 the	 modified	 version	 were	 used	 as	 fixed	
effects.	Story	and	participant	were	included	as	random	effects	in	all	models.	In	addition,	a	
variation	 of	 this	 model	 including	 random	 slopes	 for	 participants	 and	 stories	 was	






from	 the	 IRI	 Fantasy	 scale	 and	 the	 four	 question	 responses	 regarding	 reading	 habits.	 All	































Most	participants	read	3-10	books	per	year	 (34.6%),	26.9%	read	 less	 than	3,	1.9%	do	not	
read	at	all,	and	13.5%	read	at	 least	1	book	per	month	(23.1%	more	than	that).	Regarding	
literature	 type	 preferences,	 78.8%	 of	 participants	 indicated	 that	 they	 prefer	 prose.	 On	
average,	 participants	 checked	 5.7	 genres	 (s.d.=2.02,	 minimum=3,	 maximum=11).	 On	 the	





The	 best	model	 fit	was	 produced	when	 only	 including	 random	 intercepts	 for	 Immersion.	
Stories	 with	 3rd	 person	 pronouns	 showed	 lower	 scores	 on	 the	 immersion	 questionnaire	
than	 stories	with	 1st	 person	 pronouns	 (β=-0.16,	 s.e.=0.08,	 t=-1.98,	 p<0.05,	 see	 Figure	 1).	
From	 all	 individual	 difference	 measures,	 only	 EQ	 contributed	 significantly	 to	 the	 model	
(β=0.022,	 s.e.=0.01,	 t=2.57,	 p<0.05),	 meaning	 a	 higher	 EQ	 score	 predicts	 a	 higher	
immersion	score.		
	
Figure 1: Immersion 
scores in stories with 
1st and 3rd person 
pronouns referring 
to the protagonist. 
Participants on 
average scored 
higher on the 
immersion 
questionnaire when 
reading 1st person 
pronoun narratives 
compared to 3rd 
person pronoun 
narratives. Error 




For	 the	 attention	 subscale	 of	 the	 immersion	 questionnaire,	 the	 best	 model	 fit	 was	
produced	 when	 only	 including	 random	 intercepts.	 The	model	 did	 not	 show	 an	 effect	 of	
pronoun	(β=-0.14,	s.e.=0.10,	t=-1.45,	p=0.15,	see	Figure	2).	The	EQ	score	however,	explains	
a	significant	part	of	the	attention	scores,	similarly	to	the	overall	immersion	scores	(β=0.02,	
s.e.=0.01,	 t=2.03,	 p<0.05),	 meaning	 that	 a	 higher	 EQ	 predicts	 higher	 levels	 of	 attention	
during	reading.	
For	the	transportation	subscale,	the	best	model	fit	was	produced	when	only	including	
random	 intercepts.	 Here,	 we	 observe	 an	 effect	 of	 pronoun	 (β=-0.22,	 s.e.=0.08,	 t=-2.66,	
p<0.01,	 see	 Figure	 2)	 showing	 that	 transportation	 scores	 were	 significantly	 higher	 when	
participants	read	stories	with	1st	person	pronouns.	Again,	EQ	scores	show	an	effect	 in	the	
same	 direction	 as	 above	 (β=0.03,	 s.e.=0.01,	 t=2.08,	 p<0.05),	 meaning	 that	 a	 higher	 EQ	
predicts	higher	levels	of	transportation	during	reading.	
The	best	model	 fit	 for	 the	emotional	engagement	 subscale	 data	was	produced	when	
including	both	random	intercepts	and	random	slopes	for	participants	and	stories.	Pronoun	
shows	 no	 effect	 on	 the	 emotional	 engagement	 subscale	 (β=-0.11,	 s.e.	 =0.17,	 t=-0.67,	
p=0.50,	 see	 Figure	 2).	 None	 of	 the	 individual	 differences	 measures	 contributed	 to	 the	
model.		
The	best	model	fit	was	produced	when	only	including	random	intercepts	for	the	mental	
imagery	 subscale.	 The	 model	 shows	 an	 effect	 of	 pronoun,	 indicating	 that	 less	 mental	
imagery	 occurred	 in	 stories	 with	 3rd	 person	 pronouns	 compared	 to	 1st	 person	 pronoun	
stories	(β=-0.21,	s.e.=0.10,	t=-2.20,	p<0.05,	see	Figure	2).	None	of	the	individual	differences	
measures	contributed	to	the	model.		













Figure 2: Subscales of the immersion questionnaire. The subscales were emotional 
engagement, narrative understanding, transportation, attention, and mental imagery. 
Differences between stories with 1st and 3rd person pronouns referring to the protagonist 



















The	 best	 model	 fit	 for	 the	 EDA	 data	 was	 produced	 when	 including	 both	 random	
intercepts	and	random	slopes	for	participants	and	stories.	Pronoun	shows	an	effect	on	the	
Figure 3: Effect of 
Pronoun type on 
ranking of the stories 
for appreciation.  
The effect of pronoun 
type on appreciation of 
stories as measured by 
the ranking of all stories 
by how much 
participants liked them 
was statistically at 
p=0.06. Note that 
Ranking is a non-
normally distributed 
variable, so medians are 
plotted instead of 













The	 present	 study	 investigated	 the	 impact	 of	 personal	 pronouns	 referring	 to	
protagonists	 on	 readers’	 engagement	with	 literary	 stories.	 Participants	 read	 short	 stories	
from	 Dutch	 literature	 in	 which	 either	 1st	 or	 3rd	 person	 pronouns	 referred	 to	 the	 main	
character,	whose	 viewpoint	 the	 story	 is	 narrated	 from.	 	 Electrodermal	 activity	 (EDA)	was	
measured	while	participants	 read	 the	 stories.	After	 reading	each	 story,	participants	 rated	
the	story	and	filled	out	an	immersion	questionnaire.	Finally,	we	asked	participants	to	rank	
all	 stories	 for	 appreciation	 and	 collected	 several	 measures	 of	 inter-individual	 difference	
such	as	EQ	score	and	prior	print	exposure.	
The	results	show	that	stories	with	1st	person	pronouns	 lead	to	higher	 levels	of	overall	
immersion	 as	 measured	 by	 the	 questionnaire,	 which	 is	 in	 line	 with	 our	 predictions.	We	
qualified	 this	 general	 difference	 by	 investigating	 the	 subscales	 of	 the	 immersion	
Figure 4: Peaks in EDA 
during reading stories 
with 1st and 3rd person 
pronouns referring to 
the main character. 
Number of peaks and 
valleys were computed 
using a peak detection 
algorithm in which 
peaks are defined as 
local maxima 
surrounded by valleys 
(d=0.15). Number of 
peaks was significantly 
higher when 
participants read 3rd 
person compared to 1st 
person pronoun stories 





questionnaire.	 The	 effect	 of	 pronoun	 was	 present	 in	 the	 subscales	 transportation	 and	
mental	 imagery,	again	with	1st	person	pronouns	leading	to	higher	scores.	Additionally,	we	
observed	a	relation	between	the	scores	on	the	immersion	questionnaire	and	appreciation	







direction.	 Here	we	 observe	more	 peaks	 in	 the	 EDA	 signal	when	 participants	 read	 stories	
with	3rd	as	compared	to	1st	person	pronouns,	which	is	contrary	to	the	direction	of	the	effect	
in	 the	scores	of	 immersion	and	the	appreciation	measures.	EDA	 is	a	measure	 for	arousal,	
which	 can	 reflect	 emotional	 response,	 increased	mental	 workload,	 and	 startle	 (Figner	 &	
Murphy,	 2011),	 thus	 there	may	 be	 several	 reasons	 for	 observing	more	 peaks	 in	 the	 EDA	




An	 obvious	 explanation	 is	 that	 the	 peaks	 in	 the	 EDA	 in	 fact	 reflect	 the	 level	 of	
immersion	 and	 emotional	 engagement	 (suspense)	 with	 the	 story	 and	 that	 the	 online	
measure	of	arousal	 is	a	better	indicator	of	 immersion.	This	would	mean,	however,	that	all	
behavioural	 measures	 used	 in	 this	 experiment	 are	 completely	 off.	 We	 consider	 this	
possibility	 unlikely	 given	 their	 status	 as	 standard	 measures	 (Busselle	 &	 Bilandzic,	 2009;	
Kuijpers	 et	 al.,	 2014)	 and	 the	 limited	 knowledge	 we	 have	 regarding	 EDA	 measures	 in	
experiments	with	longer	trials.		
Another	possible	explanation	 is	 related	 to	embodied	 cognition	accounts,	 according	 to	
which	 language	 is	processed	 in	1st	 person	perspective	by	default	 (e.g.	Wilson	&	Golonka,	
2013).	According	 to	 this	 view,	 linguistic	 input	 in	1st	 person	perspective	as	with	1st	 person	
pronouns	 is	 already	 tailored	 to	 the	 cognitive	 system	 and	 promotes	 processing	 by	
decreasing	mental	 workload.	 This	means	 that	 language	 in	 1st	 person	 perspective	 can	 be	
processed	directly	by	mapping	information	to	the	relevant	modalities	in	way	similar	to	a	1st	
person	 experience.	 Language	 in	 3rd	 person	 perspective	 in	 contrast	 requires	 additional	
processing	 before	 integration	 of	 information	 can	 take	 place.	 That	means	 that	 3rd	 person	
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linguistic	 input	 has	 to	 be	 ‘translated’	 to	 fit	 a	 1st	 person	 experiencing	 system.	 Those	
additional	processes	could	for	example	comprise	a	form	of	'translation'	of	the	information	
by	 transposition	 and	 mapping	 information	 to	 the	 reader’s	 perceptual	 system.	 Any	
additional	 processes	 require	 cognitive	 resources	 and	 effort,	 which	 can	 potentially	 be	
reflected	as	an	effort	effect	 in	the	EDA	signal.	This	 interpretation	 is	supported	by	the	fact	




perspective	 taking'	 or	 emotional	 response,	 but	 rather	 showing	 an	 effect	 of	 decreased	
processing	demands	for	1st	person	perspective.	This	interpretation	supports	accounts	which	







Alternatively,	 the	 effect	 could	 also	 reflect	 perspective	 shifts,	 which	 are	 typical	 for	
narratives	 with	 internal	 focalization	 with	 3rd	 person	 pronouns	 referring	 to	 the	 character	
(Miall	 &	 Kuiken,	 1998).	 This	means	 that	 perspective	 shifts	 in	 comprehension	 occur	 with	
several	characters	and	not	only	with	the	protagonist.	The	reader	steps	in	the	shoes	of	the	
characters	 when	 trying	 to	 understand	 information	 about	 them,	 but	 otherwise	 processes	
the	narrative	from	the	perspective	of	an	observer	or	another	character.	Those	perspective	
shifts	 lead	 to	 increased	processing	cost.	With	1st	person	narration,	 the	perspective	of	 the	




anticipation	 people	 have	 in	 language	 comprehension.	While	 for	 a	 1st	 person	 perspective	
simulation	it	is	only	necessary	to	anticipate	from	the	viewpoint	of	one	character	(and	his	or	
her	understanding	of	other	characters),	an	observer	in	the	3rd	person	perspective	is	likely	to	
anticipate	 from	 multiple	 viewpoints	 and	 potentially	 takes	 the	 perspective	 of	 multiple	
characters	 into	 account,	 keeping	 information	 from	other	 characters	 active.	 This	 is	 clearly	
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illustrated	when	we	 think	 about	watching	 a	 horror	movie:	 people	 are	 already	 excited	 or	
even	 scared	 before	 something	 is	 about	 to	 happen	 and	 feel	 the	 urge	 to	 warn	 the	













it	 is	 likely	 that	an	 interaction	of	all	 three	causes	 leads	 to	 the	observed	effect.	 In	contrast,	
the	first	explanation	which	argues	for	an	effect	of	stronger	immersion	for	3rd	person	stories	
is	not	compatible	with	the	other	three	alternatives.	
We	have	shown	that	personal	pronouns	can	 indeed	be	a	crucial	 factor	 in	how	readers	
experience	 fiction.	 However,	 personal	 pronouns	 are	 only	 one	 possible	 facet	 of	 narrative	
viewpoint	and	narrative	perspective.	Whether	the	effects	we	observed	can	be	generalized	
across	 several	 features	 of	 narrative	 style	 remains	 an	 open	 question	 (Sanford	 &	 Emmott,	
2012).	Our	 results	 show	 that	 readers	 are	more	 easily	 immersed	when	 reading	 1st	 person	
stories,	 as	 proposed	 by	 narrative	 theory	 (Oatley,	 1999a).	We	 add	 to	 this	 assumption	 not	
only	by	providing	experimental	evidence,	but	 	 in	addition,	we	show	that	the	difference	 in	
processing	1st	or	3rd	person	viewpoints	 in	story	engagement	mainly	relates	to	arousal	and	




be	 interpreted	 as	 evidence	 in	 support	 of	 embodied	 models	 of	 language	 processing.	 In	
addition,	this	study	confirms	the	link	between	immersion	and	appreciation	of	the	story	and	
reveals	evidence	that	appreciation	of	stories	is	positively	linked	to	prior	reading	experience	





A	 remaining	 issue	 is	 whether	 pronouns	 are	 a	 major	 force	 in	 driving	 narrative	
perspective.	 It	 could	 be	 that	 people	 tend	 to	 identify	 with	 the	 character	 from	 whose	
viewpoint	the	story	 is	told	(Dancygier,	2014),	which	 is	 independent	of	pronoun	choice.	As	
all	 stories	 that	we	 selected	were	 internally	 focalized,	 the	main	 character	 always	 told	 the	
story	 from	 his	 or	 her	 perspective.	 Another	 very	 plausible	 reason	 is	 variability	 between	
















unclear	 how	 linguistically	 encoded	 perspective	 relates	 to	 cognitive	 perspective	 taking.	
There	 is	 evidence	 that	 personal	 pronouns	 referring	 to	 agents	 can	 influence	 perspective	
taking.	However,	most	evidence	is	based	on	non-contextual	language,	and	several	concerns	
have	 been	 raised	 that	 these	 effects	 are	 mainly	 driven	 by	 task	 strategy	 instead	 of	 true	
correlates	 of	 natural	 comprehension.	 Here,	 we	 aimed	 to	 test	 the	 effect	 of	 pronouns	 on	
perspective	 taking	 in	more	 contextual	 language	 with	 personal	 pronouns	 referring	 to	 the	
protagonists	of	short	literary	stories.	Participants	(N=52)	listened	to	literary	narratives	with	
1st	or	3rd	person	pronouns	referring	to	the	protagonist,	while	brain	activity	was	measured	
with	 fMRI.	 After	 each	 story,	 participants	 responded	 to	 questionnaires	 regarding	 their	
engagement	with	 the	 story	 including	 two	 items	 for	 subjective	 experience	 of	 perspective.	
When	looking	 into	action	events	with	1st	and	3rd	person	pronouns,	we	found	no	evidence	
for	 a	 neural	 dissociation	 depending	 on	 the	 pronoun.	 However,	 a	 split	 sample	 approach	
based	on	the	questionnaire	responses	for	subjective	perspective	taking	revealed	3	groups	
of	 comprehension	 preferences.	 One	 group	 showed	 a	 strong	 preference	 for	 1st	 person	
perspective	 (Enactors),	 while	 another	 group	 showed	 a	 strong	 preference	 for	 3rd	 person	
perspective	 (Observers),	 and	 a	 third	 group	 seemed	 to	 engage	 in	 1st	 and	 3rd	 person	
perspective	taking	simultaneously	(Hypersimulators).	Comparing	brain	activations	of	the	3	
groups	 revealed	 that	 readers	with	different	preferences	 indeed	activated	different	neural	
networks	 when	 engaged	 in	 the	 narratives.	 Our	 results	 suggest	 that	 comprehension	 and	







Yet,	 we	 know	 relatively	 little	 about	 how	 the	 linguistically	 encoded	 agent	 relates	 to	 our	
cognitive	representation	of	events.	Recent	experimental	research	on	perspective-taking	 in	
language	comprehension	has	shown	that	 the	 linguistic	encoding	of	 the	agent	of	an	event	
(e.g.	with	the	use	of	personal	pronouns	referring	to	the	agent)	can	have	consequences	for	
its	 cognitive	 representation.	 An	 action	 event	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 represented	 from	 an	
observer’s	 perspective	 when	 the	 agent	 of	 the	 action	 is	 referred	 to	 with	 a	 3rd	 person	
pronoun	 (He	 is	 slicing	 the	 tomato)	 as	 compared	 to	 a	 potentially	 self-referential	 pronoun	
(you,	I)	(e.g.,	I	am	slicing	the	tomato).	In	contrast,	self-referential	pronouns	can	facilitate	1st	
person	 perspective	 taking	 (Borghi,	 2004;	 Brunyé	 et	 al.,	 2009,	 2011;	 Buccino	 et	 al.,	 2005;	
Ditman	et	al.,	2010;	Sato	&	Bergen,	2013;	Tettamanti	et	al.,	2005).	Yet,	simulating	the	agent	
and	 therefore	 perspective	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 necessary	 for	 comprehension	 (Sato	 &	
Bergen,	2013).	
Personal	 pronouns	 are	 also	 important	 in	 literature	 theory,	 where	 they	 contribute	 to	
narrative	 perspective.	 First	 person	 perspective	 narration	 is	 thought	 to	 invite	 a	 closer	
relationship	 between	 readers	 and	 characters	 (Stanzel,	 1979)	 by	 making	 them	 share	
experiences	 and	 perceptions.	 It	 is	 therefore	 assumed	 that	 1st	 person	 fiction	 feels	 more	
direct	and	immediate	to	the	reader	(Keen,	2007;	see	also	Lodge,	2002).	This	means	that	in	
comparison	with	a	3rd	person	narration,	1st	person	narration	creates	a	stronger	 illusion	of	





cortices	 are	 only	 activated	 when	 reading	 action	 verbs	 in	 1st	 person	 as	 compared	 to	 3rd	
person.	In	addition,	Tomasino	and	colleagues	(2007)	found	that	sentences	presented	in	1st	
person	relative	to	3rd	person,	differentially	activated	areas	in	the	posterior	middle	cingulate	
cortex	 (mPCC)	 and	 the	 left	 dorsal	 occipital	 cortex.	 There	 is	 further	 evidence	 for	 the	
tendency	 to	 adopt	 a	 1st	 person	 perspective	 when	 comprehending	 isolated	 action	 verbs	
(Hauk,	Johnsrude,	and	Pulvermuller	2004;	Pulvermuller	2005;	Willems	et	al.	2010).	There	is	








the	 action	 observation	 network	 are	 systematically	 higher	 when	 observing	 other	 agents	
performing	 an	 action	 as	 compared	 to	 perceiving	 movements	 or	 body	 parts	 from	 a	 1st	
person	perspective.	This	effect	is	taken	as	evidence	for	the	higher	salience	of	other	agents	
and	higher	working	memory	demands	based	on	the	prediction	of	others’	actions	(Allison,	
Puce,	 &	 McCarthy,	 2000;	 see	 Peelen	 &	 Downing,	 2007	 for	 an	 overview;	 Saxe,	 Jamal,	 &	
Powell,	 2006).	 If	 the	 3rd	 person	 bias	 effect	 turns	 out	 to	 play	 a	 role	 in	 language	
comprehension	as	well,	it	might	explain	the	findings	reported	in	Chapter	2,	where	we	found	
that	 reading	 3rd	 person	 stories	 is	 associated	 with	 increased	 arousal,	 as	 compared	 to	 1st	
person	stories.		
These	 differences	 in	 neural	 activation	 between	 the	 types	 of	 personal	 pronouns	 have	
been	 taken	 as	 evidence	 that	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 perspective	 is	 encoded	 linguistically	
affects	 whether	 an	 event	 is	 simulated	 in	 the	 1st	 or	 3rd	 person	 perspective.	 Although	
perspective	effects	have	been	reported	by	multiple	studies,	 there	are	several	concerns	at	
hand.	
First,	 these	 effects	 might	 be	 a	 results	 of	 task	 and	 strategy	 rather	 than	 of	 stimulus	
properties	 (Gardner,	Brazier,	Edmonds,	&	Gronholm,	2013;	Tomasino	&	Rumiati,	2013).	 In	
their	 comprehensive	 review	 on	 the	 role	 of	 motor	 representations	 in	 comprehension,	
Tomasino	 and	 Rumiati	 (2013)	 concluded	 that	 activations	 in	 primary	 motor	 areas	 during	
action	verb	comprehension	are	not	a	systematic	effect	of	action	language,	but	depend	on	
strategies	suited	to	the	experimental	task.		
Second,	much	 of	 the	 research	 on	 perspective	 taking	 in	 language	 has	 focused	 on	 the	
comprehension	of	single	words	or	sentences,	when	in	fact	perspective	is	especially	crucial	
in	 regular	 communicative	 situations,	 where	 language	 comprehension	 depends	 on	 the	
context,	such	as	in	narratives	or	route	descriptions.		
Third,	 there	 is	 little	 empirical	 work	 on	 perspective	 in	 literary	 reading.	 In	 one	
experimental	 study,	 it	 has	 been	 found	 that	 narrative	 perspective	 as	 manipulated	 by	
personal	pronouns	referring	to	the	protagonist	of	a	story	influences	experiential	effects	of	
fiction	 reading	 (Hartung,	 Burke,	 Hagoort,	 &	Willems,	 2016,	 see	 Chapter	 2).	 First	 person	





arousal	as	measured	by	peaks	 in	electrodermal	activity.	With	these	 limitations,	 it	 remains	




on	 narrative	 perspective,	 as	 encoded	 by	 personal	 pronouns,	 by	 investigating	 the	 neural	
correlates	of	simulating	action	events	during	narrative	comprehension.	In	doing	so	we	had	





person	narratives,	 especially	 in	 the	 action	observation	network.	 This	 third	 aim,	 builds	 on	
the	work	done	in	Chapter	2	(Hartung	et	al.,	2016).	Such	an	effect	would	be	independent	of	






We	 used	 functional	 MRI	 to	 investigate	 the	 comprehension	 of	 stories	 in	 1st	 and	 3rd	
person	 perspective,	 using	 1st	 or	 3rd	 person	 pronouns	 that	 refer	 to	 the	 protagonist	 of	 the	
story	 in	 the	 agent’s	 position.	We	measured	brain	 activity	while	 participants	 listened	 to	 2	
literary	stories,	one	from	a	1st	and	the	other	from	a	3rd	person	perspective.	After	each	story,	
participants	rated	the	story	for	appreciation	and	reading	immersion.	In	order	to	dissociate	
strategy	 and	 pronoun	 effects	 (see	 discussion	 in	 Tomasino	 &	 Rumiati,	 2013),	 we	 also	
included	a	measure	of	subjective	experience	of	mental	imagery	after	each	story,	with	two	
items	 directly	 addressing	 perspective	 taking.	 Here,	 participants	 indicated	 how	 far	 they	
experienced	 a	 1st	 or	 3rd	 person	 imagery	 during	 listening.	 We	 used	 a	 task	 in	 which	
participants	 listened	 to	 unintelligible	 speech	 as	 a	 baseline	 condition.	 The	 story	 condition	
was	always	tested	first,	followed	by	three	tasks.	Of	these	three	tasks,	one	was	the	baseline	




with	 1st	 and	 3rd	 person	 pronouns	 because	 sufficient	 prior	 research	 was	 available	 to	
formulate	clear	hypotheses	regarding	brain	areas	associated	with	perspective.		
Hypotheses	
Based	 on	 the	 literature	 reviewed	 above	we	 expected	 to	 find	 stronger	 involvement	 of	
sensorimotor	cortices	 for	action	events	with	1st	person	pronouns	compared	 to	3rd	person	
pronouns,	 as	 well	 in	 the	 mPCC,	 the	 left	 dorsal	 occipital	 cortex	 and	 the	 dorsolateral	
prefrontal	 cortex	 (Saxe	 et	 al.,	 2006;	 Tomasino	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 For	 3rd	 person	 pronouns	















Helsinki	 was	 obtained	 from	 the	 local	 ethics	 committee	 (CMO	 Committee	 on	 Research	
Involving	 Human	 Subjects,	 Arnhem-Nijmegen,	 Netherlands,	 protocol	 number	 2001/095).	
Participants	received	monetary	compensation	at	the	end	of	the	study.		
Data	exclusions	
One	 participant	 aborted	 the	 experiment	 due	 to	 pain	 from	 wearing	 the	 headphones.	















of	 characters,	 no	 introduction,	 and	 an	 open	 ending	 (see	 supplementary	 material	 for	
translations	 of	 the	 stories).	 The	 stories	 were	 narrated	 with	 internal	 focalization,	 which	
means	that	the	protagonist	is	always	in	focus,	allowing	readers	to	access	the	protagonists’	









recorded	 separately	 in	 one	 shot	 and	 speech	 errors	 were	 corrected	 afterwards.	 The	
recordings	 were	 about	 7	 minutes	 long	 (De	Mexicaanse	 hond:	 version	 1	 =	 7	 minutes	 17	
seconds,	 version	2	=	7	minutes	23	 seconds;	De	muur:	version	1	 =	 7	minutes	01	 seconds,	





Story	 appreciation	was	measured	 directly	 after	 listening.	 Participants	were	 presented	




following	 items:	 interesting,	 well-written,	 of	 high	 literary	 quality,	 easy	 to	 understand,	









times,	 I	 had	 the	 feeling	 of	 seeing	 right	 through	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 protagonist’	 (1st	 person	
perspective)	and	‘During	reading,	I	saw	the	situations	in	my	mind	as	if	I	was	an	eyewitness’	
(3rd	 person	 perspective).	 Participants	 responded	 to	 the	 items	 on	 a	 4-point	 scale	 ranging	
from	'I	totally	disagree’	(1)	to	'I	totally	agree'	(4).	
Individual	Differences	
We	 collected	 several	 measures	 for	 individual	 differences	 from	 each	 subject.	 Before	
participants	could	participate	in	the	study,	they	filled	out	an	online	version	of	the	Vividness	
of	 Visual	 Imagery	 Questionnaire	 (VVIQ,	 Marks	 1973/1995)	 with	 some	 additional	 items.	
After	 the	 experiment,	 participants	 filled	 in	 a	 battery	 of	 questionnaires	 consisting	 of	 self-
reported	 measures	 of	 reading	 preferences	 and	 behaviour,	 the	 fantasy	 scale	 of	 the	
Interpersonal	Reactivity	 Index	questionnaire,	Need	 for	Cognition,	Need	 for	Affect,	Author	





(totally).	 An	 additional	 question	 asked	 How	 many	 novels	 did	 you	 read	 last	 year?.	 This	
question	 was	 answered	 by	 a	 numerical	 estimate	 entered	 into	 an	 empty	 field	 by	 the	
participant.	 In	the	 last	 item	How	often	do	you	read	fiction?	subjects	chose	between	daily,	
more	than	twice	per	week,	once	per	week,	not	regularly,	and	never.	
In	addition,	we	used	the	6	items	from	the	Fantasy	scale	of	the	Interpersonal	Reactivity	
Index	 (IRI,	 Davis	 1983).	 IRI	 is	 a	 self-report	measure	 of	 individual	 differences	 in	 empathy,	
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consisting	 of	 4	 subscales.	 The	 Fantasy	 scale	 of	 the	 IRI	 tests	 individual	 readiness	 to	 get	
transported	 imaginatively	 into	 the	 feelings	 and	 actions	 of	 fictive	 characters	 in	 books,	
movies,	and	plays.	




Test	 (ART,	 Acheson	 et	 al	 2008;	 Koopman	 2015).	 This	 standard	 measure	 contained	 42	
names,	of	which	30	are	existent	fiction	authors	and	12	made	up	names	(see	supplementary	
material).	The	score	of	each	participant	is	computed	by	subtracting	the	sum	of	all	incorrect	
answers	 from	the	sum	of	all	 correct	answers.	The	 total	 score	can	vary	between	 -12	 (only	
non-existent	author	names	selected)	to	30	(all	correct	names	selected).	
We	 also	 included	 the	 Empathy	 Quotient	 questionnaire	 to	 measure	 individual	




of	 one	 two-hour	 session.	 After	 the	 participant	 was	 placed	 in	 the	 MRI	 scanner,	 the	
experiment	 began	 with	 a	 volume	 test,	 to	 adjust	 to	 subject-specific	 hearing	 levels.	 This	
involved	 listening	 to	 a	 fragment	 of	 a	 story	 that	 was	 not	 used	 in	 any	 other	 part	 of	 the	
experiment.	The	first	task	consisted	of	 listening	to	two	recordings	of	the	stories	(one	with	
1st	 and	one	with	 3rd	 person	pronouns	 referring	 to	 the	main	 character).	 Participants	were	
instructed	to	listen	to	the	materials	carefully	and	attentively,	and	they	were	informed	that	
this	 would	 be	 followed	 by	 questions	 on	 their	 appreciation	 of	 the	 story	 and	 narrative	
engagement.	 After	 each	 story,	 participants	 responded	 to	 the	 appreciation	 items,	 the	
emotional	engagement,	and	mental	imagery	questions.	This	was	followed	by	3	more	tasks	
which	 were	 presented	 in	 random	 order.	 One	 of	 the	 3	 tasks	 was	 a	 baseline	 condition	 in	
which	 participants	 listened	 to	 a	 reversed	 speech	 recording	 of	 the	 two	 story	 recordings.	
They	were	instructed	to	pay	attention	and	listen	carefully,	even	though	comprehension	was	
impossible	 (see	Chapter	4	 for	details	about	the	other	two	tasks).	There	was	a	break	after	
each	 task	 and	 the	 participant	 decided	 when	 to	 continue.	 After	 the	 experiment,	 a	 ToM	
localizer	task	was	conducted	(~7	min;	see	below)	followed	by	a	high	resolution	anatomical	







version	 (~10	min)	 including	 reading	 behaviour	 and	 preferences,	 the	 Fantasy	 scale	 of	 the	
Interpersonal	Reactivity	Index	(IRI,	Davis,	1983),	Need	for	Cognition	Scale	(Cacioppo,	Petty,	
Feinstein,	&	Jarvis,	1996),	Need	for	Affect	Scale	 (Maio	&	Esses,	2001),	Author	Recognition	
Test	 (Acheson	 et	 al.,	 2008;	 Koopman,	 2015),	 and	 the	 Empathy	 Quotient	 questionnaire	
(Baron-Cohen	&	Wheelwright,	2004),	in	this	order.	In	addition,	all	participants	completed	a	
modified	 online	 version	 of	 the	 Vividness	 of	 Visual	 Imagery	 Questionnaire	 (Marks,	 1972,	
1995)	 as	 part	 of	 signing	 up	 for	 the	 experiment.	 The	 entire	 experiment	 took	 about	 120	
minutes,	including	about	70	minutes	scanning	time.		
Stimulus	presentation	
Stimuli	 were	 presented	 with	 Presentation	 software	 (version	 16.2,	
http://www.neurobs.com),	 and	 recordings	 were	 presented	 through	 MR-compatible	






Images	 of	 blood-oxygen	 level	 dependent	 (BOLD)	 changes	 were	 acquired	 with	 a	 3T	
Siemens	 Magnetom	 Trio	 scanner	 (Erlangen,	 Germany)	 with	 a	 32-channel	 head	 coil.	 We	
used	 cushions	 and	 tape	 to	 minimize	 head	 movement.	 Functional	 images	 were	 acquired	





five	 volumes	 of	 each	 scanning	 block	 to	 control	 for	 T1	 equilibration,	 images	were	motion	
corrected	 and	 registered	 to	 the	 first	 image	 of	 each	 scanning	 block.	 The	 mean	 of	 the	










we	additionally	 tested	 for	between	story	differences	 (story	A	vs.	 story	B).	For	a	 follow	up	













regressors	by	 calculating	 the	Variance	 Inflation	Factors	 (VIFs)	 for	all	 regressors.	VIFs	were	
low	 (action	 events:	 mean=1.14,	 median=1.12,	 range=1.12-1.17;	 mentalizing	 events:	
mean=1.15,	median=1.17,	 range=1.06-1.22)	 and	well	 below	 values	 considered	 critical	 for	
estimability	of	regressors	(Kleinbaum,	Kupper,	Muller,	&	Nizam,	1998;	Mumford,	Poline,	&	
Poldrack,	 2015).	 At	 the	 single-subject	 level,	 statistical	 analysis	 was	 performed	 using	 a	
general	linear	model,	in	which	beta	weights	for	each	regressor	of	interest	are	estimated	for	
the	 time	 course	of	 each	voxel,	 using	multiple	 regression	analysis	 (Friston	et	 al.,	 1995).	 In	
this	model,	the	two	regressors	(mentalizing	and	action	events)	were	modelled	as	their	true	
durations,	 and	 convolved	 with	 a	 canonical	 hemodynamic	 response	 function	 (Friston,	
Holmes,	 Poline,	 Price,	 &	 Frith,	 1996).	 The	 motion	 estimates	 of	 the	 motion	 correction	
algorithm	 were	 modelled	 as	 regressors	 of	 no	 interest	 to	 account	 for	 head	 motion.	 The	
same	analysis	was	done	on	 the	data	 acquired	while	participants	 listened	 to	 the	 reversed	
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speech	 fragments,	 for	which	 the	mentalizing	 and	 action	 regressors	 are	meaningless.	 This	
served	as	a	baseline	condition.		Whole	brain	analysis	(WBA)	
We	 first	 performed	 a	 whole-brain	 analysis	 in	 which	 a	 statistical	 group	 analysis	 by	
contrasting	 the	 action	 regressor	 during	 story	 presentation	 between	 the	 two	 pronoun	
conditions	 (1st	 versus	 3rd	 person	 pronouns).	 Results	 were	 corrected	 for	 multiple	
comparisons	 by	 combining	 a	 voxel-wise	 threshold	 of	 p<0.005	 with	 a	 cluster	 extent	
threshold	of	54	voxel	 for	the	first	WBA	and	68	voxels	for	the	second	WBA.	These	settings	




hand	 (Bennett,	Wolford,	&	Miller,	 2009;	Woo,	Krishnan,	&	Wager,	 2014).	 The	 simulations	
took	 the	 amount	 of	 autocorrelation	 in	 the	 data	 into	 account,	 which	 leads	 to	 different	
thresholds	 for	 the	 two	analyses	 (Bennett	et	al.,	2009;	Woo	et	al.,	2014).	The	scripts	used	
were	taken	from	(https://www2.bc.edu/~slotnics/scripts.htm).		
To	 account	 for	 potential	 differences	 in	 strategies,	 independent	 of	 pronoun,	 a	 second	
WBA	was	performed	in	a	split	sample	approach	based	on	the	behavioural	responses	to	the	
two	perspective-specific	 items	 in	 the	 imagery	 questionnaire.	 For	 both	 stories,	 individuals	
who	scored	greater	than	or	equal	to	3	(of	4	possible)	for	the	1st	person	item	(‘At	times,	I	had	




threshold	 for	 these	 two	 items	 was	 due	 to	 a	 ceiling	 effect	 for	 the	 1st	 person	 item.	
Participants	who	 scored	 above	 threshold	 for	 both	 items	 in	 both	 stories	were	 labelled	 as	
Hypersimulators	(N=12).	The	remaining	participants	(N=10)	showed	high	variation	without	
a	 consistent	 pattern	 and	 were	 excluded	 in	 the	 second	 analysis.	 In	 the	 WBA	 we	 only	
compared	Enactors	and	Observers	directly	with	each	other	and	Hypersimulators	against	the	
enactor	 and	 observer	 group	 in	 two	 separate	models.	 An	 independent	 sample	 t-test	 was	







et	 al.,	 2006;	 Tomasino	 et	 al.,	 2007)	 and	 one	 TMS	 study	 (Papeo	 et	 al.,	 2011)	 in	which	 an	
effect	 of	 perspective	or	 pronoun	was	observed.	 The	 selected	ROIs	 in	which	we	expected	
increased	activation	for	1st	person	action	events	were	left	and	right	primary	motor	cortices	
(left	 MNI:	 -36,	 -19,	 48;	 right	 38,	 -18,	 45;	 Lacadie,	 Fulbright,	 Arora,	 Constable,	 &	
Papademetris,	 2008;	 pronoun	 effect	 reported	 by	 Papeo	 et	 al.,	 2011),	 medial	 posterior	
cingulate	 cortex	 (-6,	 -54,	 2;	 Tomasino	 et	 al.,	 2007),	 left	 calcarine	 gyrus	 (-10,	 -76,	 16;	
Tomasino	 et	 al.,	 2007),	 and	 dorsolateral	 prefrontal	 cortex	 (51,	 27,	 27;	 Saxe	 et	 al.,	 2006).	




regressor	 were	 extracted	 for	 each	 participant	 separately	 using	 the	 Marsbar	 toolbox	
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/)	 (Brett,	 Anton,	 Valabregue,	 &	 Poline,	 2002).	 The	 model	






stories	 on	 easy	 to	 understand	 (appreciation	 questionnaire,	 mean	 difference=0.33,	
s.d.=1.29,	 tdf=50=1.84,	 p=0.07)	 and	more	 likely	 to	 evoke	mental	 imagery	 of	 the	 situations	
narrated	 in	 the	story	 (imagery	questionnaire,	mean	difference=0.26,	 s.d.=1.00,	 tdf=50=1.91,	
p=0.06).	 For	 all	 other	 items,	 we	 observed	 no	 significant	 differences	 between	 1st	 and	 3rd	
person	 pronouns	 for	 either	 appreciation	 or	 the	 emotion	 or	 mental	 imagery	 items	 (all	
|t|<1.24,	 p>0.21).	 In	 contrast,	 for	 between	 story	 differences,	 we	 observed	 several	
statistically	significant	differences.	Story	B	(De	muur)	was	rated	higher	for	appreciation	by	
participants	 on	 the	 items	 well	 written	 (mean	 difference=0.33,	 s.d.=1.07,	 tdf=50=2.22,	
p<0.05),	 easy	 to	 understand	 (mean	 difference=0.45,	 s.d.=1.25,	 tdf=50=2.57,	 p<0.01),	
beautiful	 (mean	 difference=0.41,	 s.d.=1.08,	 tdf=50=2.72,	 p<0.01),	 and	 emotional	 (mean	











No	 contrast	 activations	 between	 1st	 and	 3rd	 person	 pronouns	 survived	 thresholding.	
Below	the	corrected	threshold	(clusters	>	10	voxels),	2	clusters	showed	higher	activations	
for	action	events	with	1st	person	pronouns	as	compared	to	3rd	person	pronouns,	in	the	left	
hippocampus	 (k=49,	 x=-42,	 y=20,	 z=6,	 Tmax=3.02,	 p<0.005	uncor.)	 and	 in	 the	 right	 insula	
(k=28,	 x=42,	 y=-14,	 z=-8,	 Tmax=2.90,	 p<0.005	 uncor.),	 and	 1	 cluster	 showing	 higher	
activation	 for	 3rd	 person	 as	 compared	 to	 1st	 person	 pronouns	 in	 the	 right	 middle	 and	
superior	frontal	gyrus	(k=34,	x=18,	y=20,	z=62,	Tmax=2.98,	p<0.005	uncor.).		
For	completeness,	we	report	the	results	of	the	comparisons	of	the	action	regressors	in	
1st	 and	 3rd	 person	 pronoun	 conditions	 compared	 to	 the	 baseline.	 Events	 with	 1st	 person	
pronouns	showed	increased	activations	in	the	left	and	right	precentral	and	postcentral	gyri,	
as	 well	 as	 in	 left	 inferior	 occipital	 gyrus	 (see	 Table	 3,	 Figure	 5).	 Events	 with	 3rd	 person	
pronouns	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 showed	 activations	 in	 right	 inferior	 occipital	 gyrus,	 and	 a	
region	 stretching	 from	 the	 left	middle	 temporal	 gyrus	 (MTG)	 towards	 hippocampus	 (see	
Table	3,	Figure	5).		ROI	analysis	






Table 3: Results of activations for 1st and 3rd person pronouns in action events as compared to 
baseline. 











18	 -30	 58	 3.90	 439	
26	 -32	 56	 2.92	 	
	 8	 -30	 56	 2.90	 	
L	 precentral,	 postcentral	
gyrus		
-20	 -28	 54	 3.61	 305	
-22	 -26	 62	 3.47	 	
	 -18	 -36	 54	 2.99	 	
L	inferior	occipital	gyrus	
-44	 -74	 -4	 3.52	 56	





R	inferior	occipital	gyrus	 18	 -86	 -16	 3.58	 157	
L	 middle	 temporal	 gyrus,	
hippocampus		
-40	 -6	 -22	 3.53	 115	
-34	 -12	 -22	 2.81	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
Figure 5: Regions which show higher activation during action events with 1st person pronouns 




Table 4: Differences in events with 1st and 3rd person pronouns referring to the agent of an action 
tested with a two-tailed paired sample t-test. No significant differences were observed in any of 










I	 0.05	 0.40	 0.08	 0.41	 1.38	 0.17	
R	M1	 She	 -0.03	 0.41	 	 	 	 	
L	M1	 I	 0.03	 0.35	 0.08	 0.37	 1.47	 0.15	




I	 -0.10	 0.48	 -0.02	 0.47	 -0.35	 0.73	




I	 -0.01	 0.54	 0.01	 0.62	 0.15	 0.88	
She	 -0.02	 0.63	 	 	 	 	
Mpcc	 I	 0.13	 0.80	 0.12	 0.75	 1.19	 0.24	
She	 0.00	 0.80	 	 	 	 	
Psts	 I	 0.01	 0.40	 -0.03	 0.41	 -0.44	 0.66	
She	 0.04	 0.37	 	 	 	 	
L	MT	 I	 0.07	 0.36	 0.04	 0.34	 0.90	 0.37	
She	 0.03	 0.35	 	 	 	 	
R	EBA	 I	 0.13	 0.80	 0.12	 0.75	 1.19	 0.24	
She	 0.00	 0.80	 	 	 	 	
L	postcen-
tral	gyrus	
I	 0.07	 0.26	 0.02	 0.24	 0.57	 0.57	





questionnaire	 we	 identified	 3	 groups	 which	 showed	 a	 consistent	 pattern	 across	 both	
stories.	Participants	who	scored	high	for	1st	person	perspective	taking	were	grouped	in	the	
Enactor	 group	 (N=15),	 whereas	 those	who	 scored	 high	 for	 3rd	 person	 perspective	 taking	
were	grouped	in	the	Observer	group	(N=14,	see	Data	analysis	for	more	details).	Participants	
who	 scored	 high	 for	 both	 items	 were	 put	 in	 a	 separate	 group	 labelled	 Hypersimulators	
(N=12).	To	test	 the	 initial	hypotheses	regarding	different	activations	 for	1st	and	3rd	person	






Table 5: Resulting activation clusters of comparing action events in enactors with the observer 
group and vice versa.  






R	frontolateral	pole	 16	 60	 10	 4.49	 96	
18	 58	 2	 3.36	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Observers	 >	
Enactors	
L	 middle	 and	 inferior	 occipital	
gyrus	/	lingual	gyrus	
-10	 -96	 0	 4.95	 1576	
-16	 -92	 8	 4.32	 	
-18	 -86	 -2	 4.17	 	
	 R	 middle	 and	 inferior	 occipital	
gyrus,	 lingual	 gyrus,	 calcarine	
gyrus	
26	 -86	 8	 4.52	 1127	
	 16	 -92	 -2	 4.13	 	
	 36	 -80	 -12	 3.83	 	
	 R	inferior	frontal	gyrus		 38	 34	 22	 4.87	 503	
	 54	 26	 30	 3.64	 	
	 48	 28	 22	 3.56	 	
	 L	 postcentral	 gyrus,	 supra-
marginal	 gyrus,	 posterior	 supe-
rior/middle	temporal	gyrus	
-54	 -18	 48	 4.46	 665	
	 -58	 -36	 16	 4.03	 	
	 -56	 -24	 20	 3.92	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 L	cerebellum	 -34	 -60	 -50	 4.29	 91	
	 R	 posterior	 superior	 temporal	
gyrus	
52	 -40	 10	 4.22	 324	
	 50	 -32	 2	 3.86	 	
	 64	 -38	 14	 2.77	 	
	 R	middle	temporal	gyrus	 44	 2	 -26	 4.15	 169	
	 56	 -6	 -22	 4.12	 	
	 62	 -14	 -18	 2.87	 	
	 R	middle	orbital	gyrus	 38	 42	 -12	 3.93	 109	
	 46	 46	 -12	 3.8	 	
	 24	 40	 -12	 3.01	 	
	 R	caudate	nucleus	 20	 2	 22	 3.47	 152	
	 22	 -8	 22	 3.43	 	
	 28	 -12	 32	 3.07	 	
	 R	lingual	gyrus	 16	 -72	 -12	 3.21	 71	
During	action	events,	enactors	compared	 to	observers	 showed	higher	activation	 in	an	
area	in	the	right	frontolateral	pole	(area	Fp1,	see	Bludau	et	al.,	2014)	(see	Table	5,	Figure	6).	
Observers	 compared	 to	 enactors	 showed	 increased	 activations	 bilaterally	 in	 the	 occipital	







Shared	 activations	 of	 Enactors	 and	 Observers	 as	 indicated	 by	 conjunction	 analysis	
(global)	 of	 both	 groups	 against	 baseline	 were	 found	 bilaterally	 in	 precentral	 and	 central	
sulci,	 and	 cuneus,	 as	 well	 as	 right	 insula,	 right	 thalamus,	 and	 right	 posterior	 inferior	
temporal	gyrus	(see	Table	6,	Figure	7).		





Table 6: Shared activations between Enactors and Observers 




L/R	 precentral	 sulcus,	 L/R	
central	sulcus	
18	 -28	 64	 2.75	 1603	
-4	 -26	 70	 2.63	 	
	 -24	 -20	 64	 2.56	 	
L/R	cuneus	 4	 -38	 50	 2.49	 96	
	
	 -6	 -32	 48	 1.65	 	
R	posterior	insula		 44	 -6	 6	 2.46	 138	
	 48	 2	 10	 2.03	 	
	
	 58	 0	 14	 1.81	 	
R	thalamus	 18	 -40	 6	 2.44	 347	
	 14	 -22	 6	 2.42	 	
	 	 24	 -44	 14	 2.20	 	
	 R	 posterior	 inferior	 temporal	
gyrus	
50	 -52	 -6	 2.05	 90	
	 54	 -58	 -12	 1.92	 	






Figure 6: Activations to action events depending on participants’ comprehension preference. 
Areas in which enactors showed higher activations than Observers (Enactors>Observers) are 
displayed in blue. Areas in which Observers showed higher activations than Enactors 
(Observers>Enactors) are displayed in yellow. In red, the conjunction of both groups is plotted 
(Enactors∩Observers). All activations are significant at p<0.05, corrected for multiple 
comparisons.  
Figure 7: Activations in which the Hypersimulator group shows higher activations as compared 
to the baseline (Hypersimulators > Baseline) are plotted in purple. These activations show large 
overlap with both the Enactor as well as the Observer group when compared to baseline 




There	were	 no	 significant	 differences	 between	 enactors	 and	 observers	 for	 any	 of	 the	
individual	 differences	 measured	 in	 the	 post	 scan	 test	 battery	 (see	 Table	 7).	 In	 the	
appreciation	measure,	 the	 enactor	 group	 rated	 our	 two	 stories	 higher	 on	 the	 item	 well	
written	(see	Table	8	for	details).		
	
Table 7: Individual differences measures between enactors and observers as tested in an 
independent two-sided t-test (two-tailed). There were no significant differences between the 
groups.  
	






How	 much	 attention	 do	
you	pay	to	writing	style?	
Enactors	 5.6	 1.06	 0.46	 0.95	 0.35	
Observer	 5.14	 1.51	 	 	 	
Do	you	like	reading?	
	
Enactors	 5.20	 1.57	 0.13	 0.21	 0.83	
Observer	 5.07	 1.69	 	 	 	
How	 many	 books	 did	 you	
read	last	year?	
Enactors	 8.13	 7.50	 2.60	 0.96	 0.35	
Observer	 5.53	 7.05	 	 	 	
How	often	do	you	read	
	
Enactors	 3.20	 0.94	 0.63	 1.80	 0.08	
Observer	 2.57	 0.94	 	 	 	
IRI_fantasy	scale	
	
Enactors	 24.13	 2.80	 0.56	 0.57	 0.57	
Observer	 23.57	 2.44	 	 	 	
NfC	
	
Enactors	 87.40	 12.35	 1.19	 0.27	 0.79	
Observer	 86.21	 11.62	 	 	 	
NfA	
	
Enactors	 47.20	 8.77	 -4.73	 -1.56	 0.13	
Observer	 51.93	 7.45	 	 	 	
ART	
	
Enactors	 8.53	 4.84	 -0.18	 -0.11	 0.92	
Observer	 8.71	 4.36	 	 	 	
EQ_score	
	
Enactors	 43.53	 8.70	 -0.61	 -0.17	 0.86	






Table 8: Differences in appreciation of stories between enactors and observers as tested in an 
independent two-sided t-test (two-tailed).  
	






interesting	 Enactors	 1.93	 0.86	 -0.07	 -0.23	 0.82	
Observer	 2.00	 0.65	 	 	 	
well	written	
	
Enactors	 1.57	 0.68	 -0.58	 -2.62	 0.02	
Observer	 2.14	 0.50	 	 	 	
Literary	 Enactors	 2.20	 0.92	 -0.06	 0.20	 0.84	
Observer	 2.14	 0.53	 	 	 	
easy	to	understand	
	
Enactors	 2.00	 0.87	 -0.11	 -0.34	 0.73	
Observer	 2.11	 0.81	 	 	 	
accessible	
	
Enactors	 2.17	 0.79	 -0.19	 -0.66	 0.52	
Observer	 2.36	 0.77	 	 	 	
thrilling	
	
Enactors	 1.80	 0.68	 -0.38	 -1.66	 0.11	
Observer	 2.18	 0.54	 	 	 	
beautiful	
	
Enactors	 2.37	 0.88	 --0.31	 -1.12	 0.27	
Observer	 2.68	 0.58	 	 	 	
fascinating	
	
Enactors	 1.93	 0.80	 -0.28	 -1.10	 0.28	
Observer	 2.21	 0.54	 	 	 	
emotional	
	
Enactors	 2.50	 0.85	 -0.29	 -1.00	 0.33	
Observer	 2.79	 0.67	 	 	 	
Sad	 Enactors	 3.20	 0.17	 0.13	 0.57	 0.57	
Observer	 3.07	 0.15	 	 	 	
Discussion		
In	 the	present	 study,	we	 tested	 the	effect	 of	 perspective	on	neural	 activations	during	
language	comprehension.	We	manipulated	perspective	with	1st	or	3rd	person	pronouns	that	
refer	to	the	protagonist	in	literary	narratives.	Our	results	showed	no	evidence	for	an	overall	
effect	 of	 perspective	 in	 the	 stories.	 Despite	 showing	 different	 focal	 areas	 of	 activation	
between	 the	 action	 regressors	 during	 listening	 and	 the	 low	 level	 baseline	 condition,	 no	
differences	 were	 found	 in	 the	 WBA	 when	 comparing	 events	 in	 1st	 and	 3rd	 person	
perspective	directly	with	each	other.		
Given	 our	 relatively	 large	 sample	 size	 and	 the	 combination	 of	 behavioural	 and	
neuroimaging	 methods,	 we	 were	 able	 to	 inspect	 for	 whether	 individual	 differences	
accounted	 for	 the	 lack	 of	 difference	 between	 personal	 pronouns.	 We	 conducted	 a	 split	





different	 modes	 in	 reading	 comprehension	 associated	 with	 perspective.	 However,	 these	
effects	 were	 not	 driven	 by	 narrative	 perspective,	 but	 rather	 by	 individual	 preferences	 in	
comprehension.	Readers	who	scored	high	on	the	item,	‘At	times,	I	had	the	feeling	of	seeing	
right	 through	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 protagonist’	 (Enactors)	 showed	 activations	 in	 a	 different	
network	than	readers	who	scored	high	on	the	question	‘During	reading,	I	saw	the	situations	
in	my	mind	as	 if	 I	was	an	eyewitness’	 (Observers).	Another	group	seemed	 to	 simulate	1st	
and	3rd	person	perspective	simultaneously	(Hypersimulators),	as	evidenced	by	high	scores	
on	 both	 behavioural	 items	 as	 well	 as	 large	 overlap	 in	 activated	 networks	 with	 both	 the	
Enactor	and	the	Observer	group.		
Comparing	brain	activations	of	Enactors	and	Observers,	we	found	significant	differences	
between	 the	 two	 groups.	 When	 listening	 to	 action	 events,	 Enactors	 showed	 stronger	




inferior	 frontal	 gyrus,	 left	 postcentral,	 left	 supramarginal,	 and	 left	 and	 right	 posterior	
superior	 and	middle	 temporal	 gyri.	 In	 addition,	 we	 found	 activations	 in	 areas	 like,	 right	






choice	 was	 motivated	 by	 previous	 studies	 reporting	 pronoun	 effects,	 we	 did	 not	 find	
evidence	 for	 a	 pronoun-dependent	modulation	 in	 neural	 activation.	 In	 fact,	 our	 findings	
provide	evidence	that	comprehension	is	not	affected	by	manipulating	personal	pronouns.	A	
follow-up	 analysis	 for	 which	 we	 split	 the	 sample	 based	 on	 the	 individual	 preferences	 in	
perspective	 taking	 during	 comprehension	 however	 revealed	 substantial	 differences	 in	
neural	networks	associated	with	1st	or	3rd	person	simulating.	What	is	striking	when	looking	
at	 the	 activations	 in	 Observers	 and	 Hypersimulators,	 as	 compared	 to	 Enactors,	 is	 the	








Tomasino	 &	 Rumiati	 2013).	 Our	 study	 adds	 strong	 experimental	 evidence	 for	 this	 idea.	
However,	 none	of	 our	behavioural	measures	 related	 to	 reading	 experience	 indicates	 that	
selecting	a	perspective	for	comprehension	has	consequences	for	affective	and	experiential	
aspects	of	reading	fiction.	Therefore,	it	remains	an	open	question	why	individuals	select	a	
particular	perspective	 to	 construct	a	mental	model	and	how	selection	of	 this	perspective	
relates	to	reading	experience.		
The	 fact	 that	both	original	 stories	were	 in	1st	person	perspective	 is	a	 confound	 in	our	
design	 which	 could	 have	 influenced	 our	 results.	 By	 having	 native	 speakers	 check	 the	
readability	of	the	stories	we	tried	to	overcome	this	 issue,	but	cannot	claim	that	there	are	
no	 other	 features	 (beyond	 our	 pronoun	manipulation)	 in	 the	 text	which	 could	 have	 one	
pronoun	condition	more	than	the	other.	However,	it	is	unlikely	that	modifications	to	one	of	
the	 story	 (from	1st	 to	3rd	person)	 can	account	 for	 the	absence	of	 an	effect	 as	we	did	not	
observe	behavioural	differences	for	the	comparison	between	the	two	pronoun	conditions	
(whereas	we	do	find	differences	between	stories).	Participants	were	equally	likely	to	select	
one	 comprehension	mode	 or	 another	 as	 indicated	 by	 comparable	 group	 size	 in	 all	 three	
groups.	 If	 the	 fact	 that	 the	stories	were	originally	written	 in	1st	person	would	be	a	strong	
influence,	we	would	expect	that	the	majority	of	participants	would	select	an	Enactor	mode	
for	 comprehension,	 which	 is	 not	 the	 case.	 Another	 limitation	 of	 the	 study	 is	 that	 our	
interpretations	 are	 restricted	 to	 action	 events.	 For	 future	 research,	 we	 advocate	 the	
importance	 of	 accounting	 for	 different	 types	 of	 events	 and	 contexts.	 The	 insight	 that	
strategy	 or	 preference	 effects	 can	 overrule	 the	 effect	 of	 a	 well-established	 experimental	
manipulation	is	a	valuable	insight	for	future	studies.	This	finding	raises	the	question	on	how	

















However,	 there	 is	 little	 evidence	 that	 simulation	 and	 imagery	 activate	 the	 same	 neural	
networks.	 In	 the	 present	 study,	 we	 critically	 investigated	 the	 similarities	 and	 differences	
between	 simulation	 and	 mental	 imagery,	 during	 the	 comprehension	 of	 narratives.	 With	
functional	MRI,	we	tested	if	simulation	during	comprehension	shares	neural	resources	with	
mental	 imagery,	 which	 can	 be	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 agent	 (1st	 person)	 and	 the	
perspective	of	an	observer	(3rd	person).	Participants	(N=60)	listened	to	two	literary	stories,	
during	 an	 fMRI	 session.	 Subsequently,	 the	 same	 stories	were	 presented	 twice	 again	 and	
participants	were	 instructed	to	‘imagine	being	the	main	character'	 (1st	person	perspective	
imagery,	 IM1)	or	 to	 ‘imagine	being	an	observer'	 (3rd	person	perspective	 imagery,	 IM3).	 In	
the	analysis,	we	focused	on	neural	responses	to	action	and	mentalizing	events	as	these	are	
canonical	examples	of	simulation.	When	looking	at	the	brain	activation	during	simulation	of	




the	3	 tasks	 (listening,	 IM1,	 IM3)	 activated	 independent	 sets	of	 regions	even	when	 taking	











are	 presented	 with	 words	 related	 to	 action	 and	 perception	 (e.g.	 Hauk	 et	 al.	 2004;	 Aziz-
Zadeh	et	al.	2006;	Bergen	&	Wheeler	2010;	Tettamanti	et	al.	2005;	Willems	et	al.	2010;	see	
Kiefer	&	Pulvermüller	2012	for	review).	Simulation	is	supposed	to	be	based	on	(partial)	re-
activations	 of	 perceptual,	 motor	 and	 introspective	 states	 (e.	 g.	 Barsalou	 2009;	 Barsalou	
2008).	 There	 is	 evidence	 that	 action	 execution,	 motor	 imagery,	 action	 observation,	 and	
action	language	processing	activate	at	 least	partially	the	same	set	of	brain	regions.	This	 is	
taken	as	support	for	the	hypothesis	that	all	these	processes	share	neural	resources	and	rely	
on	 the	 same	 cognitive	mechanisms	 (see	 review	 in	 Taylor	 &	 Zwaan,	 2009).	 However,	 the	







Another	 type	of	simulation	 is	mentalizing,	which	 is	understood	as	 the	social	cognition	
equivalent	 to	 sensorimotor	 simulation.	 Mentalizing	 refers	 to	 the	 understanding	 and	
processing	of	mental	states	of	other	agents	by	using	the	own	mind	as	a	proxy	for	simulating	
other	 agents’	 states	 of	 mind	 (Decety	 &	 Chaminade	 2003;	 Frith	 &	 Frith	 2006).	 At	 the	
conceptual	 level,	sensorimotor	simulation	and	mentalizing	can	be	considered	two	aspects	
of	mental	 simulation,	as	was	argued	by	Goldman	 (Goldman,	2006).	Mentalizing	has	been	
associated	 with	 activation	 of	 a	 set	 of	 regions	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘mentalizing	 network’	
(Decety	&	Chaminade,	2003;	Frith	&	Frith,	2006;	Tamir	&	Mitchell,	2010).		
Aside	 from	 the	 existing	 evidence	 that	 there	 are	 different	 types	 of	 simulation,	 which	
potentially	work	at	different	levels	of	cognition,	there	is	also	a	debate	over	the	general	role	
of	 simulation	 for	 cognition.	 The	 typical	 sensorimotor	 simulation	 effects	 are	 mostly	
associated	 with	 semantic	 processing	 of	modality	 specific	 word	meaning.	 Other	 accounts	
(e.g.	Barsalou,	2008,	2009,	Jeannerod,	2001,	2006)	understand	simulation	is	also	as	a	much	
more	 basic	 computational	mechanism	which	 unifies	 information	 across	 various	 forms	 of	
cognition	 like	 perception,	 imagery	 and	 social	 cognition	 (see	 also	 Chapter	 1).	 As	 such,	
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exclusive.	 These	 results	 seem	 to	 contradict	 accounts	 on	 embodied	 semantics	 which	
propose	 that	 the	 retrieval	 of	 action	word	meaning	 comprises	 of	 a	 subconscious	 form	 of	
covert	re-enactment	similar	to	motor	 imagery	(e.g.	Gallese	&	Lakoff	2005).	 In	the	present	




contextual	 setting	 (van	 Dam	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Papeo	 et	 al.	 2012;	 for	 review	 see	 Kiefer	 &	
Pulvermüller	 2012;	 Willems	 &	 Casasanto	 2011).	 It	 has	 further	 been	 argued	 that	
sensorimotor	 simulations	 play	 a	 more	 central	 role	 for	 comprehension	 in	 more	 situated	
(natural)	 language	 use	 by	 facilitating	 the	 construction	 of	 situation	 models	 (Bower	 &	
Morrow	1990;	Jacobs	2015;	Schrott	&	Jacobs	2011;	Zwaan	2004;	Zwaan	&	Radvansky	1998;	
see	 Zwaan	 2014	 for	 a	 review,	 see	 Chapter	 1).	 Situation	 models	 are	 globally	 coherent	
representations	of	specific	situations,	which	integrate	simulations	from	multiple	modalities.	







Speer	et	al.	2009;	Kurby	and	Zacks,	2013).	Consistent	with	 the	 idea	 that	simulation	has	a	
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more	 fundamental	 function	 on	 the	 level	 of	 discourse,	 Kurby	 and	 Zacks	 (2013)	
demonstrated	 in	 two	 studies	 that	 modality	 specific	 sensorimotor	 simulation	 and	 the	







simulation	 (involving	 re-enactment	 of	 mental	 states	 and	 their	 causators;	 1st	 person	
perspective).	Perspective	taking	has	not	received	much	attention	from	embodied	accounts	
on	language	(but	see	Brunyé	et	al.,	2009;	Ditman	et	al.,	2010).	Yet	it	is	commonly	assumed	
in	 embodied	 theories	 that	 language	 processing	 and	 resulting	mental	 representations	 are	
constructed	from	a	1st	person	perspective	by	default	(Barsalou,	1999a;	Bergen	&	Wheeler,	
2010;	 see	 review	 in	 Beveridge	 &	 Pickering,	 2013;	 Borghi	 &	 Scorolli,	 2009;	 Glenberg	 &	
Kaschak,	 2002;	Wu	&	Barsalou,	 2009;	 Zwaan	&	 Taylor,	 2006).	Given	 the	 concerns	 on	 the	
effects	of	 individual	differences	and	task	–dependent	requirements	on	perspective	taking,	
the	 perspective	 being	 taken	 may	 not	 default	 from	 a	 1st	 person	 processing	 mode	 (e.g.	
Tomasino	&	 Rumiati,	 2013).	 Recent	 experimental	 research	 has	 shown	 that	 readers	 show	
different	preferences	in	perspective	taking	during	narrative	comprehension	(see	Chapter	3;	
Hartung,	Hagoort,	&	Willems,	in	prep.):	whereas	some	rely	on	an	enactive	strategy	during	




(Hanakawa,	 Dimyan,	 &	 Hallett,	 2008;	 Jeannerod	 &	 Decety,	 1995;	 Lorey	 et	 al.,	 2009).	
Willems	and	colleagues	found	that	left-	and	right-handed	participants	imagine	simple	hand	
actions	according	 to	 their	dominant	hand	 (Willems,	Toni,	et	al.,	2010b).	Ruby	and	Decety	
(2001)	directly	tested	the	effect	of	1st	and	3rd	person	perspective	on	motor	 imagery.	They	
found	 that	 1st	 person	 imagery	 showed	 a	 strong	 left	 lateralization	 including	 activations	 in	
areas	 in	 inferior	 parietal	 gyrus,	 precentral	 gyrus,	 occipito-temporal	 junction	 and	 anterior	
insula,	 whereas	 3rd	 person	 perspective	 was	 associated	 more	 with	 the	 right	 hemisphere	




similarity	between	1st	 and	3rd	person	motor	 imagery	as	 shown	by	 common	activations	 in	
supplementary	motor	area	(SMA),	precentral	gyrus,	precuneus	and	area	MT	(V5).		
A	study	by	Vogeley	and	colleagues	(2001),	which	focused	on	mentalizing	about	oneself	
and	 others	 found	 similar	 dissociations:	 Mentalizing	 about	 others	 activated	 anterior	
cingulate	 cortex	 and	 left	 temporo-polar	 regions,	 whereas	 self-related	 mentalizing	 was	
associated	 with	 activations	 in	 right	 temporo-parietal	 junction	 (TPJ),	 anterior	 cingulate	







simulation	 of	 action	 and	 mentalizing	 events	 and	 motor	 imagery,	 in	 1st	 and	 3rd	 person	
perspective	 during	 comprehension	 of	 literary	 stories.	 We	 wanted	 to	 know	 whether	
simulation	during	comprehension	activates	the	same	neural	regions	as	 imagery.	Based	on	






–	 the	 first	 time	 without	 a	 specific	 task	 (Listening),	 followed	 by	 two	 more	 times	 where	
participants	were	instructed	to	‘imagine	the	story	from	the	perspective	of	the	protagonist’	
(1st	 person	 imagery,	 IM1),	 and	 to	 imagine	 the	 story	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 an	 observer	
who	 is	not	participating	 in	the	ongoing	events’	 (3rd	person	 imagery,	 IM3).	 It	was	assumed	
that	 the	 listening	 condition	 led	 to	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 simulation	 can	 naturally	 occur.	 A	
baseline	 run	 with	 unintelligible	 (reversed)	 speech	 was	 used	 as	 a	 control	 condition.	 The	
order	of	the	two	imagery	and	the	baseline	tasks	was	counterbalanced	across	participants,	







Barsalou,	 2008;	 Hétu	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Iachini,	 2011)	 we	 expected	 substantial	 overlap	 of	
activations	during	comprehension	and	imagery.	Specifically,	we	expected	overlap	in	motor	
and	premotor	 areas	 for	 action	events	 and	 in	 areas	 linked	 to	 the	mentalizing	network	 for	
mentalizing	events	(see	Introduction).	In	terms	of	the	relationships	between	simulation	and	
perspective,	we	expected	 that	 the	overlap	between	 simulation	 and	1st	 person	 imagery	 is	
more	 likely	 in	 participants	 with	 1st	 person	 preference	 (Enactors),	 whereas	 overlap	 of	
simulation	and	3rd	person	imagery	is	more	likely	in	participants	with	3rd	person	preference.	
Moreover,	we	expected	 that	 the	 imagery	 tasks	would	 result	 in	 additional	 involvement	of	
neural	 resources	 from	 the	 imagery	 network	 (McNorgan,	 2012),	 and	 areas	 of	 executive	
function	and	cognitive	control	for	imagery.	These	additional	activations,	we	expected	to	be	




Sixty	 healthy,	 native	 speakers	 of	 Dutch	 without	 psychiatric	 or	 neurological	 problems	
were	recruited	for	the	experiment	(27	male,	33	female,	mean	age=22.95	years,	s.d.=3.72,	
range	18-35).	Participants	were	naïve	as	to	the	purpose	of	the	experiment,	had	normal	or	
corrected-to-normal	 vision	 and	 no	 hearing	 problems.	 Written	 informed	 consent	 was	
obtained	 prior	 to	 the	 study,	 and	 ethical	 approval	 was	 obtained	 from	 the	 local	 ethics	
committee	 (CMO	 Committee	 on	 Research	 Involving	 Human	 Subjects,	 Arnhem-Nijmegen,	
The	 Netherlands,	 protocol	 number	 2001/095),	 in	 line	 with	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Helsinki.	
Participants	were	paid	in	money	at	the	end	of	the	study.	After	data	exclusion	(see	below	for	
details),	the	data	of	52	participants	were	used	in	the	final	analysis	for	the	group	average	(23	
male,	 29	 female,	mean	age=23.06	 years,	 s.d.=3.40,	 range	18-35).	 The	 comparison	groups	
for	 the	 listening	 task	 were	 subsets	 from	 this	 sample	 grouped	 for	 comprehension	
preference.	 We	 used	 the	 Enactor	 group	 (preference	 for	 comprehension	 in	 1st	 person	






removed	 the	 entire	 dataset	 because	 one	 of	 the	 imagery	 tasks	 was	 missing.	 Another	
participant	was	removed	from	the	analysis	because	of	 falling	asleep	during	the	scan.	Five	
more	 datasets	were	 excluded	 from	 the	 analysis	 due	 to	 data	 quality	 because	 of	 artefacts	
from	the	scanner	and/or	excessive	movement	(>	1	voxel,	3.5	mm).	One	additional	dataset	




We	 selected	 two	 short	 stories	 from	 Dutch	 fiction	 as	 stimuli	 for	 the	 experiment,	 De	
Mexicaanse	hond	 (‘The	Mexican	dog’)	by	Marga	Minco	(published	1990,	1236	words)	and	
De	muur	(‘The	wall’)	by	Peter	Minten	(published	2013,	1121	words).	Both	stories	are	typical	
short	 stories	with	a	 limited	number	of	 characters,	no	 introduction,	and	open	ending	 (see	










The	 stories	 were	 presented	 as	 audio	 recordings	 in	 the	 experiment.	 Recordings	 were	
spoken	at	a	normal	rate,	 in	a	music	recording	studio	by	a	female	native	speaker	of	Dutch.	
The	recordings	were	between	7.00	and	7.30	minutes	long	(De	Mexicaanse	hond:	original=7	
minutes	 17	 seconds,	 version	 2=7	 minutes	 23	 seconds;	 De	 muur:	 original=7	 minutes	 01	
seconds,	version	2=7	minutes	04	seconds).	For	the	volume	test	we	used	the	first	56	seconds	
of	 another	 story	which	was	not	used	 in	any	other	part	of	 the	experiment	 (De	 invaller	 by	
René	 Appel,	 published	 2003,	 excerpt=157	 words).	 The	 recordings	 were	 made	 in	 one	
continuous	 reading	 session	 for	 each	 story.	 When	 speaking	 errors	 occurred,	 the	 speaker	
started	 again	 from	 several	 words	 before.	 The	 audio	 files	 were	 processed	 by	 cutting	 out	
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speech	 errors	 and	 other	 random	 noises	 such	 as	 page	 turning	 and	 coughing,	 and	 the	













the	protagonists	of	the	stories	(9	 items)	and	experience	of	mental	 imagery	(6	 items)	after	
each	story	presentation	 (for	a	complete	 list	 see	supplementary	material).	The	 items	were	
based	on	the	emotional	engagement	and	imagery	scale	of	the	story	world	absorption	scale	
(SWAS,	Kuijpers	et	al.,	2014)	with	two	additional	items	addressing	perspective	taking.	These	
two	additional	 items	were	 ‘At	 times,	 I	had	 the	 feeling	of	 seeing	 right	 through	the	eyes	of	
the	 protagonist’	 (1st	 person	 perspective)	 and	 ‘During	 reading,	 I	 saw	 the	 situations	 in	my	
mind	 as	 if	 I	 was	 an	 eyewitness’	 (3rd	 person	 perspective).	 Participants	 responded	 to	 the	
items	on	a	4-point	scale	ranging	from	'I	totally	disagree’	(1)	to	'I	totally	agree'	(4).		
Individual	differences	measures	
For	 reasons	 not	 reported	 in	 Chapter	 3	 and	 4,	 we	 collected	 several	 measures	 for	
individual	 differences	 from	 each	 participant	 (see	 Chapter	 3	 for	 more	 details).	 Before	
participants	could	participate	in	the	study,	they	filled	out	an	online	version	of	the	Vividness	
of	 Visual	 Imagery	 Questionnaire	 (VVIQ,	 Marks	 1972,1995)	 with	 some	 additional	 items.	
After	 the	 experiment,	 participants	 filled	 in	 a	 battery	 of	 questionnaires	 consisting	 of	 self-




al.	 1996),	Need	 for	Affect	 Scale	 (NAS,	Maio	&	Esses	2001),	Author	Recognition	Test	 (ART,	
Acheson	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Koopman	 2015),	 and	 the	 Empathy	 Quotient	 questionnaire	 (Baron-








was	always	the	 listening	task,	 in	which	subjects	 listened	to	two	story	recordings	and	after	








to	 engage	 in	mental	 imagery	 by	 either	 taking	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	main	 character	 (1st	
person	perspective	imagery,	IM1)	or	the	perspective	of	an	uninvolved	observer	(3rd	person	
perspective	 imagery,	 IM3).	 The	 instructions	 for	 IM1:	 ‘While	 listening,	 imagine	 that	 you	





imagery	 task	 was	 preceded	 by	 a	 practice	 task,	 in	 which	 the	 subject	 practiced	 the	
perspective	taking	in	imagery,	while	listening	to	short	narratives	consisting	of	8	sentences.	
For	the	baseline	condition,	participants	were	presented	with	the	reversed	speech	recording	






task)	 plus	 the	 baseline	 recording.	 In	 addition,	 we	 did	 a	 ToM	 localizer	 task	 and	 a	 high	
resolution	 anatomical	 scan	 (~5min)	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 scanning	 session.	 Finally,	 the	
participant	was	taken	out	of	the	scanner	and	after	a	short	rest,	filled	in	the	post	scan	test	
battery	 on	 a	 paper	 version	 (~10	 min).	 The	 entire	 experiment	 took	 about	 120	 minutes,	
including	about	70	minutes	scanning	time.		
Stimulus	presentation	
Stimuli	 were	 presented	 with	 Presentation	 software	 (version	 16.2,	
http://www.neurobs.com).	 Auditory	 stimuli	 were	 presented	 through	 MR-compatible	
earphones.	 All	 visual	 stimuli	 (questionnaires,	 instructions,	 etc.)	 were	 projected	 onto	 a	
screen	using	a	projector	outside	the	MR	scanner	room,	which	could	be	seen	by	participants	
through	 a	mirror	mounted	 over	 the	 head	 coil.	 Responses	 to	 the	 questionnaires	 and	 the	
mentalizing	 localizer	 task	 were	 recorded	 with	 a	 4	 button	 response	 device	 (right	 hand).	
While	an	auditory	stimulus	was	presented,	no	response	was	expected.		
FMRI	data	acquisition	and	pre-processing	
Images	 of	 blood-oxygen	 level	 dependent	 (BOLD)	 changes	 were	 acquired	 on	 a	 3T	
Siemens	 Magnetom	 Trio	 scanner	 (Erlangen,	 Germany)	 with	 a	 32-channel	 head	 coil.	 We	
used	 cushions	 and	 tape	 to	minimize	 participants’	 head	movement.	We	 used	 earphones,	
which	combined	hearing	protection	from	the	scanner	noise	and	audio	presentation	of	the	
stories.	Functional	images	were	acquired	using	a	fast	T2*-weighted	3D	EPI	sequence	(Poser,	
Koopmans,	Witzel,	Wald,	&	Barth,	 2010b)	with	 high	 temporal	 resolution	 (TR:	 880ms,	 TE:	
28ms,	flip	angle:	14	degrees,	voxel	size:	3.5	x	3.5	x	3.5mm,	36	slices).	High	resolution	(1	x	1	
x	 1.25mm)	 structural	 (anatomical)	 images	 were	 acquired	 using	 an	MP-RAGE	 T1	 GRAPPA	
sequence.	 Data	 were	 pre-processed	 using	 the	 Matlab	 toolbox	 SPM8	
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).	After	 removing	 the	 first	 five	volumes	of	each	 scanning	
run	to	control	for	T1	equilibration,	images	were	motion	corrected	and	registered	to	the	first	







The	 auditory	 recordings	 of	 the	 stories	were	 scored	 for	 time	windows	 in	which	 action	
and	mentalizing	 events	 were	 presented	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly	 (we	 also	 scored	 an	 action	
when	the	action	was	implied	e.g.	by	mentioning	the	sound	caused	by	action	instead	of	the	
action	 itself).	 The	 scoring	 was	 done	 by	 three	 native	 speakers	 who	were	 naive	 as	 to	 the	
purpose	of	 the	 study	 (see	Kurby	&	Zacks,	2013;	and	Nijhof	&	Willems,	2015	 for	a	 similar	
approach).	In	case	of	disagreement,	a	fourth	naive	native	speaker	was	consulted.	For	action	
events,	we	scored	action	phrases,	implied	actions,	and	sequences	which	express	motion,	in	
which	 the	 protagonist	 of	 the	 story	 was	 the	 agent.	 For	 mentalizing	 events,	 we	 scored	




regressors	by	 calculating	 the	Variance	 Inflation	Factors	 (VIFs)	 for	all	 regressors.	VIFs	were	
low	 (action	 events:	 mean=1.14,	 median=1.12,	 range=1.12-1.17;	 mentalizing	 events:	
mean=1.15,	median=1.17,	 range=1.06-1.22)	 and	well	 below	 values	 considered	 critical	 for	
estimability	of	regressors	(Kleinbaum	et	al.,	1998;	Mumford	et	al.,	2015).		
	
Table 9: Examples for fMRI regressors for action and mentalizing events in the two version of 
the story. As action events we scored text sequences containing action phrases, implied action 
and motion. Mentalizing was scored for sequences containing information about mental states, 
feelings, thoughts and character traits. To control for text perspective, half of the stories were 







































































































At	 the	 single-subject	 level,	 statistical	 analysis	 was	 performed	 using	 a	 general	 linear	









listened	to	 the	reversed	speech	 fragments	 (baseline	condition),	 for	which	the	mentalizing	
and	action	regressors	are	meaningless.		
Statistical	 group	 analysis	was	 performed	by	 directly	 contrasting	 one	 of	 the	 regressors	
with	themselves	in	another	condition.	We	contrast	the	two	imagery	tasks	with	each	other,	
as	well	 as	with	 the	baseline	condition.	As	 the	 listening	 task	was	always	presented	before	
the	imagery	tasks	we	refrained	from	statistically	comparing	listening	and	imagery	to	avoid	
confounds	 due	 to	 order	 effects.	 Instead,	 we	 used	 the	 statistically	 thresholded	 maps	 of	
listening	 to	 stories	 compared	 to	baseline,	 depending	on	 the	preferred	perspective	of	 the	
listener	 (see	 Chapter	 3)	 to	 look	 for	 shared	 regions	 between	 simulation	 depending	 on	
preferred	perspective	and	imagery.	This	allowed	us	to	focus	on	the	similarities	of	Enactors	
with	 IM1	 and	Observers	with	 IM3	 and	we	were	 able	 to	 rule	 out	 potential	 dissimilarities	
based	on	strategy	effects.	Results	were	corrected	for	multiple	comparisons	by	combining	a	







responses	 to	 the	 two	 perspective	 items	 in	 the	 imagery	 questionnaire,	 we	 identified	 3	




mind	 as	 if	 I	 was	 an	 eyewitness’	 (3rd	 person	 perspective)	 were	 grouped	 in	 the	 Observer	
group	(N=14).	There	were	two	more	groups	with	participants	who	scored	above	threshold	
for	 both	 items	 in	 both	 stories	 (Hypersimulators,	 N=12)	 and	 a	 group	 without	 consistent	
pattern	 (N=10),	 but	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 present	 research	 question,	 we	 focus	 on	 the	
Enactor	and	the	Observer	group	only.		
The	behavioural	data	from	the	questionnaires	after	the	imagery	tasks	was	used	to	test	
whether	 subjects	 complied	 with	 the	 tasks.	 For	 all	 questionnaire	 items,	 the	 scale	 ranged	
from	1,	 (absolutely	disagree)	 to	4	 (absolutely	 agree).	Differences	between	 the	1st	 and	3rd	
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person	 imagery	 task	were	 tested	with	 a	 two	way	 repeated	measures	ANOVA,	 see	 results	
below.	
	In	 the	 imagery	 scale,	 there	 were	 two	 contrasting	 items	 addressing	 the	 perspective	
directly	(‘At	times,	I	had	the	feeling	of	seeing	right	through	the	eyes	of	the	protagonist.’	vs.	
‘While	 listening	 to	 the	 story,	 I	 saw	 the	 situations	which	were	described	 in	my	head	as	 if	 I	
was	an	observer.’)	which	we	used	as	an	indication	that	participants	were	able	to	do	the	task	
without	 problems.	 The	 separate	 analysis	 of	 these	 two	 items	 indicate	 that	 there	 was	 a	




agreement	 with	 ‘At	 times,	 I	 had	 the	 feeling	 of	 seeing	 right	 through	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	
protagonist.’	after	the	IM1	task	(t(51)=	8.38,	p<0.001,	mean	difference=1.17,	s.d.=1.01),	than	
after	 IM3.	 Vice	 versa,	 for	 ‘While	 listening	 to	 the	 story,	 I	 saw	 the	 situations	 which	 were	
described	in	my	head	as	if	I	was	an	observer.’	participants	scored	significantly	lower	for	IM1	




protagonist	 scale,	 there	 were	 significant	 main	 effects	 for	 imagery	 task	 (F(1,51)=25.53,	
p<0.001)	and	scale	(F(1,51)=88.42,	p<0.001)	as	well	as	a	significant	interaction	between	task	
and	 scale	 (F(1,51)=46.84,	 p<0.001).	 Paired	 t-test	 showed	 that	 participants	 scored	 lower	
during	 IM3	 compared	 to	 IM1	 for	 the	 emotional	 engagement	 with	 the	 protagonist	 scale	






Figure 8: Results of the behavioural responses to the two perspective specific items of the 
imagery questionnaire during IM1 and IM3. The item measuring 1st person perspective taking 
was At times, I had the feeling of seeing right through the eyes of the protagonist. (dark grey) 
which showed that people show higher agreement with during the 1st person imagery task as we 
expected. The item measuring perspective taking from an observers view (3rd person) was While 
listening to the story, I saw the situations which were described in my head as if I was an observer 
(light grey) on the other hand showed higher agreement during the 3rd person imagery task. 

















Figure 9: Activations to Action Events in 1st person Imagery (IM1; red), and Listening of 
Enactors (blue) and Observers (yellow), all results are displayed at p<0.05 corrected for multiple 
comparisons, and compared to baseline. No overlap of IM1 with IM3 was found in any regions. 
	
	
Figure 10: Activations to 
Action Events in 3rd 
person Imagery (IM3; 
red), and Listening of 
enactors (blue) & 
Observers (yellow), all 
results are displayed at 
p<0.05 corrected for 
multiple comparisons, 
and compared to 
baseline. No overlap of 
Listening with IM3 was 





Figure 11: Activations to Mentalizing Events in 1st person Imagery (IM1; red). Acti-vations 
during listening without engaging in imagery by enactors (blue) and Observers (yellow), are 
plotted on top. All results are displayed at p<0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons, and 
compared to the baseline. There was no overlap in activations of the 1st person imagery task with 
enactors during comprehension. Overlap of observers during comprehension IM3 was found in 
left and right middle temporal gyri, left middle occipital gyrus, and right superior occipital 
gyrus.  
 
Figure 12: Activations to Mentalizing Events in 3rd person Imagery (IM3; red). Activations 
during listening without engaging in imagery by enactors (blue) and Observers (yellow), are 
plotted on top. All results are displayed at p<0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons, and 
compared to the baseline. There was no overlap in activations of the 3rd person imagery task 
with enactors during comprehension. Overlap of observers during comprehension and IM3 was 
found in left ACC.  
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Table10: Activations in areas associated with action events during IM1 and IM3 as compared to 
baseline.  




R	precuneus	 329	 3.97	 22	 -54	 20	
	 3.73	 14	 -56	 16	
L	calcarine	gyrus	/	
cuneus	
260	 3.81	 -12	 -60	 18	
	 3.4	 -24	 -50	 10	




138	 3.66	 38	 -56	 20	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
R	precuneus	 143	 3.49	 18	 -38	 48	
	 3.22	 20	 -44	 42	
	 2.68	 20	 -30	 50	





60	 3.28	 2	 20	 18	
	 2.75	 10	 20	 22	
	 	 	 	 		
Table 11: Activations in areas associated with mentalizing events during IM1 and IM3 as 
compared to baseline. 






153	 4.42	 46	 6	 -28	
	 3.04	 40	 14	 -26	
	 2.84	 50	 -10	 -18	
L	middle	occipital	
gyrus	
112	 3.9	 -32	 -82	 40	
	 3.02	 -26	 -76	 36	
R	cerebellum	 93	 3.7	 30	 -36	 -34	
	 2.99	 38	 -52	 -32	




71	 3.57	 -38	 -60	 18	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
R	superior	occipital	
gyrus	
209	 3.55	 44	 -78	 34	
	 3.49	 30	 -80	 46	
	 3.03	 26	 -86	 40	
L	middle	temporal	
gyrus	
57	 3.48	 -54	 -12	 -22	
	 2.95	 -54	 -2	 -22	
L	lingual	gyrus	 58	 3.38	 -6	 -58	 2	
R	superior	parietal	
lobule	
57	 3.33	 16	 -64	 56	
	 3.16	 16	 -64	 66	




58	 3.22	 36	 -36	 -14	
	 2.72	 30	 -38	 -20	
	 	 	 	 	
	




For	 the	mentalizing	 events,	we	 also	 found	 no	 difference	when	 contrasting	 1st	 and	 3rd	
person	imagery	directly.		
IM1	 compared	 to	 baseline	 was	 associated	 with	 activations	 in	 areas	 in	 right	 anterior	
middle	 temporal	 gyrus,	 right	parahippocampal	 and	 fusiform	gyrus,	 right	 superior	parietal	





IM3	 was	 associated	 with	 activations	 in	 left	 and	 right	 anterior	 cingulate	 cortex,	 right	
middle	frontal	and	right	orbital	gyrus,	as	well	as	right	parahippocampal	gyrus	and	fusiform	
gyrus,	and	 left	precuneus	 (see	Table	11,	Figure	12).	There	was	 some	overlap	of	 IM3	with	
the	Observer	group	during	Listening	in	the	left	ACC	(see	Figure	12).	
Discussion	
In	 the	 present	 study,	 we	 investigated	 functional	 similarities	 and	 differences	 of	
simulation	 during	 language	 comprehension	 and	 mental	 imagery	 in	 1st	 and	 3rd	 person	




>	Baseline	 late	cortex	 	 3.41	 6	 28	 14	
	 3.36	 -2	 32	 18	
R	middle	orbital	
gyrus	
102	 3.62	 14	 50	 -6	




61	 3.41	 28	 -26	 -14	
	 	 	 	 	
	 2.72	 30	 -36	 -14	
L	precuneus	 56	 3.22	 -6	 -48	 8	
	 2.81	 2	 -54	 6	
R	middle	frontal	
gyrus	
99	 3.13	 32	 36	 20	
	 2.89	 38	 48	 16	





regardless	of	perspective.	We	 found	no	 indication	 that	action	 language	comprehension	 is	
similar	 to	 imagery	of	action,	be	 it	 from	the	1st	or	3rd	person	perspective,	even	accounting	
for	 individual	 preferences	 in	 comprehension	 strategy.	 The	 fact	 that	 we	 found	 almost	 no	
overlap	of	activation	during	simulation	(listening)	with	mental	imagery	in	either	perspective	
is	 tentative	 evidence	 against	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 simulation	 and	 mental	 imagery	 are	
processes	 with	 shared	 neural	 resources.	 Instead,	 we	 found	 specializations	 for	 each	
perspective	 (1st	 and	 3rd)	 in	 both	 imagery	 and	 simulation	 during	 comprehension.	 Thus,	
despite	 the	 conceptual	 similarity	 of	 action	 simulation	 and	 action	 imagery,	 we	 have	
evidence	 that	 these	 two	processes	differ	 considerably	when	 looking	 into	 their	 associated	
neural	 activations	 (see	 also	Willems,	 Toni,	 et	 al.,	 2010b)	with	 perspective	 taking	 being	 a	
modulating	factor.		
We	 did	 not	 replicate	 previous	 findings	 on	 1st	 or	 3rd	 person	 perspective	 imagery	 of	
actions	(e.g.	Ruby	&	Decety	2001).	Imagery	of	actions	from	the	1st	person	perspective	was	




The	 direct	 comparison	 of	 action	 events	 in	 1st	 and	 3rd	 person	 imagery	 did	 not	 reveal	 any	
specific	activation	patterns.		
Mentalizing	events	
We	 replicated	 previous	 findings	 on	 perspective	 taking	 in	 mentalizing	 during	 imagery	
(Vogeley	 et	 al.,	 2001),	 but	 found	 no	 significant	 activations	 when	 contrasting	 1st	 and	 3rd	
person	imagery	directly.	Imaging	mental	states	from	the	1st	person	perspective	activated	a	
wide	 network	 including	 regions	 in	 right	 anterior	 middle	 temporal	 gyrus,	 right	
parahippocampal	and	fusiform	gyrus,	right	superior	parietal	 lobule,	as	well	as	 left	middle,	
and	 posterior	 middle	 temporal	 gyrus,	 left	 angular	 gyrus,	 and	 left	 lingual	 gyrus.	 Imaging	
mental	 states	 from	3rd	 person	perspective	was	 associated	with	 a	different	 set	 of	 regions,	
namely	activation	 in	anterior	 cingulate	cortex,	 right	middle	 frontal	gyrus	and	 right	orbital	
gyrus,	as	well	as	right	parahippocampal	and	fusiform	gyrus,	as	well	as	left	precuneus.		
Regarding	the	relation	of	imagery	and	simulation,	there	was	some	overlap	of	imagery	in	
3rd	 person	perspective	with	 the	 activations	 in	 the	Observer	 group	during	 Listening	 in	 the	
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left	 anterior	 cingulate	 cortex.	 Mentalizing	 in	 comprehension	 therefore	 shares	 resources	
with	 3rd	 person	 imagery	 and	 that	 3rd	 person	 imagery	 is	 potentially	 involved	 in	 narrative	
comprehension.	
General	discussion	
Action	 simulation	 during	 story	 comprehension	 was	 found	 to	 activate	 different	 areas	
compared	 to	 imagery	 in	 both	 1st	 person	 and	 3rd	 person	 perspective,	 even	 when	 taking	
comprehension	 preference	 into	 account.	 In	 fact,	 our	 results	 indicate	 that	 simulation	 and	
imagery	do	not	share	many	neural	resources,	indicating	that	the	underlying	processes	seem	
to	 be	 qualitatively	 different.	 Therefore,	 our	 results	 do	 not	 support	 the	 hypothesis	 that	
people	 generally	 engage	 in	 mental	 imagery	 during	 action	 language	 comprehension.	 In	
studies	with	similar	 findings	 (e.g.	Willems,	Toni,	et	al.,	2010)	 it	has	been	pointed	out	that	
the	observed	difference	between	imagery	and	simulation	could	be	attributed	to	asymmetry	
in	 the	 level	 of	 detail	 and	 specificity	 between	 the	 tasks,	 e.g.	 reading	 an	 infinitive	 verb	
compared	to	motor	imagery	of	the	associated	action.	Because	we	tested	this	hypothesis	on	
the	level	of	narrative,	we	can	rule	out	this	potential	confound.		
In	 contrast	 to	 action	 events,	 activations	 during	 comprehension	 of	mentalizing	 events	
partially	 overlapped	 with	 the	 activations	 which	 we	 found	 during	 mental	 imagery	 in	 3rd	
person	perspective.	This	 is	an	 indication	that	people	do	not	use	a	 ‘putting	yourself	 in	 the	
shoes	of	the	other’	strategy	to	understand	mental	states	and	feelings	of	fictional	characters	
in	narrative	comprehension.	This	inference	is	based	on	our	results	indicating	that	not	only	
different	 modalities,	 but	 also	 different	 cognitive	 mechanisms	 are	 involved	 in	 processing	
different	types	of	event.	This	is	in	line	with	the	findings	of	Wallentin	and	colleagues	(2013),	
who	 found	 that	 emotions	 experienced	 during	 narrative	 comprehension	 are	 based	 on	
different	cognitive	processes	for	action	and	mentalizing	events.	
Although	we	found	no	evidence	that	imagery	from	1st	and	3rd	person	perspective	rely	on	
different	 networks,	 we	 do	 find	 evidence	 that	 3rd	 person	 imagery	 is	 associated	 with	
increased	activation	 in	 frontal	areas	 linked	 to	executive	 function	 in	3rd	person	 imagery	as	
suggested	earlier	for	both	mentalizing	and	action	events	(Ruby	&	Decety	2001;	2003).	This	
can	 be	 taken	 as	 evidence	 that	 3rd	 person	 perspective	 taking	 indeed	 requires	 additional	
resources	compared	to	1st	person	perspective	(see	also	discussion	in	Chapter	2	and	3).		
As	we	only	tested	two	narratives,	and	there	are	limitations	to	our	design,	we	have	to	be	




1st	 person	 viewpoint.	 There	 is	 evidence	 that	 narrative	 style	 can	 guide	 mental	
representations,	and	despite	our	efforts	 to	balance	this	confound	with	replacing	personal	
pronouns	 referring	 to	 the	 protagonist	 in	 one	 of	 the	 narratives,	 we	 cannot	 exclude	 the	
possibility	 that	 other	 stylistic	 features	 have	 influenced	 simulation.	 However,	 given	 the	
results	 presented	 in	 Chapter	 3	 (based	 on	 the	 same	 dataset)	 in	 which	 we	 found	 that	
individual	 preference	 in	 comprehension	 strategy	 is	 much	 stronger	 than	 stimulus	 guided	
perspective	in	comprehension,	we	are	confident	to	rule	out	this	concern.		
It	 is	 unclear	 whether	 the	 effects	 we	 found	 are	 specific	 for	 fiction	 comprehension.	
Further	 research	 is	 needed	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 effects	 we	 found	 are	 valid	 for	
different	types	of	narratives.		
Our	results	provide	evidence	that	simulation	in	language	comprehension	does	not	share	
relevant	 functional	 properties	 with	 mental	 imagery.	 We	 find	 no	 evidence	 for	 shared	
resources	of	 simulation	and	 imagery	 for	action	events,	 and	 therefore	cannot	 support	 the	


















influence	the	subjective	 reading	experience.	However,	 there	 is	also	evidence	that	 readers	
have	 different	 preferences	 for	 immersing	 themselves	 in	 a	 story	 from	 1st	 or	 3rd	 person	




situations	 described	 in	 factual	 texts.	 Reading	 fictional	 texts	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 seems	 to	
improve	 memory	 for	 exact	 wordings	 and	 expressions,	 e.g.	 how	 something	 is	 expressed	
rather	than	the	information	itself.	Most	studies	that	tested	for	differences	in	reading	factual	
and	fictional	texts	used	a	‘newspaper’	versus	‘literature’	comparison.	In	the	present	study,	
we	 investigated	 the	effect	of	 genre	expectation	on	experiential	 aspects	of	 reading	with	a	
more	subtle	‘fact	versus	fiction’	manipulation	labelling	short	stories	as	either	based	on	true	
events	 or	 as	 fictional	 stories	 made	 up	 by	 the	 writer.	 In	 addition,	 we	 tested	 whether	
narrative	perspective	or	 individual	preference	 in	perspective	taking	affects	reading	fact	or	




Finally,	 participants	 did	 a	 picture	 recognition	 task	 in	 which	 they	 were	 presented	 with	
pictures	of	events	from	1st	or	3rd	person	perspective	and	had	to	decide	whether	the	event	
depicted	on	the	picture	happened	in	the	story	they	just	read	or	not.	Results	show	that	the	





real	 or	 fictional	 does	 not	 affect	 experiential	 aspects	 of	 reading	 or	 how	 fast	 participants	
read.	 	From	this	null	 finding	on	the	fact	versus	fiction	manipulation	we	conclude	that	 it	 is	
not	 the	 fact	whether	a	 story	 is	 true	or	not	which	 influence	 reading	behaviour,	but	 rather	





We	know	that	perspective	 taking	 is	an	 important	 strategy	 in	 language	comprehension	
especially	on	the	level	of	situation	models.	For	example,	when	reading	a	novel,	readers	can	
get	 immersed	 as	 if	 they	 would	 experience	 the	 situations	 from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 the	
protagonist	 or	 from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 an	 eyewitness	 who	 is	 merely	 observing.	 Narrative	
techniques	like	focalization	and	the	use	of	personal	pronouns	or	proper	names	referring	to	
agents	 of	 actions	 are	 thought	 to	 guide	 perspective	 taking	 during	 comprehension	 and	 to	












their	 preference	 in	 perspective	 taking	 during	 comprehension	 and	 that	 this	 preference	 is	
stronger	than	the	effect	of	pronoun	referring	to	the	protagonist	(see	Chapter	3).		
It	 is	unclear,	whether	 the	effects	of	narrative	perspective	and	 individual	preference	 in	
perspective	 taking	 on	 reading	 are	 specific	 to	 comprehension	 of	 fictional	 stories.	 There	 is	




fictional	 information	 are	 mediated	 by	 individual	 variation	 in	 how	 much	 participants	
scrutinize	 the	 information	 they	 are	 presented	with	 (Green,	Garst,	 Brock,	&	 Chung,	 2006;	




a	 fictional	story	compared	to	 factual	stories.	Other	accounts	argue	however,	 that	 it	 is	not	
98	
	
the	 knowledge	 about	 the	 factuality	 of	 a	 narrative,	 but	 rather	 an	 engaging	narrative	 style	









reading	behaviour	 and	memory.	 In	 two	 studies	 he	 reported	 that	 texts	 labelled	 as	 factual	
were	 read	 faster	 compared	 to	 fictional	 texts	 (see	 also	 Altmann,	 Bohrn,	 Lubrich,	
Menninghaus,	 &	 Jacobs,	 2014;	 Wolfe,	 2005).	 Moreover,	 readers	 showed	 a	 better	
performance	 on	 situational	 memory	 for	 factual	 texts,	 but	 better	 memory	 for	 the	 text’s	
surface	structure	for	fictional	texts	(Zwaan,	1994).		
Readers	seem	to	use	prior	knowledge	about	the	genre	to	systematically	select	criteria	
and	strategies	 for	comprehension	 linked	to	different	 reading	goals	 (van	den	Broek,	Lorch,	
Linderholm,	 &	 Gustafson,	 2001;	 see	 van	 den	 Broek,	 Rapp,	 &	 Kendeou,	 2005	 for	 review;	
Zwaan,	1994).	Reading	goals	 for	 factual	 texts	are	to	obtain	 information	about	reality	 (e.g.	
reading	 for	 study	 purposes	 or	 reading	 the	 news)	 and	 are	 thought	 to	 prompt	 reading	
strategies	 which	 emphasize	 connections	 in	 the	 text	 in	 order	 to	 reconstruct	 the	 contents	
(van	den	Broek	et	al.,	2001).	Reading	for	enjoyment	on	the	other	hand	is	associated	with	a	
stronger	 motivation	 for	 subjective	 experience	 and	 is	 linked	 to	 reduced	 scrutiny	 and	
attention	 to	 detail	 (R.	 A.	Mar	 &	 Oatley,	 2008;	 van	 den	 Broek	 et	 al.,	 2001;	 Zwaan	 et	 al.,	













In	 the	 present	 study	 we	 wanted	 to	 extend	 the	 research	 on	 perspective	 taking	 and	
experiential	effects	during	 reading	and	 test	whether	processing	of	perspective	 is	affected	









faster	 and	 result	 in	 better	 memory	 performance	 in	 the	 picture	 recognition	 task.	 At	 the	
same	time,	other	accounts	argue	for	a	stronger	role	of	narrative	style	and	less	influence	of	
expectations	 towards	 factuality	 (van	 Krieken,	 Sanders,	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Therefore,	 as	 an	
alternative	hypothesis,	it	is	also	possible	that	factual	texts	in	a	narrative	form	as	we	used	it	
do	not	show	a	different	behavioural	pattern	from	fictional	texts.		
Moreover,	 in	 line	with	 previous	 research	 on	 narrative	 perspective,	we	 expect	 that	 1st	
person	stories	compared	 to	3rd	person	stories	promote	 immersion,	appreciation	 (Hartung	
et	 al.,	 2016),	 and	mental	 imagery	 from	 the	perspective	of	 the	protagonist	 (Brunyé	et	 al.,	
2009).	In	line	with	Mar	and	Oatley	(Mar	&	Oatley,	2008;	Zunshine,	2008)	we	expected	that	
people	show	stronger	emotional	engagement	and	are	more	likely	to	immerse	with	stories	
in	 1st	 person.	 This	 effect	 might	 be	 more	 pronounced	 for	 fictional	 texts	 as	 suggested	 by	




All	 participants	were	 naïve	 as	 to	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 experiment.	 They	 gave	 informed	
consent	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 declaration	 of	 Helsinki	 on	 the	 first	 screen	 before	 the	
experiment	 started	by	accepting	 the	use	of	 their	data	and	continuing	 to	 the	 instructions.	





Participants	were	 recruited	 via	 different	 online	 sources.	 Advertisements	 for	 the	 study	
were	 posted	 on	 several	 blogs,	 websites,	 and	 Facebook	 or	 Twitter	 accounts	 specifically	
targeting	 Dutch	 readers	 interested	 in	 language,	 reading,	 and	 research.	 Examples	 include	




task	 to	datasets	 from	participants	who	completed	 the	 task	and	were	within	a	 reasonable	
time	per	item	(<3	times	the	next	slowest	time).	This	means	that	the	dropout	rate	increased	
per	 task	 in	 the	experiment.	 For	 the	 first	 task	 (reading	 the	 story	 and	 fill	 in	 the	 immersion	
questionnaire)	participants	who	took	more	than	5	min	to	read	the	instructions	(N=5),	or	did	
not	 fill	 in	 the	 immersion	questionnaire	at	 all	 (N=186),	or	only	partially	 (N=60),	 as	well	 as	
participants	 who	 took	 more	 than	 1.5	 min	 on	 average	 per	 item	 to	 respond	 to	 the	
questionnaire	 items	 were	 excluded	 from	 the	 analysis.	 In	 addition,	 4	 more	 subjects	 who	
took	 disproportionally	 long	 (>3	 times	 longer	 than	 the	 next	 slowest	 subject)	 to	 read	 the	




51.33	 years	 (s.d.=17.08,	 range=12-93	 years,	 see	 Figure	 13,	 Table	 12).	 Most	 participants	
indicated	that	their	highest	educational	level	was	university	or	technical	college	(specialized	
vocational	or	applied	training;	N=1485),	but	education	level	ranged	from	primary	education	
(primair	 onderwijs	 basisschool,	 N=4),	 high	 school	 (voortgezet	 onderwijs,	 N=175),	 or	
community	college	(middelbaar	beroepsonderwijs	MBO,	N=145;	other	forms	of	education	
N=27)	to	university	level.	Most	participants	(N=1651)	were	native	speakers	of	Dutch.	Non-
native	 speakers	 (N=87)	 were	 learning	 Dutch	 on	 average	 since	 24.32	 years	 (s.d.=21.71,	
range=1-82	years).		
For	the	second	task	(the	appreciation	rating),	further	subjects	were	excluded	from	the	
analysis	who	 did	 not	 participate	 in	 the	 appreciation	 rating	 at	 all	 (N=28)	 or	 only	 partially	
(N=6),	as	well	as	one	participant	who	took	more	than	3	times	as	 long	as	the	next	slowest	
participant	 to	 complete	 the	 task.	 This	 adds	up	 to	 a	 total	 additional	 exclusion	of	 35	more	




task	 (N=62),	 gave	 responses	 faster	 than	 1	 second	 on	 average	 per	 item	 (N=1)	 or	 took	 on	
average	more	 than	2x	 the	 time	 the	next	 slowest	 participant	 did	 (N=3),	 leading	 to	 a	 total	
exclusion	of	66	participants	(N=1742).	
	
Table 12: Overview over demographic data in the sample 
		 N	 Min	 Max	 Mean	 Std.	Deviation	
Age	 1836	 12	 93	 51.33	 17.06	
Education	 1809	 1	 4	 3.72	 0.64	
Do	you	like	fiction?	 1842	 0		 7	 5.24	 1.83	
Do	you	like	factual	
stories?		
1842	 0	 7	 5.2706	 1.63	
Dutch	is	native	lan-
guage	
1836	 1	(yes)	 2	(no)	 1.10	 0.30	
If	no,	years	learning	
Dutch	





sample	 in	 the	 lab.	 We	 recruited	 46	 (30	 female,	 16	 male)	 proficient	 speakers	 of	 Dutch	
without	 reading	 impairments	 via	 the	 Max	 Planck	 participant	 database	 in	 Nijmegen.	
Figure 13: Distribution 
of age in the tested 
sample. Participants 
from 12 to 93 years 
participated in the 
study with a mean age 












protagonist	 is	 referred	 to	 with	 ‘I’	 and	 one	 with	 3rd	 person	 pronouns	 in	 which	 the	
protagonist	is	referred	to	with	‘he’	or	‘she’(see	Table	13	for	more	information).	This	way,	we	





Table 13: Number of words per story in both pronoun conditions.  
The stories differed in the pronouns and the dependent verb forms, as well as some minor 
changes (1 change in Emotioneel and 3 changes in Koffiemolen) for readability (e.g. more 







All	 stories	 were	 narrated	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 protagonist	 with	 internal	
focalization.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 stories	 are	 told	 from	 the	 protagonist’s	 subjective	

















For	 the	 immersion	 questionnaire	 we	 used	 the	 Story	 World	 Absorption	 Scale	 (SWAS)	
(Kuijpers	 et	 al.,	 2014)	 with	 the	 subscales	 attention,	 emotional	 engagement	 with	 the	
protagonist,	mental	 imagery,	 and	 transportation	 into	 the	 story	 world.	 We	 extended	 the	
subscale	for	mental	imagery	by	adding	two	items,	to	account	for	differences	depending	on	
perspective	 taking:	 ‘At	 times,	 I	 had	 the	 feeling	 of	 seeing	 right	 through	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	
protagonist’	and	‘During	reading,	I	saw	the	situations	in	my	mind	as	if	I	was	an	eyewitness’	
(see	 supplementary	 materials	 for	 details).	 Apart	 from	 the	 added	 items,	 the	 SWAS	 is	 a	








disagree’	 (1)	 to	 'I	 totally	 agree'	 (7)).	 The	 measure	 contained	 the	 following	 adjectives:	





was	 taken	 from	 both	 the	 actor’s	 perspective	 (1st	 person)	 and	 from	 an	 observer’s	
perspective	(3rd	person,	see	Table	14).	The	photos	were	converted	into	stencil	 like	pattern	






with	 factual	 and	 fictional	 narratives	 like	 films	 or	 popular	 science	 books.	 Participants	
responded	 to	 the	 items	 on	 a	 7-point	 scale	 ranging	 from	 'not	 at	 all’/‘never’	 (1)	 to	 'very	
much’/’daily’	(7).	The	3	fiction	items	were:	Do	you	like	reading	fiction?;	Do	you	engage	with	
other	types	of	fiction	(e.g.	movies	or	series,	comic	books,	etc.)?;	How	often	do	you	engage	
with	 fiction?.	 The	 3	 factual	 items	were:	Do	 you	 like	 reading	 non-fiction	 (stories	 based	 on	
true	 events)?;	Do	you	engage	with	other	 types	of	 non-fiction	media	 (e.g.	 journal	 articles,	
science	reports,	(auto-)	biographies,	etc.)?;	How	often	do	you	engage	with	non-fiction?		
	
Table14: Examples of picture stimuli taken from 1st and 3rd person perspective for the stories 

















The	data	 for	 this	 experiment	was	 collected	online	by	 the	use	of	 a	 self-contained	web	
application	 and	 a	 separate	 data	 submission	 /	 reporting	web	 service,	 both	 of	which	were	
produced	with	FRINEX,	 (framework	 for	 interactive	experiments)	developed	at	Max	Planck	
Institute	 for	Psycholinguistics,	Nijmegen.	Participant	responses	were	collected	by	the	web	
application	 as	 time	 series	 data,	 which	 were	 sent	 to	 the	 server	 when	 a	 connection	 was	
available.	 The	 data	 submission	 /	 reporting	 web	 service	 was	 run	 in	 a	 Java	 Tomcat	 server	
using	 a	 Postgres	 database.	 Communication	 between	 the	web	 application	 and	 the	 server	
was	done	over	a	 JSON	/	REST	 interface.	 If	 the	 connection	 to	 the	 server	 failed	during	 this	
communication	process	 then	 the	web	application	stored	 the	data	and	retried	 later	 in	 the	
experiment.	This	retry	/	store	process	could	continue	if	required	until	specific	points	in	the	
experiment	such	as	the	registration	screen,	where	a	successful	submission	was	mandated	
before	 proceeding.	 This	 combination	 allowed	 users	 to	 do	 the	 experiment	 on	 desktop	
computers	 or	mobile	 devices	 and	 in	 environments	with	 periodic	 internet	 access	 such	 as	
when	commuting.	
The	application	 flow	was	 restricted	 to	 linear	navigation	with	each	screen	being	visible	
once	 in	 its	 sequence.	Neither	 refreshing	 the	 browser	 nor	 using	 the	 browser	 back	 button	
would	 alter	 this	 linear	 application	 flow.	 The	 participant	 could	 exit	 the	 experiment	 at	 any	
stage;	 with	 the	 data	 from	 their	 participation	 having	 already	 been	 stored	 on	 the	 server	
provided	internet	access	was	available.		
The	experiment	started	with	a	screen	giving	an	overview	of	the	goal	of	the	experiment.	
Informed	 consent	 was	 acquired	 on	 this	 page	 when	 the	 subjects	 confirmed	 willing	 to	
participate	 by	 button	 click.	 On	 the	 subsequent	 screen,	 information	 about	 age,	 gender,	
education	 level,	and	proficiency	 in	Dutch	was	acquired.	Then,	participants	were	randomly	




You	 are	 going	 to	 read	 a	 story	 written	 by	
Martin	 Rombouts.	 He	 is	 a	 young	 Dutch	
columnist.	He	writes	about	his	everyday	life,	
always	inspired	by	a	real	event.	
You	 are	 going	 to	 read	 a	 story	 from	Martin	
Rombouts.	 He	 is	 a	 young	 Dutch	 writer.	 He	




two	 conditions.	On	 the	 next	 screen,	 the	 story	was	 presented.	 Each	 participant	 only	 read	
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items	 of	 the	 immersion	 questionnaire	 followed	 by	 the	 appreciation	 rating.	 Items	 were	
presented	 individually	 per	 screen	 in	 random	 order	 and	 subjects	 answered	 on	 a	 7-point	
scale	ranging	from	‘I	totally	disagree’	(=1)	to	‘I	totally	agree’	(=7).	Selecting	a	value	on	the	
scale	 prompted	 the	 next	 screen.	 After	 this	 participants	were	 presented	with	 the	 picture	
task.	 Participants	 saw	 pictures	 and	 decided	 whether	 the	 scene	 displayed	 on	 the	 image	
happened	in	the	story	they	just	read	or	not.	Participants	were	instructed	to	react	as	fast	as	
possible.	 Each	 participant	 saw	 all	 16	 pictures.	 Finally,	 participants	 responded	 to	 the	 6	
questions	 regarding	 their	 regular	 engagement	 with	 fiction	 and	 non-fiction.	 After	 these	






genre	 (fact	 or	 fiction)	 and	 pronoun	 (1st	 or	 3rd	 person	 pronoun)	 as	 predictors	which	were	
allowed	to	interact,	and	story	as	random	effect	with	random	intercept	(Baayen	et	al.,	2008).	
In	 addition,	 individual	 differences	 in	 perspective	 taking,	 gender,	 age,	 education	 level,	
whether	Dutch	was	native	language	or	not,	and	the	two	mean	scores	for	general	exposure	


















There	 are	 also	 no	 statistically	 significant	 effects	 for	 genre	 for	 any	 of	 the	 appreciation	
measures,	but	there	was	a	trend	suggesting	that	fiction	stories	were	rated	as	 less	easy	to	
understand	 than	 factual	 stories	 (β=-0.58,	 s.e.=0.31,	 t=-1.86,	 p=0.06).	 In	 sum,	 whether	
stories	were	presented	as	fictional	or	as	factual	did	not	influence	reading	experience	as	we	
measured	it.	
For	 perspective	 (1st	 or	 3rd	 person	 pronouns),	 the	 second	 factor	 of	 interest,	 several	
statistically	significant	effects	were	observed.	Stories	in	1st	person	showed	higher	scores	for	
emotional	 engagement	 with	 the	 protagonist	 (β=-0.13,	 s.e.=6.44,	 t=-2.09,	 p<0.05)	 and	
people	were	more	likely	to	engage	in	1st	person	perspective	taking	in	1st	person	stories	(β=-
0.24,	 s.e.=0.11,	 t=-2.16,	 p<0.05).	 There	was	 no	 effect	 of	 perspective	 on	 reading	 time,	 as	
well	as	 the	 immersion	subscales	attention,	 transportation,	and	mental	 imagery.	 Stories	 in	
3rd	 person	 were	 rated	 as	 sadder	 (β=0.31,	 s.e.=0.10,	 t=2.97,	 p<0.005),	 and	 there	 was	 a	
statistically	 significant	 interaction	 between	 perspective	 and	 genre	 on	 this	 item	 (β=-0.31,	
s.e.=0.15,	t=-2.13,	p<0.05).	In	addition,	there	was	a	trend	suggesting	that	3rd	person	stories	
were	rated	as	less	fascinating	(β=-0.15,	s.e.=0.09,	t=-1.79,	p=0.07).	Otherwise,	none	of	the	
appreciation	measures	were	 affected	 by	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 story	 and	 there	were	 no	
interaction	effects.		
Regarding	 individual	 differences,	 liking	 fiction	was	 associated	with	 faster	 reading	 (β=-
3.31,	 s.e.=0.71,	 t=-4.64,	 p<0.0001),	 higher	 probability	 for	 1st	 person	 perspective	 taking	
(β=0.03,	s.e.=0.01,	t=2.03,	p<0.05),	and	lower	ratings	on	the	items	well	written	and	literary	
(-0.03<β<-0.02,	 s.e.=0.01,	 -2.44,t<-2.21,	 p<0.05).	 High	 scores	 for	 both	 1st	 person	
perspective	preference	and	3rd	person	perspective	preference	were	associated	with	higher	





associated	 with	 lower	 scores	 on	 the	 rating	 whether	 the	 stories	 were	 perceived	 as	 sad.	
There	was	a	small	age	effect	throughout	most	measures	indicating	that	older	readers	score	
slightly	lower	on	the	immersion	scales	transportation,	emotional	engagement,	and	mental	
imagery	 (-0.42<β<-0.01,	 0.00<s.e.=<0.00,	 -4.15<t<-2.94,	 p<0.005).	 Age	 was	 negatively	
correlated	with	liking	fictional	texts	(r=-0.16,	p<0.0001,	N=1792))	and	positively	with	liking	
factual	 texts	 (r=0.07,	 p<0.05)	 as	 tested	 by	 a	 partial	 correlation	 analysis	 controlling	 for	
gender	and	education.		
In	 the	 picture	 task,	 we	 observe	 no	 effect	 for	 genre	 or	 perspective.	 There	 were	 no	




For	 the	1st	person	perspective	 taking	questionnaire	 item	we	observe	a	main	effect	of	
perspective	 (β=-0.24,	 s.e.=0.11,	 t=-2.16,	 p<0.05,	 see	 Figure	 14)	meaning	 that	 readers	 are	
less	 likely	to	engage	in	1st	person	perspective	taking	when	reading	a	story	with	3rd	person	
pronouns	referring	to	the	protagonist.	There	is	no	main	effect	of	genre	(β=0.39,	s.e.=0.43,	
t=0.91,	 p=0.36)	 and	 no	 interaction	 effect	 with	 perspective	 (β=0.15,	 s.e.=0.15,	 t=0.96,	
p=0.34).	 People	 who	 report	 to	 like	 fiction	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 engage	 in	 1st	 person	
perspective	taking	(β=0.03,	s.e.=0.01,	t=2.03,	p<0.05).		
Figure 14: A=1st person perspective taking, B=3rd person perspective taking 
There was no difference in perspective taking depending on whether the stories were presented 
as factual or fictional. Stories with 1st person pronouns were rated significantly higher for 1st 











for	 genre	 (β=2.53,	 s.e.=21.39,	 t=0.12,	 p=0.91,	 see	 Figure	 15)	 or	 perspective	 (β=9.17,	
s.e.=5.85,	 t=1.57,	p=0.	12),	and	no	 interaction	effect	 (β=-0.14,	 s.e.=8.25,	 t=-0.02,	p=0.99).	





t=-1.69,	p=0.09),	or	genre	 (β=0.04,	 s.e.=0.26,	 t=0.14,	p=0.89),	and	no	 interaction	 (β=0.13,	
s.e.=0.10,	 t=1.32,	 p=0.19;	 see	 Figure	 16).	 Both	 1st	 (β=0.36,	 s.e.=0.02,	 t=19.91,	 p<0.0001)	
and	 3rd	 (β=0.29,	 s.e.=0.02,	 t=15.70,	 p<0.0001)	 person	perspective	 taking	were	 associated	
with	higher	scores	on	the	attention	scale.		
For	 transportation,	 there	 were	 no	 main	 effects	 of	 genre	 (β=0.09,	 s.e.=0.23,	 t=0.41,	
p=0.69)	and	perspective	 (β=-0.01,	 s.e.=0.06,	 t=-0.24,	p=0.81),	 and	no	 interaction	 (β=0.03,	
s.e.=0.09,	 t=0.34,	 p=0.73;	 see	 Figure	 16).	 Both	 1st	 (β=0.42,	 s.e.=0.02,	 t=26.87,	 p<0.0001)	
and	 3rd	 (β=0.27,	 s.e.=0.02,	 t=16.52,	 p<0.0001)	 person	perspective	 taking	were	 associated	
with	higher	scores	for	transportation.	
For	 emotional	 engagement	 with	 the	 protagonist	 we	 observe	 a	 main	 effect	 of	
perspective	 (β=-0.13,	 s.e.=0.01,	 t=-2.09,	 p<0.05)	 showing	 that	 readers	 are	 less	 engaged	
when	 reading	 a	 story	 with	 3rd	 person	 pronouns	 (β=0.01,	 s.e.=0.00,	 t=0.92,	 p=0.36;	 see	
Figure	 16).	 There	 was	 no	 effect	 of	 genre	 (β=0.00,	 s.e.=0.0.23,	 t=0.13,	 p=0.89)	 and	 no	
interaction	of	genre	and	perspective.	Both	1st	(β=0.46,	s.e.=0.00,	t=28.91,	p<0.0001)	and	3rd	








16: Immersion subscales. A=Attention, B=Transportation, C=Mental imagery, D=Emotional 
engagement. There was no difference in immersion depending on whether the stories were 
presented as factual or fictional. Stories with 1st person pronouns had significantly higher scores 
for attention and emotional engagement with the protagonist, but not for transportation and 
mental imagery during reading. 
Figure 15: Time in 
seconds participants took 
to read the story. There 
was no difference between 
reading times in the 
fictional or factual 
condition, as well as no 
difference in reading time 
dependent on pronoun. 
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For	 mental	 imagery,	 we	 observe	 no	 main	 effect	 of	 perspective	 (β=0.02,	 s.e.=0.06,	
t=0.37,	 p=0.71)	 or	 genre	 (β=0.11,	 s.e.=0.23,	 t=0.46,	 p=0.64),	 and	no	 interaction	 (β=-0.07,	
s.e.=0.09,	 t=-0.75,	 p=0.45;	 see	 Figure	 16).	 Both	 1st	 (β=0.30,	 s.e.=0.02,	 t=19.26,	 p<0.0001)	





interaction	 (β=0.02,	 s.e.=0.13,	 t=0.16,	 p=0.87).	 Both	 1st	 (β=0.32,	 s.e.=0.02,	 t=14.17,	
p<0.0001)	 and	 3rd	 (β=0.28,	 s.e.=0.02,	 t=11.63,	 p<0.0001)	 person	 perspective	 taking	were	
associated	with	higher	appreciation	scores	for	interesting.	
The	 rating	of	how	well	written	 the	 story	was	 rated	 revealed	no	effect	 for	perspective	
(β=-0.16,	s.e.=0.10,	t=-1.62,	p	=0.10)	or	for	genre	(β=-0.20,	s.e.=0.29,	t=-0.68,	p=0.50),	and	
no	 interaction	 (β=-0.10,	 s.e.=0.14,	 t=-0.71,	 p=0.48).	 Readers	 who	 scored	 high	 on	 liking	
fiction	 rated	 the	 stories	as	 less	well	written	 (β=-0.02,	 s.e.=0.01,	 t=-2.21,	p<0.05).	Both	1st	
(β=0.30,	s.e.=0.02,	t=12.58,	p<0.0001)	and	3rd	person	perspective	taking	(β=0.30,	s.e.=0.03,	
t=12.01,	p<0.0001)	were	associated	with	higher	appreciation	scores	for	interesting.		
The	 rating	 of	 how	 literary	 the	 stories	 were	 showed	 no	 main	 effect	 for	 perspective	
(β=0.03,	 s.e.=0.09,	 t=0.39,	 p=0.70)	 and	 genre	 (β=0.03,	 s.e.=0.26,	 t=0.12,	 p=0.90),	 and	 no	
interaction	 (β=-0.22,	 s.e.=0.13,	 t=-1.73,	 p=0.08).	 Both	 1st	 (β=0.26,	 s.e.=0.02,	 t=11.70,	
p<0.0001)	 and	 3rd	 (β=0.26,	 s.e.=0.02,	 t=11.28,	 p<0.0001)	 person	 perspective	 taking	were	
associated	 with	 higher	 scores	 for	 the	 rating	 if	 the	 story	 was	 considered	 literary.	 Older	
readers	rated	the	stories	as	less	literary	(β=-0.01,	s.e.=0.00,	t=-2.89,	p<0.0001),	and	readers	
who	score	high	on	liking	fictional	stories	rated	them	as	less	literary	(β=-0.03,	s.e.=0.01,	t=-
2.44,	p<0.05).	There	was	a	 significant	 interaction	of	 liking	 fictional	 texts	and	whether	 the	
participant	was	in	the	factual	or	fictional	condition	(β=0.03,	s.e.=0.01,	t=2.38,	p<0.05).		










more	 likely	 to	 rate	 the	 story	as	easy	 to	understand	 (β=0.01,	 s.e.=0.00,	 t=4.81,	p<0.0001).	
There	was	a	main	effect	of	educational	 level	(β=-0.17,	s.e.=0.06,	t=-2.80,	p<0.01)	showing	
that	readers	with	higher	education	were	less	likely	to	rate	the	stories	as	easy	to	understand.		
For	 the	 rating	 on	 how	 accessible	 the	 stories	 were,	 we	 find	 no	 main	 effect	 for	
perspective	 (β=-0.10,	 s.e.=0.10,	 t=-0.99,	 p=0.32)	 and	 genre	 (β=-0.28,	 s.e.=0.29,	 t=-0.95,	
p=0.34),	and	no	interaction	(β=-0.09,	s.e.=0.14,	t=-0.65,	p=0.52).	Both	1st	(β=0.22,	s.e.=0.02,	





interaction	 (β=-0.07,	 s.e.=0.13,	 t=-0.54,	 p=0.59).	 Both	 1st	 (β=0.27,	 s.e.=0.02,	 t=11.87,	






interaction	 (β=0.02,	 s.e.=0.13,	 t=0.17,	 p=0.86).	 Both	 1st	 (β=0.32,	 s.e.=0.02,	 t=14.21,	




stories	 are	 rated	 as	 less	 fascinating	 (β=-0.15,	 s.e.=0.09,	 t=-1.79,	 p=0.07).	 There	 was	 no	
effect	 for	 genre	 (β=-0.01,	 s.e.=0.26,	 t=-0.02,	 p=0.98)	 and	 no	 interaction	with	 perspective	
(β=0.01,	 s.e.=0.12,	 t=0.12,	 p=0.90).	 Again,	 both	 1st	 (β=0.34,	 s.e.=0.02,	 t=15.60,	 p<0.0001)	
and	 3rd	 person	 perspective	 taking	 (β=0.31,	 s.e.=0.02,	 t=13.87,	 p<0.0001)	were	 associated	
with	higher	scores	for	fascinating.		
For	 the	 rating	 on	 how	 emotional	 the	 stories	 were,	 we	 find	 no	 main	 effect	 for	








The	 rating	of	how	sad	 the	 stories	were	 revealed	 that	3rd	person	stories	were	 rated	as	
sadder	 (β=0.31,	 s.e.=0.10,	 t=2.97,	p<0.005).	There	was	no	main	effect	 for	genre	 (β=-0.02,	
s.e.=0.31,	 t=-0.07,	 p=0.94).	 However,	 there	 was	 an	 interaction	 effect	 of	 genre	 and	








(β=-0.21,	 s.e.=0.39,	 t=-0.53,	 p=0.60),	 and	 no	 interaction	 (β=-0.07,	 s.e.=0.13,	 t=-0.52,	
p=0.60;	 see	 Figure	17).	Readers	who	engaged	 in	1st	 person	perspective	 taking	 responded	
more	accurate	(β=0.07,	s.e.=0.02,	t=3.14,	p<0.005),	but	there	was	no	advantage	for	readers	
who	 engage	 in	 3rd	 person	 perspective	 taking	 (β=-0.01,	 s.e.=0.02,	 t=-0.34,	 p=0.74).	 There	
was	a	main	effect	of	age,	showing	that	older	readers	responded	slightly	less	accurate	than	





perspective	 also	 showed	 no	 effect	 of	 perspective	 (β=-0.00,	 s.e.=0.01,	 t=-0.22,	 p=0.83)	 or	
genre	 (β=0.02,	 s.e.=0.31,	 t=0.59,	 p=0.55),	 and	 no	 interaction	 (β=-0.01,	 s.e.=0.01,	 t=-0.74,	
p=0.46;	 see	 Figure	 17).	 Both	 1st	 (β=0.05,	 s.e.=0.02,	 t=2.79,	 p<0.01)	 and	 3rd	 person	
perspective	taking	(β=0.05,	s.e.=0.02,	t=2.56,	p<0.05)	were	associated	with	better	accuracy	
in	responding	to	pictures	in	from	3rd	person	perspective.	Native	speakers	responded	more	
accurately	 than	 non-native	 speakers	 (β=0.21,	 s.e.=0.09,	 t=2.41,	 p<0.05).	 Likewise,	 in	 the	
reference	 group,	 there	 were	 no	 main	 effects	 of	 perspective	 (β=-0.37,	 s.e.=0.29,	 t=-1.25,	
p=0.22)	or	genre	 (β=-2.34,	s.e.=1.71,	 t=-1.36,	p=0.20),	and	no	 interaction.	However,	 there	
were	main	effects	for	perspective	taking	preference:	whereas	1st	person	perspective	taking	
was	 associated	 with	 lower	 accuracy	 (β=-0.23,	 s.e.=0.09,	 t=-2.48,	 p<0.05),	 3rd	 person	
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perspective	 taking	 was	 associated	 with	 higher	 accuracy	 (β=0.26,	 s.e.=0.08,	 t=3.22,	
p<0.005).		
The	reaction	times	towards	pictures	depicting	events	from	the	1st	person	perspective	
showed	 no	 effect	 of	 perspective	 (β=131.22,	 s.e.=126.90,	 t=1.03,	 p=0.30)	 or	 genre	 (β=-
737.94,	 s.e.=559.07,	 t=-1.32,	 p=0.19),	 and	 no	 interaction	 (β=20.52,	 s.e.=	 179.41,	 t=0.11,	
p=0.90;	 see	 Figure	17).	Moreover,	 there	 are	no	effects	 for	perspective	 taking	 (1st	 person:	
β=27.75,	s.e.=31.77,	t=0.87,	p=0.38;	3rd	person:	β=56.83,	s.e.=33.27,	t=1.71,	p=0.09).	There	
was	a	main	effect	of	whether	the	response	was	correct	or	not	(β=-139.90,	s.e.=34.80,	 t=-
4.02,	 p<0.0001),	 and	 a	main	 effect	 of	 age	 showing	 that	 older	 readers	 responded	 slower	
(β=34.53,	 s.e.=2.78,	 t=12.42,	 p<0.0001).	 In	 the	 reference	 group,	we	 also	 did	 not	 observe	
main	 effects	 for	 perspective	 (β=785.67,	 s.e.=503.25,	 t=1.56,	 p=0.13)	 or	 genre	 (β=2.96,	




Figure 17: Accuracy and reaction times in responses to events pictured from 1st person 
perspective (A=accuracy, C=reaction time) and 3rd person perspective (B=accuracy, D=reaction 





showed	 no	 effect	 of	 perspective	 (β=133.47,	 s.e.=116.92,	 t=1.14,	 p=0.25)	 or	 genre	 (β=-
441.81,	 s.e.=514.98,	 t=-0.86,	 p=0.39),	 no	 interaction	 (β=-196.42,	 s.e.=165.50,	 t=-1.19,	
p=0.24;	 see	 Figure	 17),	 and	 no	 effects	 for	 perspective	 taking	 (1st	 person:	 β=-13.13,	
s.e.=29.29,	t=-0.45,	p=0.65;	3rd	person:	β=45.26,	s.e.=30.74,	t=1.747,	p=0.14).	Male	readers	
responded	faster	(β=-229.20,	s.e.=94.89,	t=-2.42,	p<0.05)	whereas	older	readers	responded	
slower	 (β=30.38,	 s.e.=2.56,	 t=11.88,	 p<0.0001).	 Higher	 education	 level	 (β=-140.48,	
s.e.=67.39,	 t=-2.09,	 p<0.05)	 and	 liking	 fiction	 (β=-170.47,	 s.e.=43.02,	 t=-3.96,	 p<0.0001)	
were	 associated	 with	 faster	 reaction	 times.	 Liking	 factual	 texts	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 was	
associated	 with	 slower	 reaction	 times	 (β=117.51,	 s.e.=55.28,	 t=2.13,	 p<0.05).	 In	 the	
reference	group,	there	was	also	no	main	effect	of	genre	(β	2387.39,	s.e.=1288.68,	t=1.85,	
p=0.10)	 or	 perspective	 (β=19.91,	 s.e.=228.69,	 t=0.09,	 p=0.93),	 and	 no	 interaction.	 	 In	
addition,	there	were	also	no	effects	for	perspective	taking	(1st	person:	β=124.78,	s.e.=75.84,	
t=1.65,	p=0.12;	3rd	person:	β=81.80,	s.e.=67.17,	t=1.22,	p=0.29).	Liking	factual	text	showed	
a	 trend	 to	 be	 associated	 with	 slower	 reaction	 times	 (β=283.98,	 s.e.=146.40,	 t=1.94,	
p=0.07).		
Discussion	




measures	 no	 evidence	 that	 knowing	 that	 a	 story	 is	 factual	 or	 fictional	 affects	 reading	
behaviour,	experiential	aspects	of	reading,	or	memory	of	events	in	the	stories.		
In	 line	 with	 previous	 research	 we	 found	 that	 1st	 person	 stories	 facilitate	 1st	 person	
perspective	 taking.	 In	 addition,	 we	 found	 that	 1st	 person	 stories	 can	 lead	 to	 higher	
emotional	engagement	with	the	protagonist	compared	to	3rd	person	stories.	However,	we	
did	 not	 replicate	 earlier	 findings	 (Hartung	 et	 al.,	 2016)	 that	 1st	 person	 stories	 generally	
increase	 immersion	and	are	 liked	better	by	readers	on	any	of	our	appreciation	measures.	
The	only	 appreciation	measure	 in	which	we	 find	a	difference	between	1st	 and	3rd	person	
stories	is	the	rating	of	the	item	‘sad’.	Here,	3rd	person	stories	were	rated	as	sadder	than	1st	




Despite	not	 finding	effects	 for	 the	perspective	 in	which	 the	 story	 is	 narrated,	we	 find	
strong	evidence	that	perspective	taking	 influences	 immersion	and	appreciation	of	stories.	
Readers	 who	 engage	 in	 perspective	 taking,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 they	 select	 1st	 or	 3rd	
person	perspective,	report	higher	immersion	during	reading	and	like	the	stories	better.		
We	 did	 not	 replicate	 previously	 reported	 evidence	 that	 personal	 pronouns	 affect	
perspective	 taking	 of	 the	memory	 representation	 (e.g.	 Brunyé	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Instead,	 we	
found	 evidence	 that	 people	 who	 engage	 in	 1st	 person	 perspective	 taking	 during	 reading	
respond	more	accurately	to	pictures	from	1st	and	3rd	person	perspective,	whereas	readers	
who	 engage	 in	 3rd	 person	 perspective	 taking	 only	 have	 an	 advantage	 in	 responding	 to	








stories	 labelled	as	 factual	or	 fictional	 seems	 to	be	 in	contrast	with	previous	experimental	
research	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 genre	 on	 reading	 behaviour	 which	 showed	 that	 factual	 and	
fictional	stories	are	read	differently	(Altmann	et	al.,	2014;	Zwaan,	1994).	Yet,	we	think	that	
our	 findings	 are	 complementary	 rather	 than	 in	 contrast	with	 previous	 findings.	 Typically,	
studies	 on	 genre	 effects	 used	 a	 ‘newspaper’	 versus	 ‘literature’	 labelling	 to	 manipulate	
readers	 expectations	 towards	 factuality	 (Zwaan,	 1994).	 This	 manipulation	 does	 not	 only	
address	 factuality	 of	 the	 information,	 but	 likely	 is	 also	 associated	 with	 different	 reading	
contexts	and	goals.	The	manipulation	we	used	is	more	subtle	in	a	sense,	because	factuality	
was	 the	 only	 factor	 being	 manipulated.	 We	 can	 conclude	 that	 genre	 does	 not	 seem	 to	
matter	in	a	sense	of	whether	the	information	is	factual	or	fictional	but	rather	which	reading	
goals	are	associated	with	certain	contexts.	Whereas	the	reading	goals	for	newspaper	texts	
and	 literature	 seem	 to	be	different,	our	 results	 show	 that	 this	difference	 is	not	based	on	
knowledge	 about	 factuality.	 The	 previously	 reported	 effects	 might	 therefore	 be	 better	
attributed	 to	 systematic	 effects	 of	 reading	 situation	 rather	 than	 the	 factuality	 of	 the	
content.	 While	 expository	 texts	 like	 newspaper	 or	 textbooks	 are	 all	 about	 extracting	




activate	 the	 appropriate	 reading	 goals	 for	 the	 current	 situation	 and	 systematically	 select	
criteria	and	strategies	for	comprehension	(van	den	Broek	et	al.,	2001,	see	2005	for	review;	









so	 the	 pronoun	 effect	 reported	 by	 earlier	 research	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 an	 indirect	 effect	 of	
perspective	 taking	and	might	also	 vary	 for	different	 stories.	 Future	 research	 is	needed	 to	
scrutinize	this	finding	in	more	detail.		
Despite	 evidence	 that	 readers	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 engage	 in	 1st	 person	 perspective	
imagery	when	reading	1st	person	stories,	we	cannot	replicate	the	perspective	effects	for	the	




another	 group:	 http://goo.gl/KR2Z4S).	 There	 is	 evidence	 for	 large	 individual	 variation	 in	
perspective	 taking	 (see	 e.g.	 Vukovic	 &	 Williams,	 2015)	 and	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 individual	
differences	have	a	stronger	influence	on	memory	of	events	than	the	pronoun	manipulation.		





The	 present	 study	 provides	 experimental	 evidence	 that	 prior	 knowledge	 about	 the	
factuality	of	a	text	does	not	influence	reading	behaviour.	Rather	it	is	assumed	that	reading	

















In	this	dissertation,	 I	explored	perspective	as	an	 important	factor	 in	mental	simulation	
during	 language	 comprehension.	 I	 tested	 the	 influence	 of	 narrative	 perspective	 on	
experiential	 aspects	 of	 reading	 and	 individual	 preferences	 for	 perspective	 taking	 in	
narrative	comprehension	(Chapter	2,	3,	and	5).	In	addition,	I	used	fMRI	to	investigate	neural	
network	 involvement	 associated	with	 simulation	 in	 narrative	 comprehension	 (Chapter	 3)	
and	 explored	 the	 relation	 between	 simulation	 and	mental	 imagery	 by	 looking	 at	 shared	
neural	activations	(Chapter	4).	Finally,	 I	tested	whether	factual	and	fictional	narratives	are	
processed	differently	in	terms	of	perspective	taking	and	reading	engagement	(Chapter	5).		
In	 Chapter	 2	 and	 5	 we	 found	 that	 narrative	 perspective	 can	 indeed	 influence	 how	
readers	 get	 immersed	 into	 stories.	 Chapter	 2	 also	 provides	 evidence	 that	 narrative	
perspective	can	affect	enjoyment	and	appreciation	of	fiction.	In	addition,	we	found	that	the	
effect	of	narrative	perspective	on	experiential	aspects	of	reading	is	independent	of	whether	
narratives	 are	 fictional	 or	 factual	 (Chapter	 5).	Whether	 narrative	 perspective	 also	 affects	
comprehension	 is	 less	 clear.	 While	 we	 found	 some	 tentative	 evidence	 that	 narrative	
perspective	 influences	 arousal	 during	 reading	 (Chapter	 2),	 we	 found	 no	 evidence	 that	
narrative	 perspective	 affects	 neural	 network	 involvement	 (Chapter	 3)	 or	 memory	
performance	 (Chapter	 5).	 Instead	 we	 found	 that	 individual	 preferences	 for	 perspective	
taking	affect	neural	network	recruitment	(Chapter	3).	When	engaging	with	fiction,	readers	
use	 1st	 and	 3rd	 person	 perspective	 taking	 independently	 from	 narrative	 perspective.	
However,	we	found	some	evidence	that	narratives	in	1st	person	perspective	can	facilitate	1st	
person	perspective	taking.	This	suggests	that	there	might	be	a	relation	between	narrative	
perspective	 and	 perspective	 taking	 during	 comprehension	 (Chapter	 5).	 In	 Chapter	 4,	 we	
tested	the	long	standing	hypothesis	that	simulation	during	comprehension	involves	mental	
imagery	of	 the	events	presented	 in	 the	 story.	The	 results	 show	that	despite	 the	 fact	 that	





of	 possible	 comprehension	 modes	 from	 which	 readers	 can	 select	 according	 to	 their	
preference	 or	 the	 situation.	Moreover,	 selecting	 one	 perspective	 over	 the	 other	was	 not	









from	which	the	story	 is	narrated	seems	not	to	be	crucial	 for	guiding	perspective	taking	 in	
narrative	 comprehension.	 Instead,	 readers	 seem	 to	 select	 from	 potential	 comprehension	
modes	 independent	 from	 narrative	 perspective.	Whether	 this	 selection	 process	 is	 solely	
based	 on	 individual	 preferences	 or	 on	 situational	 needs	 is	 an	 open	 question	 for	 future	
research.		
The	 results	 presented	 here	 are	 an	 important	 example	 that	 research	 should	 take	
individual	preferences	more	seriously	and	try	to	disentangle	task	and	strategy	effects	more.	
Yet,	it	is	early	days	to	draw	strong	conclusions	from	the	present	research.	One	limitation	is	
that	 fiction	 stories	 are	 only	 one	 type	 of	 narrative,	 which	 is	 also	 associated	with	 specific	
situational	 settings.	 It	has	been	pointed	out	before	 that	 fiction	 takes	a	 special	position	 in	




to	 influence	 perspective	 taking.	 However,	 narrative	 perspective	 as	 investigated	 here	 is	
limited	 to	 the	use	 of	 personal	 pronouns	 referring	 to	 protagonists	 of	 stories.	 Therefore,	 a	
second	 limitation	 is	 that	 personal	 pronouns	 are	 only	 one	 aspect	 of	 narrative	 perspective	
and	 the	 conclusions	 drawn	 regarding	 narrative	 perspective	 can	 only	 account	 for	 the	
presented	 research	 on	 personal	 pronouns.	 Whether	 other	 narrative	 techniques	 like	
focalization	or	narrative	viewpoint	have	a	stronger	effect	compared	to	pronouns	referring	










Whether	 perspective	 taking	 preferences	 are	 specific	 to	 fiction	 reading	 is	 beyond	 the	
scope	 of	 this	 dissertation.	 It	 would	 be	 interesting	 to	 see	 in	 how	 far	 these	 individual	









Simulation	 is	 suspected	 to	 play	 a	 fundamental	 role	 for	 language	 comprehension	 for	
highly	contextual	language	such	as	narratives	(see	also	discussion	in	Chapter	1).	The	results	
of	 the	research	presented	 in	 this	dissertation	 indeed	show	that	 readers	seem	to	simulate	
the	events	and	 situations	unfolding	on	 the	pages	when	 reading	 fiction.	The	most	 striking	
new	 insight	 is	 that	 readers	 seem	 to	 have	 certain	 preferences	 for	 simulating	 either	 in	 an	
enactive	(1st	person),	or	observant	(3rd	person)	manner,	or	do	both	simultaneously.	There	is	
throughout	 all	 presented	 studies	 no	 evidence	 that	 simulation	 in	 comprehension	 is	 by	
default	 enactive,	 or	 that	 1st	 person	 perspective	 is	 overall	 preferred.	 Moreover,	 the	
perspective	from	which	a	story	is	narrated	only	has	limited	influence	on	perspective	taking	
in	 comprehension.	 The	 finding	 that	 simulation	 is	 perspective	 specific	 might	 lead	 to	 the	
conclusion	 that	 simulation	 involves	mental	 imagery.	Yet,	despite	 the	conceptual	 similarity	
of	 simulation	 with	 imagery,	 we	 found	 little	 evidence	 that	 simulation	 recruits	 the	 same	
neural	networks	as	imagery.		
The	fact	that	there	are	also	readers	who	do	not	rely	on	only	one	perspective,	but	seem	
to	simulate	two	perspectives	simultaneously	 is	surprising.	 It	 is	unclear	 in	how	far	 this	has	
consequences	 for	 processing	 demands	 or	 depth	 of	 processing	 compared	 to	 readers	who	
consistently	 rely	 on	 one	 perspective.	 	 Interestingly,	 we	 found	 no	 evidence	 that	 selecting	
one	 perspective	 over	 the	 other	 affects	 understanding,	 immersion,	 or	 appreciation	 of	 the	
story.	 Neither	 did	 we	 find	 that	 individual	 differences	 in	 reading	 habits	 are	 linked	 to	
perspective	taking	preferences.			
That	readers	rely	on	different	strategies	in	simulation	during	fiction	comprehension	has	




rely	 more	 on	 mentalizing.	 It	 seems	 that	 there	 are	 different	 simulation	 modes	 available	
when	 engaging	 with	 stories.	 These	 modes	 seem	 to	 affect	 different	 aspects	 of	 semantic	
processing	 (e.g.	 modality,	 perspective).	 It	 remains	 an	 open	 question	 whether	 these	
individual	differences	are	linked	to	top-down	expectations	and	in	how	far	they	are	situation	
dependent.	 Either	 way,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 individual	 preferences	 play	 much	 larger	 role	 in	
comprehension	 than	 assumed	 by	 previous	 research	 on	 simulation.	 Instead	 of	 trying	 to	
eliminate	 these	 factors	 as	 confounds,	 future	 research	 should	 acknowledge	 this	 variation	
and	 treat	 them	 as	 factors	 of	 interest.	 In	 order	 to	 gain	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 natural	





in	 constructing	 situation	 models,	 which	 potentially	 support	 working	 memory	 and	





It	 seems	 to	 be	 clear	 that	 simulation	 is	 not	 an	 automatic	 or	 necessary	 process	 for	
comprehension	 at	 the	 level	 of	 individual	 concepts	 (e.g.	 word	 comprehension).	 Some	
accounts	 even	 argue	 that	 there	 are	 no	 stable	 ‘core’	 concepts	 at	 all	 and	 that	 every	
instantiation	of	meaning	is	ad	hoc	(e.g.	Casasanto	&	Lupyan,	2015;	van	Gelder,	1995).		
Simulation	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 modality	 specific	 concept	 processing.	 Rather	
simulation	 seems	 to	 produce	 multimodal	 and	 contextual	 dependent	 models	 which	 are	
semantically	 rich	 and	 flexible.	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 before	 that	 simulation	 is	 not	 equal	 to	
word	 level	 comprehension,	 but	 potentially	 functions	 as	 a	 support	 mechanism	 at	 the	
interface	 of	 concept	 representations	 from	 different	 levels	 and	 modalities	 (Mahon	 &	
Caramazza,	2008;	Papeo	et	al.,	2011).	Instead	of	being	restricted	to	modality	(and	effector)	





situation	 models.	 Its	 function	 is	 to	 continuously	 integrate	 information	 from	 different	
cognitive	levels	and	modalities	in	order	to	maintain	flexible	and	coherent	mental	models	of	
events	in	real	time	(see	Figure	18).	This	way,	information	from	lower	levels	is	restructured	
and	 reshaped	 into	 suitable	 chunks	 for	 episodic	memory.	 This	 idea	 has	 parallels	with	 the	
consecutive	 ‘now-or-never’	 bottleneck	 model	 of	 language	 processing	 by	 Christiansen	 &	
Chater	(2015)	(see	also	Barsalou,	n.d.).	Christiansen	and	Chater	(2015)	argue	that	in	order	
to	deal	with	the	‘continual	deluge	of	linguistic	input’,	the	brain	must	compress	and	recode	
linguistic	 information	 on	multiple	 levels	 as	 rapidly	 as	 possible.	 In	 order	 to	 do	 so,	 it	 uses	
recurring	bottlenecks	at	each	new	representational	level.	These	‘now-or-never’	bottlenecks	
force	 the	 language	system	to	compress	 input	 into	 increasingly	abstract	 chunks	 that	 cover	
progressively	 longer	 temporal	 intervals	 and	 facilitate	 prediction	 to	 support	 processing	
(Christiansen	&	Chater,	 2015).	Discourse	 is	 the	highest	 level	 of	 language	processing,	 so	 a	
narrative	 consisting	 of	 multiple	 events,	 is	 the	 biggest	 possible	 chunk.	 I	 suggest	 that	
simulation	 is	 that	 bottleneck	 at	 the	 level	 of	 situation	models,	which	 predicts,	 integrates,	
and	 unifies	 information	 into	 one	 coherent	 chunk	 or	 rather	 a	 situation	 model.	 Only	
information	which	 is	 relevant	and	consistent	with	 the	current	 situation	model	passes	 the	
bottleneck	and	can	in	this	form	be	encoded	into	episodic	memory.		
Figure 18: Simulation as a semantic unification mechanism supporting situation models. 
Simulations integrate information from different modalities in order to maintain flexible and 
coherent mental models of events in real time order to facilitate prediction and appropriate 
output. This way, information from lower levels is restructured and reshaped into suitable 
chunks for episodic memory.  
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Framing	 simulation	 as	 a	 mechanism	 which	 mainly	 supports	 situation	 models	 implies	
that	simulation	must	be	multimodal,	flexible,	and	context	sensitive.	In	addition,	simulation	
must	 be	 a	 continuous	 process	 in	which	 information	 is	 constantly	 updated	with	 incoming	
input.	At	 the	 level	of	situation	models,	 simulation	can	support	prediction	by	providing	an	
anticipation	frame	(next	moment	will	be	within	the	scope	of	the	current	model).	Following	
this	 argumentation,	 investigating	 simulation	 only	 makes	 sense	 at	 the	 level	 of	 situation	
models.	At	 this	 level,	simulation	 indeed	seems	to	 fulfil	a	more	 important	 if	not	necessary	
role	 for	 comprehension	 (Barsalou,	 2012;	Kurby	&	Zacks,	 2013).	 This	 framing	has	multiple	
links	 to	 the	 situated	 conceptualizations	 model,	 which	 also	 highlights	 the	 relevance	 of	
simulation	for	other	areas	of	cognition	like	social	cognition,	affective	processes,	appetitive	
processes,	and	episodic	memory	 (Barsalou,	2015).	A	 related	 idea	has	also	been	 raised	by	
Clark	 (2006)	 who	 proposes	 that	 language	 evolved	 as	 a	 cognitive	 tool	 which	 enhances	
cognition	by	creating	mental	models	and	substituting	or	improving	perceptual	input	where	
appropriate	 (Dehaene,	 1997;	 see	 Dehaene,	 Spelke,	 Pinel,	 Stanescu,	 &	 Tsivkin,	 1999;	
Feigenson,	Dehaene,	&	Spelke,	2004	for	a	similar	case	for	numbers).	Whether	simulation	is	
automatic	and	necessary	on	the	level	of	situation	models	is	still	an	open	question.		
While	 simulation	 can	 be	 enactive,	 it	 is	 not	 necessarily	 so.	 We	 have	 seen	 that	
comprehension	 can	 follow	 an	 enactive	 or	 observant	 manner	 and	 while	 the	 resulting	
representations	of	events	might	be	different,	there	is	no	evidence	that	there	is	a	difference	
in	 performance.	 Given	 the	 findings	 presented	 in	 this	 dissertation,	 simulation	 cannot	 be	
reduced	to	a	subconscious	and	automatic	 form	of	mental	 imagery	 (Chapter	4).	 Instead,	 it	
seems	to	be	an	independent	process,	which	is	highly	flexible	 in	terms	of	perspective	(and	
potentially	modality)	and	there	is	no	strong	tendency	towards	either	perspective.	Yet,	once	
a	 comprehension	 mode	 is	 selected,	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 applied	 consistently	 in	 the	 present	
situation	(e.g.	within	a	story).		
It	 is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	dissertation	to	answer	the	question	whether	simulations	
are	 actually	 based	 on	 embodiment	 and	 previous	 interaction	with	 the	world.	 But	maybe,	
research	 on	 simulation	 has	 spent	 too	 much	 time	 already	 trying	 to	 establish	 where	










scale	up	 to	natural	 situations,	 and	b)	 researchers	 are	 afraid	 to	 compromise	experimental	
control	 when	 choosing	 for	 a	more	 natural	 experimental	 setting.	 Effects	 like	 that	 regions	
from	 the	 motor	 cortex	 become	 active	 when	 someone	 reads	 an	 action	 verb,	 or	 that	 we	
encode	 actions	 from	 an	 actor’s	 perspective	 when	 being	 presented	 with	 I	 am	 cutting	
tomatoes,	 but	 from	 an	 observers	 perspective	 when	 being	 presented	 with	 He	 is	 slicing	
tomatoes	are	well-established	experimental	effects	in	language	research.	Yet,	we	have	seen	
that	 this	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 case	 when	 these	 verbs	 and	 sentences	 are	 embedded	 in	
context.	Language	is	not	about	cutting	tomatoes	or	deciding	whether	a	verb	is	part	of	the	
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fiction	 authors,	 some	 are	made	 up.	 Indicate	 by	 underlining,	which	 names	 are	 familiar	 to	
you.	 When	 you	 underline	 a	 wrong	 name,	 it	 will	 be	 substracted	 from	 your	 final	 score.	
Therefore,	 please	 do	 not	 guess,	 but	 only	 underline	 names,	 you	 know	 for	 sure.	 It	 is	 not	




























Instructions:	To	what	degree	do	 the	 following	statements	correspond	 to	your	 feelings	
and	experiences	while	reading	the	story?	Indicate	with	a	cross	on	the	scale	which	number	























































































































When	we	read	a	book,	we	often	get	 immersed	 into	 the	story	and	colorful	adventures	
unfold	 from	the	pages	 in	our	minds.	At	 times,	 this	can	 feel	as	 if	we	relive	the	adventures	
through	 the	 eyes	 of	 a	 character	 and	 sometimes	 we	 accompany	 the	 characters	 as	 silent	
witnesses	of	their	stories.	But	how	does	black	ink	on	white	paper	transform	to	lively	images	
in	 the	mind?	And	how	much	does	 the	way	a	 story	 is	 told,	 e.g.	 from	 the	perspective	of	 a	
character	or	an	all	knowing	narrator,	influence	how	we	experience	it?	A	popular	theory	in	
cognitive	science	proposes	that	our	minds	can	simulate	what	is	communicated	in	order	to	
create	 a	 form	 of	 experience	which	 is	 similar	 to	 real	 events.	 For	 example,	when	we	 read	
about	 actions,	 parts	 of	 the	 sensory	 (sensation)	 and	motor	 (action)	 cortex	which	 are	 also	
involved	 when	 actually	 experiencing	 these	 actions	 can	 become	 active.	 This	 so	 called	
simulation	theory	proposes	that	when	reading	about	events,	our	brains	create	states	which	
are	 similar	 to	 the	 brain	 states	 when	 we	 experience	 such	 events	 ourselves.	 The	 main	
question	 of	 this	 thesis	 was	 how	 narrative	 perspective	 influences	 the	 way	 we	 simulate	
during	reading.	This	question	was	addressed	in	4	separate	experiments.		
In	Chapter	2,	I	report	an	experiment	in	which	I	tested	in	how	far	our	reading	experience	
is	 influenced	 by	 the	 perspective	 from	 which	 a	 story	 is	 narrated.	 Participants	 read	 short	
stories,	 which	 could	 be	 either	 told	 from	 a	 1st	 person	 perspective	 or	 from	 a	 3rd	 person	
perspective.	While	participants	were	 reading,	 their	 levels	of	 arousal	were	measured	with	
skin	conductance	sensors.	And	after	each	story,	participants	answered	questions	regarding	
their	engagement	with	the	story	and	the	main	character.	The	results	indicated	that	people	
get	more	 immersed	 into	 stories	which	 are	 told	 from	 a	 1st	 person	 perspective,	 but	 show	
higher	 arousal	 for	 stories	 narrated	 from	 a	 3rd	 person	 perspective.	 While	 it	 was	 not	
surprising	 that	 readers	 engage	 more	 with	 1st	 person	 stories	 and	 their	 characters,	 it	 is	
unclear	why	readers	are	more	aroused	during	3rd	person	stories.		
In	order	to	get	a	better	understanding	of	the	underlying	principles,	I	conducted	an	fMRI	
experiment	 in	which	participants	 listened	 to	 stories	 in	1st	and	3rd	person	perspective.	 In	
addition	 to	 asking	 about	 their	 narrative	 engagement	 after	 each	 story,	 I	 also	 asked	
participants	whether	they	pictured	the	story	from	the	perspective	of	the	main	character	or	
from	 the	 perspective	 of	 an	 eyewitness.	 The	 results	 show	 that	 readers	 have	 strong	
preferences	 for	 the	 perspective	 from	 which	 they	 picture	 a	 story.	 Independent	 from	 the	
perspective	from	which	a	story	is	told,	some	readers	prefer	to	simulate	the	story	from	the	




In	 Chapter	 4,	 I	 tested	 in	 how	 far	 the	 brain	 processes	 which	 are	 involved	 when	 we	
simulate	 during	 reading	 resemble	 the	 brain	 states	 when	 we	 are	 consciously	 imagining	
something.	 Again,	 participants	 listened	 to	 short	 stories	 while	 their	 brain	 activity	 was	
measured	with	 fMRI.	 After	 listening	 to	 the	 stories	 once,	 the	 stories	were	 presented	 two	
more	times,	but	now	participants	were	instructed	to	actively	imagine	the	stories	from	the	
perspective	 of	 the	 protagonist	 or	 the	 perspective	 from	 an	 uninvolved	 eyewitness.	
Comparing	 brain	 activations	 from	 just	 listening	 to	 the	 story	 with	 imagining	 being	 the	
protagonist	 or	 an	 eyewitness	 revealed	 that	 despite	 relying	 on	 similar	 resources,	
comprehension	and	imagery	are	qualitatively	different	cognitive	processes.		
It	was	 an	open	question	whether	 the	 effects	 of	 increased	 immersion	with	 1st	 person	
stories	 are	 specific	 to	 fiction	 reading.	 To	 answer	 this	 question,	 I	 conducted	 a	 final	
experiment	reported	in	Chapter	5.	In	an	online	study	with	more	than	2000	readers,	I	tested	
whether	 people	 engage	 differently	 with	 a	 story	 when	 it	 is	 presented	 as	 based	 on	 true	
events	or	as	fictional.	Before	reading	the	story,	participants	saw	a	short	 introduction	with	
information	about	 the	writer	and	his	writing	style.	Half	of	 the	participants	were	told	 that	
the	writer	 is	 a	 columnist	who	writes	 about	 everyday	 situations	which	 are	 based	 on	 true	
events,	 whereas	 the	 other	 half	 of	 the	 participants	 were	 told	 that	 the	 writer	 is	 a	 fiction	
writer	who	writes	stories	inspired	by	his	vivid	fantasy.	Like	in	the	other	experiments	in	this	
dissertation,	 the	 stories	 were	 presented	 in	 either	 1st	 or	 3rd	 person	 perspective.	 After	
reading	participants	answered	questions	 regarding	 their	narrative	engagement	 like	 in	 the	
preceding	experiments.	The	results	confirm	the	results	reported	in	Chapter	2	that	narrative	
perspective	can	have	an	effect	on	narrative	engagement.	Whether	the	story	was	presented	
as	 factual	 or	 fictional	 however	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 affect	 how	 readers	 get	 immersed	 into	
fiction.		
In	the	final	chapter,	I	discuss	that	while	all	experiments	suggest	that	narrative	style	can	
influence	 how	 we	 experience	 stories,	 individual	 differences	 seem	 to	 be	 an	 even	 more	
important	factor	in	predicting	engagement	with	fiction.	In	addition,	I	propose	a	new	model	
of	the	function	of	simulation	in	language	comprehension.	In	contrast	with	previous	models,	
my	 model	 takes	 factors	 which	 are	 subject	 to	 individual	 and	 situational	 variation	 into	
account	(see	Figure	18,	page	166).	As	such,	the	model	offers	an	explanation	for	variation	in	
experimental	data	which	formerly	led	to	controversies.	Simulation	is	proposed	to	function	
as	 a	 semantic	 unification	 mechanism	 at	 the	 level	 of	 situation	 models.	 It	 is	 predicted	 to	
support	working	memory	by	continuously	 integrating	 incoming	 information	from	multiple	





In	 summary,	 we	 have	 learned	 that	 getting	 immersed	 into	 stories	 and	 simulating	
experiences	 during	 reading	 is	 a	 very	 unique	 cognitive	 process.	 So	 what	 makes	 us	
experience	 stories	 through	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 characters	 or	 and	 as	 a	 silent	 companion?	
Readers	 seem	 to	 have	 a	 set	 of	 reading	modes	 between	which	 they	 select	 depending	 on	











inkt	 op	wit	 papier	 nu	 zulke	 levendige	 voorstellingen	 oproepen?	 En	maakt	 het	 voor	 onze	
voorstelling	 nog	 uit	 hoe	 een	 verhaal	 wordt	 verteld:	 door	 een	 ik-figuur,	 of	 door	 een	
alwetende	verteller?	Een	bekende	theorie	uit	de	cognitieve	wetenschappen	stelt	dat	onze	
hersenen	datgene	kunnen	simuleren	wat	we	lezen.	Volgens	deze	simulatietheorie	kan	onze	
leesbeleving	 dus	 vergelijkbaar	 zijn	 met	 de	 ervaring	 van	 echte	 gebeurtenissen.	 Als	 we	
bijvoorbeeld	lezen	dat	iemand	een	bepaalde	handeling	uitvoert,	dan	worden	die	delen	van	
onze	sensorische	cortex	en	motorcortex	geactiveerd	die	normaal	gesproken	ook	actief	zijn	
als	 we	 deze	 handeling	 zelf	 uitvoeren	 of	 iemand	 erbij	 zien.	 De	 centrale	 vraag	 in	 dit	
proefschrift	 was	 hoe	 het	 vertelperspectief	 de	 simulaties	 die	 we	 ervaren	 bij	 het	 lezen,	
beïnvloedt.	Deze	vraag	heb	ik	in	vier	experimenten	onderzocht.		
In	 hoofdstuk	 2	 beschrijf	 ik	 een	 experiment	 waarin	 ik	 onderzocht	 in	 hoeverre	 het	
vertelperspectief	 onze	 leesbeleving	 beïnvloedt.	 Proefpersonen	 lazen	 korte	 verhalen,	 die	
ofwel	 geschreven	waren	 in	 de	 ik-figuur,	 ofwel	 vanuit	 het	 perspectief	 van	 een	 alwetende	
verteller.	 Terwijl	 de	 proefpersonen	 aan	 het	 lezen	 waren,	 werd	 hun	mate	 van	 opwinding	
gemeten	aan	de	hand	van	huidgeleiding.	Als	we	emoties	ervaren,	krijgen	we	namelijk	een	
hogere	 bloeddruk	 en	 gaan	 we	meer	 zweten,	 waardoor	 de	 huid	 een	 betere	 geleider	 van	
elektriciteit	 wordt.	 Na	 het	 lezen	 van	 elk	 verhaal	 beantwoordden	 de	 proefpersonen	 ook	
vragen	 over	 hun	 leesbeleving.	 De	 resultaten	 lieten	 zien	 dat	 mensen	 meer	 opgaan	 in	
verhalen	 die	 verteld	 worden	 in	 de	 eerste	 persoon	 (ik-figuur).	 Deze	 uitkomst	 is	 niet	
verrassend.	Wél	verrassend	is	dat	er	meer	opwinding	te	zien	was	bij	verhalen	verteld	vanuit	
de	derde	persoon	(alwetende	verteller).	Waarom	dit	het	geval	was,	is	nog	onduidelijk.	
Om	 de	 onderliggende	 hersenprocessen	 beter	 te	 begrijpen,	 heb	 ik	 een	 fMRI-studie	
uitgevoerd	waarin	de	proefpersonen	 luisterden	naar	 verhalen	 geschreven	 in	de	eerste	of	
derde	 persoon.	 Dit	 is	 beschreven	 in	 hoofdstuk	 3.	 Naast	 de	 leesbeleving	 vroeg	 ik	 de	
proefpersonen	 ook	 of	 zij	 zich	 het	 verhaal	 voorstelden	 vanuit	 het	 perspectief	 van	 de	












stellen.	 Proefpersonen	 luisterden	 weer	 naar	 korte	 verhalen	 terwijl	 hun	 hersenactiviteit	
werd	 gemeten	 met	 fMRI.	 Nadat	 ze	 de	 verhalen	 één	 keer	 hadden	 gehoord,	 werden	 de	
verhalen	nog	twee	keer	afgespeeld.	Daarbij	werd	de	proefpersonen	gevraagd	om	zich	het	
verhaal	een	keer	actief	voor	te	stellen	vanuit	het	perspectief	van	de	hoofdpersoon,	en	een	
keer	 van	 de	 getuige.	 Een	 vergelijking	 van	 de	 drie	 luisterrondes	 liet	 zien	 dat	 begrijpend	
luisteren	 en	 actief	 voorstellen	 weliswaar	 wat	 activatie	 in	 dezelfde	 hersengebieden	
oproepen,	maar	dat	de	onderliggende	cognitieve	processen	kwalitatief	anders	zijn.		
Het	was	nog	een	open	vraag	of	de	observatie	dat	mensen	meer	in	een	verhaal	opgaan	
als	 ze	 een	 verhaal	 in	 de	 eerste	 persoon	 lezen,	 alleen	 van	 toepassing	 is	 op	 het	 lezen	 van	
fictie.	 Om	 deze	 vraag	 te	 beantwoorden,	 voerde	 ik	 een	 laatste	 experiment	 uit,	 dat	wordt	
beschreven	 in	hoofdstuk	5.	 In	een	online	experiment	met	meer	dan	2000	proefpersonen	
keek	 ik	 of	 mensen	 een	 verhaal	 anders	 ervaren	 als	 het	 wordt	 gepresenteerd	 als	
waargebeurd	of	als	fictief.	Voordat	ze	het	verhaal	lazen,	zagen	de	proefpersonen	een	korte	
introductie	 met	 informatie	 over	 de	 schrijver	 en	 zijn	 schrijfstijl.	 De	 helft	 van	 de	
proefpersonen	 werd	 verteld	 dat	 de	 schrijver	 een	 columnist	 was	 die	 over	 alledaagse	
situaties	 schrijft	 die	 gebaseerd	 zijn	 op	 waargebeurde	 verhalen.	 De	 andere	 helft	 van	 de	
proefpersonen	 werd	 juist	 verteld	 dat	 de	 schrijver	 fictie	 schrijft,	 geïnspireerd	 door	 zijn	
levendige	 fantasie.	 Net	 zoals	 in	 de	 andere	 experimenten	 in	 dit	 proefschrift	 werden	 de	
verhalen	 gepresenteerd	 in	 de	 eerste	 of	 derde	 persoon,	 en	 beantwoordden	 de	
proefpersonen	 na	 afloop	 vragen	 over	 hun	 leesbeleving.	 De	 resultaten	 bevestigen	 de	




vertelperspectief	 van	 invloed	 is	 op	 onze	 leesbeleving	 van	 fictieve	 teksten,	 individuele	
verschillen	een	nóg	grotere	 invloed	 lijken	 te	hebben.	 Ik	presenteer	ook	een	voorstel	voor	
een	 nieuw	model	 over	 het	 functioneren	 van	 simulatie	 bij	 taalbegrip.	 In	 tegenstelling	 tot	
voorgaande	 modellen,	 neemt	 mijn	 model	 ook	 factoren	 mee	 die	 gevoelig	 zijn	 voor	




model	wordt	 aan	 simulatie	de	 functie	 toegeschreven	dat	het	 informatie	uit	 verschillende	
cognitieve	 domeinen	 omvormt	 tot	 betekenisvolle	 mentale	 beelden,	 aangepast	 aan	 de	
situatie.	 Zo	 kan	 het	model	 verklaren	 hoe	 nieuwe	 informatie	 uit	 volgende	 zinnen	 in	 de	 al	
bekende	 informatie	 geïntegreerd	 kan	 worden.	 Het	 model	 neemt	 aan	 dat	 simulatie	 het	





Samenvattend	 kunnen	 we	 zeggen	 dat	 het	 beleven	 van	 verhalen	 een	 uniek	 cognitief	
proces	 is.	Maar	wat	bepaalt	 nu	of	we	ons	 een	 verhaal	 voorstellen	 vanuit	 het	perspectief	
van	de	hoofdpersoon	of	de	getuige?	Lezers	lijken	meerdere	manieren	van	lezen	te	hebben,	









Wenn	wir	Bücher	 lesen,	 tauchen	wir	oft	 völlig	ein	 in	 fantastische	Welten	und	erleben	
Abenteuer	die	 sich	beinahe	echt	anfühlen.	Manchmal	kommt	es	einem	fast	 so	vor	als	ob	
man	 die	 Geschichte	 direkt	 durch	 die	 Augen	 des	 Protagonisten	 erlebt.	 Andere	 male	
wiederum,	ist	man	eher	ein	stiller	Augenzeuge	zu	den	Geschehnissen	der	Geschichte.	Aber	
wie	 kommt	es,	 dass	 aus	 etwas	 so	banalem	wie	 schwarzer	 Tinte	 auf	weißem	Papier	 solch	
lebendige	Vorstellungen	in	unserem	Geist	entstehen?	Und	inwiefern	verändert	sich	dieses	
Erlebnis	 in	 Abhängigkeit	 davon	 wie	 eine	 Geschichte	 erzählt	 wird?	 Wird	 unsere	
Leseerfahrung	davon	beeinflusst	ob	die	Geschichte	durch	einen	der	Charaktere	oder	einem	
allwissenden	 Erzähler	 präsentiert	 wird?	 Eine	 weitverbreitete	 Theorie	 in	 den	
Kognitionswissenschaften	geht	davon	aus,	dass	unsere	Gehirne	den	Bedeutungsinhalt	von	
Sprache	während	des	Verstehens	nachsimulieren	um	Erfahrungen	nachzuahmen,	die	dem	
echten	 Erleben	 ähnlich	 sind.	 	 Wenn	 wir	 beispielsweise	 über	 Handlungen	 lesen,	 werden	
Gehirnareale	 des	 Motorkortexes	 aktiv,	 die	 auch	 aktiviert	 werden,	 wenn	 wir	 dieselbe	
Handlung	 ausführen	 oder	 jemanden	 bei	 dieser	 Handlung	 beobachten.	 Diese	 sogenannte	




In	 Kapitel	 2	 stelle	 ich	 ein	 Experiment	 vor,	 indem	 ich	 getestet	 habe	 inwiefern	
Erzählperspektive	 die	 Leseerfahrung	 beeinflusst.	 Das	 Experiment	 bestand	 daraus,	 dass	
Versuchspersonen	kurze	 literarische	Geschichten	 lasen,	die	entweder	aus	der	Perspektive	




was	 als	 plötzlicher	 Kurvenanstieg	 sichtbar	wird.	Die	 Ergebnisse	 zeigen,	 dass	 Leser	 stärker	
mitfiebern	 bei	 Geschichten,	 die	 aus	 der	 ersten	 Person	 geschrieben	 sind,	 jedoch	 stärkere	




eine	 Studie	 mit	 funktionaler	 Magnetresonanztomographie	 (fMRT)	 durchgeführt,	 in	 der	
Versuchspersonen	 während	 der	 Messung	 literarische	 Geschichten	 aus	 der	 ersten	 und	
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dritten	Person	 gehört	 haben.	 Zusätzlich	 zu	den	 Fragen	nach	der	 Leseerfahrung,	wurde	 in	
diesem	Experiment	 auch	direkt	 danach	 gefragt,	 ob	 sich	 die	Versuchsperson	während	des	
Hörens,	 Situationen	 in	 der	 Geschichte	 von	 der	 Perspektive	 des	 Protagonisten	 oder	 vom	
Standpunkt	 eines	 Augenzeugens	 vorgestellt	 hat.	 In	 den	 Ergebnissen	 wird	 deutlich,	 dass	
Leser	 starke	 Präferenzen	 für	 die	 Perspektive	 haben	 von	 der	 aus	 sie	 sich	 die	 Geschichte	
vorstellen.	 Diese	 ist	 weitestgehend	 unabhängig	 davon,	 von	 welcher	 Perspektive	 aus	 die	
Geschichte	erzählt	wird.	Einige	 Leser	gaben	 sogar	an,	 sich	die	Geschichte	gleichzeitig	 von	
der	 Perspektive	 des	 Protagonisten	 und	 der	 Perspektive	 eines	 Augenzeugen	 aus	
vorzustellen.		
In	 Kapitel	 4	 stelle	 ich	 eine	 Studie	 von,	 in	 der	 ich	 untersucht	 habe	 inwiefern	 die	
Aktivierungsmuster	 während	 des	 Sprachverstehens	 tatsächlich	 den	 Aktivierungsmustern	
während	 sich	 Versuchspersonen	 bewusst	 vorstellen	 etwas	 zu	 erleben	 ähneln.	Wie	 in	 der	
vorherigen	 Studie,	 haben	 Versuchspersonen	 Geschichten	 gehört,	 während	 ihre	
Gehirnaktivität	 mit	 fMRT	 gemessen	 wurde.	 Nach	 dem	 ersten	 hören,	 wurden	 dieselben	
Geschichten	 noch	 zwei	 weitere	 Male	 präsentiert.	 Hierbei	 wurde	 die	 Versuchsperson	
instruiert,	sich	aktiv	vorzustellen	die	Geschichte	so	wie	der	Protagonist	zu	erleben	oder	sich	
genau	vorzustellen	wie	es	wäre	den	Protagonisten	bei	seinen	Handlungen	zu	beobachten.	
Ein	 Vergleich	 der	 Aktivierungsmuster	 während	 der	 drei	 Hördurchgänge	 zeigt,	 dass	 außer	
wenigen	 Gemeinsamkeiten,	 Sprachverstehen	 und	 sich	 vorstellen	 etwas	 zu	 erleben	
qualitative	unterschiedliche	kognitive	Prozesse	zugrunde	liegen.		
Im	letzten	Experiment	dieser	Dissertation,	habe	ich	mich	der	Frage	gewidmet	ob	Effekte	
von	 Erzählperspektive	 und	 persönlicher	 Vorliebe	 für	 Perspektive	 spezifisch	 für	 das	 Lesen	
von	Literatur	sind.	In	einer	Interstudie	mit	mehr	als	2000	Teilnehmern	habe	ich	getestet	ob	
Geschichten	anders	erlebt	werden,	wenn	der	Leser	glaubt	die	Geschichte	ist	frei	erfunden	
oder	 beruht	 auf	 wahren	 Tatsachen.	 Bevor	 die	 Teilnehmer	 die	 Geschichte	 präsentiert	




Charaktere	 und	 Situationen	 erfindet.	 Wie	 in	 den	 anderen	 Experimenten	 in	 dieser	
Dissertation,	konnten	die	Geschichten	entweder	aus	der	ersten	oder	dritten	Person	erzählt	
sein.	 Nach	 dem	 Lesen,	 wurden	 Fragen	 nach	 der	 Leseerfahrung	 gestellt	 und	 ob	 sich	 der	
Leser	 die	 Geschichte	 aus	 der	 Perspektive	 des	 Protagonisten	 oder	 eines	 Augenzeugens	





Im	 letzten	 Kapitel	 fasse	 ich	 zusammen,	 dass	 die	 Resultate	 aus	 den	 4	 Experimenten	
bestätigen,	 dass	 die	 Art	 und	Weise	 wie	 eine	 Geschichte	 erzählt	 wird,	 die	 Leseerfahrung	
beeinflussen	kann.	Jedoch	wurde	deutlich,	dass	persönliche	Vorlieben	ein	wichtiger	Faktor	
für	 das	 Erleben	 von	 Geschichten	 sind.	 Außerdem	 stelle	 ich	 ein	 neues	 Modell	 für	 die	
Funktion	 von	 Simulation	 während	 des	 Sprachverstehens	 vor.	 Anders	 als	 bei	
Vorgängermodellen,	 nimmt	 das	 neue	 Modell	 Faktoren	 wie	 Unterschiede	 zwischen	
Personen	sowie	jeweiligen	Situationen	mit	in	Bezug	(siehe	Abbildung	18	auf	Seite	165)	und	
kann	 dadurch	 ein	 wesentlich	 größeres	 Spektrum	 von	 natürlicher	 Varianz	 erklären	 was	
bisher	zu	Kontroversen	geführt	hat.	Das	Modell	nimmt	an,	dass	die	Funktion	von	Simulation	
im	Sprachverstehen	daraus	besteht,	 Information	aus	verschieden	kognitiven	Bereichen	 zu	
bedeutungsvollem	mentalen	Wissen	oder	Bildern	 zu	 formen,	 die	 der	 jeweiligen	 Situation	
angepasst	sind.	Damit	kann	es	die	Eigenschaften	des	Sprachverstehen	über	die	Einheit	des	
einzelnen	Satzes	hinaus	erklären.	Es	wird	angenommen,	dass	Simulation	ein	Mechanismus	
des	 Arbeitsgedächtnisses	 ist,	 dessen	 Aufgabe	 es	 ist,	 kontinuierlich	 neue	 Information	 aus	
verschieden	Bereichen	 in	bereits	bestehende	Vorstellungen	 zu	 integrieren	um	benötigten	
Arbeitsspeicher	 zu	 reduzieren	 und	 zusammengehörige	 Information	 als	 Gesamtheit	




ob	 wir	 eine	 Geschichte	 durch	 die	 Augen	 des	 Protagonisten	 oder	 als	 stiller	 Augenzeuge	
erleben?	 Es	 scheint	 als	 hätten	 Leser	 eine	 Reihe	 von	 Verschieden	 Lesemethoden	 zur	
Verfügung	 zwischen	 denen	 sie	 sich	 nach	 Lust	 und	 Laune	 oder	 auch	 Ziel	 des	 Lesens	
entscheiden	könnten.	Während	die	Erzählweise	für	das	Erleben	von	Geschichten	nicht	völlig	
unwichtig	 erscheint,	 ist	 es	 wahrscheinlich,	 dass	 persönliche	 Vorlieben	 eine	 wesentlich	
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